



Charles Francis Murphy at Tammany Hall

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Charles Francis Murphy,
1858-1924:
*Respectability and Responsibility
in Tammany Politics*

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TO
ARTHUR MANN

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Introduction

Charles Francis Murphy was a "marginal man."¹ Like many turn-of-the-century political leaders, he was a product of an immigrant culture. His people had one root firmly in the Old Country, and another somewhat more hesitantly in the East Side of New York City. The limbo of confused national loyalties and cultures gave the Charles Murphys their chance to move up in the world; men capable of bridging the gap between old and new became the acknowledged leaders of these easily manipulated constituencies.

But any citizen who knew his Americana looked askance at the Charles Murphys; for, in the blueprint sketched by America's Founding Fathers, early theorists, and observers, there was no place for the Gas House boy's kind. Making no provision for political parties, these writers envisaged widespread, informed, interested popular participation in the business of governing. Moreover, ethnic appeals were anathema to the men of the Enlightenment, for whom the New World was a melting pot producing a homogeneous, virtuous, talented breed of men. And so a political boss, who calculated his power on the basis of immigrant separateness and whose every action interfered with clean representative government, met with little favor among "upright citizens."

If the world of the boss was an aberration in American society, Tammany Hall was the worst aberration of all. Connoting mystery, graft, and backroom politics, the name alone has developed into a broad symbol of the evils lurking in American cities. ("In the American political lexicon Tammany Hall and municipal misgovernment are interchangeable terms."²) The Tammany myth quickly overshadowed the individuals without whom there would have been no Tammany. As a consequence—and at the same time a cause—of the myth's influence, the literature about the Hall is

mostly about the machine, or the system of bosses, but not about the bosses themselves.

Murphy has the reputation of being the greatest of all Tammany bosses, and anyone would agree that he led the Hall during a crucial period not only for Tammany but for the nation as a whole. His rule coincided roughly with the Progressive Era and the immigrant thrust for political power on a national level. Yet he has not received the scholarly attention he deserves. Although their observations of the American political scene include much that can be said in a general way of the Tammany system, foreigners Ostrogorski and Bryce wrote too early to include "Mr." Murphy himself. The chief Tammany histories by Myers and Werner (and even those by Stebbins and Franklin) are campaign polemics against the Hall, concentrating on the graft of the machine and missing the opportunity to evaluate the efforts and personality of Murphy the man. The most recent, most objective study of the machine in the Murphy era is Zink's brief chapter, which makes some tentative beginnings but is hardly sufficient.* That the best chronological accounts of the Hall should have appeared as derogatory campaign literature is fairly easy to understand; Tammany's partisans were the poor masses of immigrants, who had few real friends among the literate, established middle and upper classes. It is reasonable to conclude, then, that an honest, scholarly study of the Hall and its bosses would probably have found only a very limited sympathetic market.

Magazine literature, which is relatively scarce, is of little help in filling the gap left by books. The researcher, then, must rely on the first-hand report. Reminiscences recorded through the Columbia University Oral History Project are an indispensable guide. Among traditional written materials only the newspaper coverage is excellent; the Edwin P. Kilroe Collection of Tammaniana, also housed in the Columbia University Library, provides a useful source for piecing together the puzzle.

Reconstructing Charlie Murphy means building completely from the outside. Contemporary observers—friends or journalists—agree

* Alfred Connable and Edward Silberfarb's *Tigers of Tammany: Nine Men Who Ran New York* (New York, 1967), which includes an interesting chapter on Murphy, was published when this book was already in proof.

on the facts of what he did, but what he did does not furnish all that history needs to know. If history were merely a product of interacting forces, then a historical narrative could assume the existence of faceless personalities, obscured by and contributing little to the course of events. But men make history, and their values, aspirations, and personal styles determine the events which unfold.

Even his closest friends were unable to explain the motivations of Charles Murphy. For them, and for future generations, he left few concrete clues as to aims. Ed Flynn, one of his protégés and a political power in his own right, resorted to autobiography to record his own personal experiences, ideas, and hopes.³ Tammany district leader George Washington Plunkitt's lectures at the courthouse bootblack stand have been preserved as a "compleat primer" for practical politicians.⁴ Accusations levelled at Murphy charged, probably unfairly, that he had little command of the written word.⁵ In any case, he left no records and no formal speeches, and he granted no interviews of consequence. No letters survive, and it is unlikely that they ever existed. Tammany politics was a man-to-man proposition; negotiations were carried on in person or through intermediaries. The scope of activity and the availability of the telephone made written communication unnecessary.

This lack of personal evidence means that the historian can see Charlie Murphy only through the eyes of those who knew him. Is it fair to rely on impressions superimposed on the public record? Certainly, the risk involved is eminently worth taking. Any biography mixes speculation or inference with the uneven evidence available to the researcher. Even the historian confronted with reams of personal manuscripts faces the task of judging the relative truth of his subject's stated motives. In Murphy's case, an individual flavor and personality have survived. Through a synthesis of reports from those who hated him and those who admired him, a distinctive Murphy style emerges.

Four years after Murphy's death, the author of one of the few useful magazine articles about him observed, "... no life of him has been or is likely to be written, for lack of the dramatic and intimate material which makes biographies. He will not get even a footnote in history."⁶ Believing that Murphy's uniqueness is well

suited to biographical study, however, this monograph attempts to resurrect the man and to capture his style—to paint a man who played the game, but with a difference. It is also presented with the purpose of documenting Murphy's movement to the left in the 1910's—a swing which carried Tammany Hall along with him. In other words, the Progressive Era saw the curious spectacle of the New York County Democracy lining up—somewhat tentatively, to be sure—on the side of reform. An awareness of this phenomenon is essential to understanding how men like Al Smith, Robert Wagner, James Foley, and Jeremiah Mahoney came out of Tammany Hall. Moreover, it is only through a serious evaluation of the men within the system that the validity of the amorphous Tammany legend can reasonably be assessed.

I have lived in this city all of my life; my neighbors know me. It is the fate of political leaders to be reviled. If one is too thin-skinned to stand it, he should never take the job. History shows the better and more successful the organization and the leader, the more bitter the attacks. Success is always a target.

The character of an organization may be judged by the confidence reposed in it by the people. There has never been a time in 133 years of its existence when there has not been talk of the finish of Tammany; but the organization continues to carry on, while it has lived to see scores of political factions come up and fade away.

When Tammany can elect its candidate so often in a city of 6,000,000 inhabitants, in a city of intelligence, in a city dotted all over by the church spire and the school house, it seems silly to use the time-worn campaign cry that there is nothing good but everything corrupt in Tammany.

Charles Francis Murphy, 1922

Quoted in New York
World, April 26, 1924,
Edwin P. Kilroe Collection.

The Gas House District: Early Years

"Don't tell the Mrs. I was so sick," Murphy begged his hastily-summoned doctor.¹ And then, early in the morning of April 25, 1924, the Tammany Sachem succumbed to acute indigestion at his East Seventeenth Street home.

Three days later, his funeral mass was sung in Saint Patrick's Cathedral, which, like the Hall's leader, had nearly completed its sixty-sixth year. All weekend long a continuous stream of mourners from every walk of life had filtered into the Murphys' "somewhat unpretentious" East Side brownstone;² on Monday morning, the silk-hatted dignitaries filing somberly out of the Cathedral struck a curious contrast to the thousands of ordinary citizens lining Fifth Avenue. The newspapers estimated that the crowds exceeded 50,000; surely, many stopped out of fascination with the unfolding spectacle, but most of the silent watchers were there to pay their respects to "Mr." Murphy. How many of them paused to wonder at the paradox: a man who never held elective office was being mourned by every top public official in New York and by many important political figures throughout the country; a city was quietly grieving for one who, during nearly a quarter of a century, had directed its most widely criticized institution.

New York's tribute, fitting for any mayor or governor, honored a man who governed by indirection, a man who had learned his trade in saloons, on baseball fields, and on gaslit street corners. He developed, at first, in a pattern followed by almost any man who claimed a place in the Tammany Hall system. Coming out of one of the worst sections of the city and gaining his political background within one of the most corrupt machines in the nation, Murphy was a curious misfit in his drive for power rooted in respectability. He broke so clearly with the traditional evils typical of the system that fellow citizens could forget—at least momen-

tarily—their distrust and dislike of the machine, and think only of Charles Francis Murphy.

Ireland on the East Side

Murphy was born in a Gas House tenement on June 20, 1858.³ The year 1858 also saw the laying of the Atlantic Cable and the setting of the cornerstone for the new Saint Patrick's Cathedral on Fifth Avenue, but these events had little if any impact on the humble Murphy family. Very little is known of their daily life, so that it is impossible to recreate more than a sketchy framework of the Tammany leader's boyhood. His father, referred to in later accounts as John M. or Dennis Murphy, was of Irish tenant farmer stock. A native of County Kildare, he had emigrated in 1848.⁴ The mother, Mary Prendergrass (or Prendergrast) Murphy, was also a native of the Old Country. The Murphys were devout communicants at the Roman Catholic Church of the Epiphany on Twenty-second Street. Young Charlie attended local public schools until the age of fourteen, when he abandoned formal education and decided to try his luck at a job in the wire factories and as a part-time handyman in Barney Curtin's saloon. Though sources fail to reveal his motives, his choice was probably based on the necessity of helping to support a large family (he was the second of nine children), coupled with a lack of interest in schooling. Before long, he left the wire factory and established himself as a caulker in Roach's shipyard at Ninth Street along the East River, where he came into contact with many of the young men who would later form the core of his political support. The survival of the fittest was the rule at the shipyard, and Murphy was well-suited for survival.

But these jobs offered little to a restless, ambitious young man, and in 1875 he landed a position as driver of a crosstown Blue Line horsecar. His route nearly covered lower Manhattan; the car line ran "from the Twenty-third Street ferry down Avenue A, across Eighteenth Street, down Broadway and across Fourteenth Street to the Hoboken Ferry."⁵ The boy, armed with tin lunch pail delivered daily by his brother, became a familiar figure to crosstown commuters. Popular legend has it that Murphy had a singular way with stubborn horses. When the animal balked, he quietly removed

the bridle, replaced it, and shouted to the horse to move on. The unsuspecting animal, assuming that his tack had been removed at the end of the run, invariably moved.⁶

In the following year Murphy the horsecar driver bloomed as Murphy the athlete. He organized fellow members of the "Gas House Gang" into two baseball teams, the Senators and the Sylvans. A year later the sandlot catcher led his triumphant nines on a tour of the state, drawing much attention as well as offers from professional baseball clubs. But his plans lay elsewhere, and baseball remained an avocation. By 1880 the Sylvans, a social organization for boys from fifteen to twenty, were housed in second-floor clubrooms at Nineteenth Street and Avenue A, where, with an investment of \$500, Murphy opened a small street-level saloon.

The saloon was once a key factor in American political history. The men who gravitated regularly to the local bar established a feeling of kinship with the proprietor. For the Irishman the saloon was a taste of the Old Country; he came for drink, fellowship, and the sense of social belonging that was so often missing for new immigrants. With power easily built on friendships and solidarity, the liquor-vender was a force to reckon with in political life.


"Charlie's Place," as some reports claim it was known, was a typical lower-class establishment catering to dock and gas workers, local politicians, and minor clerks and small businessmen.⁷ For five cents Murphy offered a glass of beer and a cup of soup. The saloon's distinguishing feature was its ban against profanity and women. Like the smartest politician-saloon keepers, Murphy himself drank only occasionally. As fellow Sachem George W. Plunkitt put it, "The men who sit in the executive committee room at Tammany Hall and direct things are men who celebrate on apollinaris or vichy."⁸ But Murphy was always on hand behind the bar, impassive and sharp-eyed, to serve patrons and to keep order in the place. He later acquired enough capital to open three more saloons. The fourth, at Twentieth Street and Second Avenue, became the headquarters of the Anawanda Club, which was the local district organization.⁹

The men who clustered in Murphy's saloons were, like the proprietor himself, Gas House people. Poor workingmen often stopped by after a day's toil in the gas plants or the lumberyards

and shipyards along the East River. After 1842, when the first gas house sprang up at the foot of East Twenty-first Street, that district took its name from the massive tanks dotting its surface. "Their tracery of iron, against an occasional clear lemon-green sky at sunrise," Lewis Mumford wrote, "was one of the most pleasant aesthetic elements in the new order."¹⁰ For the humble tenement dwellers, however, life was anything but "pleasant" and "aesthetic." Physically, they endured nearly slumlike conditions; "Gas, leaking from the tanks, made the neighborhood a pesthole."¹¹ They also had to contend with gangs running wild over empty lots and through tenements.¹²

The Gas House shared the Eighteenth Assembly District with a two-by-four-block area known as Stuyvesant Square.¹³ Bordering the East River, the former ran west to First Avenue between Fourteenth and Eighteenth Streets, to Third Avenue between Eighteenth and Twenty-third, and over one block to Fourth from Twenty-third to its northern boundary at Twenty-seventh.¹⁴ Stuyvesant Square filled in the southwest corner from Fourteenth Street on the south to Eighteenth on the north, and from First Avenue west to Third.¹⁵ By the time Charlie Murphy became boss of Tammany Hall, he had moved from his Gas House home to 305 East Seventeenth Street, at the Stuyvesant Square District's Third Avenue boundary, just south of Gramercy Park. This section of the assembly district housed political leaders, prize fighters, professional men, industrialists, and lawyers; among the many fine residences stood Saint George's Protestant Episcopal Church, known familiarly as J. P. Morgan's Church.¹⁶

Just before Murphy took the leadership of Tammany Hall, his own district numbered 45,197 men and women (divided about equally between the two sexes). The 1900 census listed 17,330 foreign-born, but of the 27,867 natives, 19,659 were children of immigrants.¹⁷ Divided into 9,877 families, these people crowded into 1,839 buildings, illustrating the tenement-dwelling character of life in the Gas House. Racial homogeneity (the white majority was sprinkled with just a handful of other races—eighty-six Negroes, seventy-two Chinese, two Indians, and one Japanese) could not cover up ethnic diversity. The fact that 38.3 percent of the Eighteenth District's total population was foreign-born, with another



43.5 percent only first-generation American, was symptomatic of a phenomenon which, for over half a century, had radically altered the complexion of cities throughout the United States.

That phenomenon made the New York of the Lower East Side distinctive. Built from teeming, dirty, multinational, poverty-stricken blocks, this New York—unique in urban America with the exception of Boston, which hosted a great Irish influx in the early part of the century—bore the weight of the immigration explosion of the nineteenth century.

In the eighteenth century J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur foresaw an America arising from a “mixture of English, Scotch, Irish, French, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes”; these Europeans, he believed, would migrate to the New World, shed their old values and habits, and join in the forging of that “new man,” the American.¹⁸ Indeed, nearly all eighteenth-century philosophers of the American Creed welcomed newcomers; believing that America was still in the process of becoming, they optimistically encouraged diversity and shared with Crèvecoeur the faith that a new breed would emerge, conditioned in values and attitudes by the fresh environment and the reign of liberty and equality.

But this theory does not describe what was happening in Charlie Murphy’s assembly district, nor in all Manhattan. Irish and Germans elbowed each other aside to find room to live in the tumultuous East Side. As the ships from abroad unloaded their steerage cargo of human beings, those who survived were dumped into the rapidly growing tenement district east of the Bowery. Many migrated further—not only within the city, but westward, where the promise of land signalled peace and freedom. But thousands stayed, out of inertia, or poverty, or fear—or because they actually liked the fast-moving city—and swelled the ranks of New York’s foreign-born.

Under pressures of famine, religious persecution, and the necessity of acting according to the dictates of others, many immigrants had simply fled from the Old Country. Not travel literature or political principle, but hope, fear, and unhappiness drove them from their native lands. Sometimes there were easily cited causes, like the potato famine of 1846, which sent Irish hordes streaming across the sea. Popular belief has it that the German influx of the

1850's was a direct result of political persecution and, more specifically, a reaction to the revolutions of 1848. But the theories do not fit the facts for the majority of German immigrants, who came from areas other than those most seriously beset by political disturbances.¹⁹ All they asked was the opportunity to pursue unfettered commercial and personal lives—to buy and sell and make profits, to think and worship as they wished. And the idea current in Europe was that the enigma known as America offered such opportunities. So they came. Comparatively few among the Irish and Germans chose to come because they liked American democratic principles; escape seemed the only way to preserve their self-identity and livelihood.

When Charlie Murphy was born, the Irish led all nationalities in number of immigrants per year and in number of foreign-born in the United States. In 1855 the six wards comprising the heart of the Lower East Side (bounded on the north by Twenty-sixth Street, on the west by the Bowery and Fourth Avenue, and on the east and south by the river) included 128,385 foreign-born, nearly 54 percent of the East Side's total population.²⁰ With their American-born children they outnumbered natives in those wards by nearly three to one. One-fourth of the area was Irish, and more than one-fifth German. True to Crèvecoeur's prediction, they found brothers from England, Scotland, Wales, France, Belgium, Holland, Prussia, Austria, Switzerland, Russia, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Poland, Norway, Sweden, Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Newfoundland, the West Indies, Mexico, and South America.²¹ Clearly, whether or not they mixed, the elements of the melting pot were present in profusion.

Certainly some of the nineteenth-century immigrants were educated and comparatively well-to-do, but these did not choose to settle on the Lower East Side. Those who did were generally poor laborers or domestics, although there was a strong prejudice in New York against hiring the Irish, whom natives considered loud, brash, and dedicated to drink. Their alternative was to continue to serve their own people as craftsmen, storekeepers, clergymen, and the like; nothing was quite so reassuring as to buy homemade sauerbraten from a German storekeeper, or to send for a poor Irish teacher to keep the ways of the Old Country alive for

the second generation. And so there developed closely-knit ethnic communities, clinging to memories and customs from their native lands to help them adjust to the strangeness and loneliness of the New World.

Straining to cope with the life of the Lower East Side, the immigrant imagination could scarcely conceive of yet another New York. This was the New York of Fifth Avenue, Riverside Drive, and Broadway, a "vertical city" bursting with new skyscrapers, fine shops, and multimillionaires' palaces.²² The city, typifying the nation and yet unlike any other part of it, was in the midst of social and economic change previously unknown in the brief history of the Republic.

In the forefront of the new New York were the social set with their standards of dignified opulence. While immigrant life revolved around a corner saloon, the world of the *élite* centered in Park Avenue's Waldorf-Astoria. Commercial success blessed many and found its expression in a total rejection of simplicity in attire, dwellings, and social mannerisms, and in a new attention to things of culture. But men of financial and social standing had little or nothing to do with city government. Municipal administration belonged to tough, selfish, socially disreputable ward politicians. For most capable, qualified New Yorkers, civic responsibility meant no more than protecting their own increased financial opportunities.

Certainly, there were exceptions. Men of the caliber of Theodore Roosevelt, Henry L. Stimson, Herbert Parsons, and Elihu Root were seriously active in city politics in the 1890's. Some men, shying away from the actual party machinery, joined patrician good government clubs aimed at reforming municipal administration. A few chose the more effective method of attacking the leadership from within the organization.²³ As Stimson's biographer explains it, a host of "good men," with equally "good names"—like Tucker, Cutting, Wickersham, Root, Choate, Roosevelt, Evarts, Parsons, Swayne, Bliss, Jerome, De Forest, Schieffelin, Carter, Burlingham, Taft, Schwab, Hewitt, and Low—made first-rate contributions to New York City's political life as "aldermen, members of city commissions, mayors, councilmen and chairmen of county committees."²⁴

Despite this activity, however, the fact remains that two men—Republican boss Thomas Collier Platt and Tammany leader Richard Croker—really ruled New York at the end of the nineteenth century. And, because of traditionally heavy Democratic majorities, power in fact rested in the thirty-five-member Croker-dominated Democratic Executive Committee. This meant that the city operated according to the wishes of a liberal assortment of gamblers, ex-prize fighters, and outright criminals.²⁵ Not even their law-observing colleagues on the committee seemed qualified intellectually or professionally to govern a metropolis as complex as New York. Croker's men readily followed the boss's maxim: "As he himself often said, he was in politics for what he could get out of it."²⁶ This attitude—exploiting the public, but behind closed doors whenever practical—typified the approach of most of Tammany's nineteenth-century leaders. But it hardly explains the full meaning of Tammany Hall, and it fails to do justice to its historical purposes.

Government by Machine

The Society of Saint Tammany, or the Columbian Order, was founded in 1789 as a patriotic, benevolent organization. During much of its early existence it confined its activities to purely social functions. Among its most notable eighteenth-century feats was the conciliation of representatives of some Indian tribes who journeyed to New York to meet with the new national government.²⁷ Led by colorful sachems and a Sagamore and a Wiskinski, the Society early focused its efforts on "the promotion and maintenance of republican principles," and the politicization of Tammany was underway.²⁸ The Society was nationalistic and democratic; the mobilization of those purporting to be the sons of the American Indian chief was in part a reaction against "the foreign ties of the societies of St. George and St. David . . . or the aristocratic airs of the Sons of the Cincinnati."²⁹ Its early predilections were anti-Federalist; the Jeffersonians, after all, stood for France and for Irish revolt against England. Tammany Hall was simply an edifice, but the Society, the Hall, and the Democratic Party of the City of New York soon became indistinguishably intertwined in activities and supporters. After 1871, however, when the assembly district

replaced the ward as the basic unit of representation, and state election laws regulating party control developed, the Society and the party machinery were again separated. The two continued to share leaders, but the Hall came into prominence as the official organ of party government while the Society reverted to its original patriotic and fraternal status.³⁰

To talk of government by Tammany Hall is to talk of the Democratic machine, for only in terms of machine politics can the singular role of Tammany be explained and understood. The machine is the party organization. In New York City it rests comfortably on a pyramid of organization "regulars." The grass-roots unit of party politics is the election district committee, led by a captain appointed by the assembly district leader. Many election districts make up one assembly district, whose elected leader sits on the Executive Committee of Tammany Hall, or the New York County Executive Committee. The latter, which in turn elects the leader of the County Democracy, is the real governing body, since the Hall's General Committee, numbering thousands of members chosen by the assembly districts, is clearly unwieldy.³¹

The system of government by committee originated in the early nineteenth century, when the electorate grew from the extended franchise and the waves of immigration. "To get out the larger vote and designate candidates for office, party managers perfected the rudimentary machinery that had previously existed."³² Graft, practiced by the new governing class which had overwhelmed the gentry, fed on urban physical expansion. The machine's development would have shocked the Founding Fathers. First, it meant blatant interference with the democratic process; democracy stood for free selection of duly constituted leaders who would execute the will of the electorate, but it had no room for middlemen. Also, government by the spoils system, instead of by reasoned deliberation over the public good, openly contradicted the nation's early principles.

But Tammany prospered, above all as a working-class, heavily immigrant machine. Its bosses, mainly second-generation Irishmen after mid-century, had a special appeal to new immigrants through ties of language, custom, and religion. Newcomers communicated readily with sons of earlier immigrants and looked to

them as successful conquerors of the gap between the old and new cultures. They served as symbols of pride, belonging to the old and yet worthy of awe because of their Americanization, which the newcomers hoped to imitate. For these reasons the bosses won their votes.

Ideas of rank, inherited from experience with European authority, cemented the link between immigrants and bosses. Clericalism and the hurdle of migration set their attitude toward established leadership. Political equality, foreign to their ideas of a status hierarchy, made them bewildered voters; a figure who imposed his authority and manipulated those votes was only natural. The machine smoothed the immigrants' adjustment to representative government, which was unfamiliar to them—and the boss mediated between the unknowing immigrants and the law.³³

What do people want out of politics? "Jobs . . . recognition and prestige and the advancement of group interests," answer Glazer and Moynihan.³⁴ The machine's success resulted from its ability to satisfy in concrete terms exactly what immigrants and poor natives asked of politics. It not only helped them in their unfamiliarity with the democratic process, but more important, it also dispensed social welfare. Aside from his ethnic affiliations, the boss's special attraction was patronage. He cultivated the immigrant population by tailoring politics to its needs, and this attention paid political dividends.

More specifically, George Washington Plunkitt, leader of the Fifteenth Assembly District, offered a concise formula for the successful politician. To hold a district, he said, go among the people and study human nature; personal contact and favors, not political platforms, win votes. Baseball and glee club invitations meant that the beneficiaries would be

workin' for my ticket at the polls next election day. . . . I rope them all in by givin' them opportunities to show themselves off. I don't trouble them with political arguments. I just study human nature and act accordin'.³⁵

As any master politician knows, aid for fire victims or needy families is

philanthropy, but it's politics, too — mighty good politics. . . . The consequence is that the poor look up to George W. Plunkitt as a father, come to him in trouble — and don't forget him on election day.³⁶

Jobs found, loans granted, commemorative statues erected, wakes and weddings attended—these were the basis of the power of an effective political boss. No less important was the speech in Yiddish to the Jewish group or the wearing of a green carnation on Saint Patrick's Day.

Machine manipulation of the immigrant vote incurred strong native disapproval; it was denounced as the source of corruption and a variety of evils. According to Lincoln Steffens, "educated citizens . . . believed . . . that it was the ignorant foreign riff-raff of the big congested towns that made municipal politics so bad."³⁷ However, by the time the capable citizenry had become alert to the perils of government by machine, the "new breed" of politicians was so firmly entrenched as to make their protests futile. A confused, self-conscious, low-economic-bracket immigrant constituency was in no position to object to underhanded dealings, so vice and dishonesty ruled. The means were inconsequential for the immigrants as long as the jobs and handouts continued. On the positive side, the machine helped the acculturation of the immigrants. Probably no other institution in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was prepared to give them so much attention, get jobs for them, and cope with their problems. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the machines also hindered adjustment. They capitalized on differences among immigrants and reinforced their separateness. The graft and corruption they spread tainted the political system with which the immigrants would have to deal.

That immigrants were in no position to fight the machine can easily explain Tammany's success on the Lower East Side. Similarly, the characteristics attributed to immigrants might hold equally well for poor, uneducated native Americans. But how can one account for Tammany's power when the Manhattan of Broadway and Fifth Avenue flourished? The only logical answer is that the wealthy, educated class abdicated its natural responsibility to govern, out of apathy or out of fear. Both were likely. Party organization, at the outset, was messy work. Apathy stemmed from the absorption of the wealthy in cultural and social activities and in commercial enterprise.³⁸ Fear included an element of disdain; most proper New Yorkers wanted no part of the teeming immigrant

masses. But governing the city in the nineteenth century meant facing squarely the challenge and problems of the newcomers. And it was this clear failure that gave the new breed of professional politicians, eager and willing to deal with the immigrants, easy access to power.

District Leader with a Difference

From time to time the anti-machine elements paused to look seriously at the kind of government in power and expressed their dismay in legal investigations and condemnations. Charles Francis Murphy represented the Eighteenth Assembly District on the County Executive Committee during such a decade, when city officials and public-spirited citizens were exposing and denouncing what they considered to be his brand of politics. The Lexow Committee investigation made headlines in the 1890's when Police Captain Max Schmittberger took the stand and explained in full detail the incredible system of police sanctions for crime. Gambling houses, saloons, and brothels operated under the watchful eye of the police force; this legal protection stemmed, very simply, from wholesale bribery.³⁹ And, perhaps less surprising, the law officers took their orders (as well as payoffs) from local politicians.

But what those who were quick to accuse neglected to notice was that not every politician fit into the image projected by the Lexow Committee. One obvious exception was Charles Francis Murphy. The leader of the Eighteenth followed many traditional routes in gaining power, and used a host of standardized methods in keeping it, but he drew a stiff line at crime. Crime, to him, was inseparable from immorality. Unknown to those who knew him only vaguely, the East Side saloon keeper was a thoroughgoing puritan. As Tammany crony James W. Gerard put it, "I would have just as soon thought of telling an off-color story to a lady as I would to Murphy."⁴⁰

How, in a world apparently ruled by the fast dollar and the underhanded deal, could a man of honest moral principles ever rise to power within an organization like Tammany Hall? Slowly and carefully, Murphy developed a solid reputation and a following which lifted him, just as methodically, to the head of the Demo-

cracy's Executive Committee. He knew instinctively that the world of the Gas House was unique in its ethic of survival. Two things counted above all else: man-to-man relationships and sheer physical strength. Power rested in the ability to build unshakeable friendships, and competition among men often turned on tests of physical prowess. Only on the basis of this ethic can the rise of Charlie Murphy be fully understood.

It was a Gas House value system that led Murphy's Sylvan Social Club to the East River one Sunday afternoon in 1880 to challenge Barney Biglin's boast of superiority in boat racing. At the time, Murphy was an election district captain for Tammany Hall. Biglin, Republican leader of the Twentieth Assembly District (just north of Murphy's Eighteenth), rallied his three brothers to represent their local club against the East Side Democrats.⁴¹ Crowds lined the course of the race along the river from 100th to 129th Street. The Sylvan stroke, a shipyard worker known as "Tecumseh," suddenly fell ill, and rumors spread that he had been drugged.⁴² Small riots flared, and finally Charlie Murphy, leader of the Sylvan Club, quietly substituted for the ailing oarsman and sparked his crew to victory. The upshot of this seemingly insignificant event was that Murphy, "carried on the shoulders of his cheering supporters in a celebration that evening," quickly became a confirmed hero in the eyes of the young men of his district, and thus insured his already growing political stature.⁴³

Politics came naturally to Charles Murphy. His brothers were active in the local Tammany organization (William became an alderman and John a councilman), and it was only logical that a strong Irish youth should follow in their footsteps.⁴⁴ Besides, politics meant social mobility and a chance at respectability for a child of the slums. His first introduction into the practical game came through his friend, Edward Hagan, Tammany Assemblyman from the Eighteenth District. Francis B. Spinola, then leader of the Eighteenth, denied Hagan a renomination in 1883, and the down-cast politician sought the advice of his friend Murphy.

"Charlie," said Hagan, "Spinola says I can't run again. What would you do about it?"

"I dunno," said Murphy. "Come back in half an hour." Hagan came back and asked, "What do you say, Charlie?"

Murphy, already noted for his taciturnity, reportedly replied, "Run independent, Ed."⁴⁵

And run independent he did. With Murphy as campaign strategist, manager, and financier, Hagan defeated his Tammany opponent. This time Charles Murphy outwitted the Hall, but he never tried again.

Murphy's political rise became closely associated with Spinola's fortunes. When the district leader ran for the State Senate, he had the saloon keeper's support. Then, in 1886, Spinola tried for a seat in Congress. His opponent, Allen Thorndike Rice, was a silk stocking from the Fifth Avenue district who enjoyed the enthusiastic support of Henry George's party. Anyone knowledgeable in the game of politics would have conceded victory to the Republicans. But when the votes were counted, Spinola had won by a slim margin of 174. Someone had altered a flood of ballots to list Spinola's name, not Rice's, at the head of the regular Republican slate. No one has been able to ascertain Murphy's role in the cleverly engineered coup, but the upshot of the victory was that "his prestige was enormously increased . . . and Mike Cregan, the Republican leader of the Eighteenth, was read out of his party."⁴⁶

Hagan succeeded Spinola as district leader in 1887, and Murphy was elevated, unofficially, as his chief lieutenant. An indefatigable worker at the Anawanda Club, he was a smart practitioner of his art. The great blizzard of 1888 provided a new opportunity for strengthening his political position. Tammany, of course, was a self-avowed charitable organization, and so it was not unusual that it should be among the first to respond to the call for funds for those left homeless or hungry by the disaster. The Hall raised \$4000, of which the largest single donation came from none other than the Eighteenth District's second-in-command. Murphy himself delivered \$1400 of the fund to George Rainsford, pastor of Saint George's Episcopal Church in Stuyvesant Square, to bolster his relief efforts. Delighted by the unexpected contribution, the cleric chose to extoll Murphy's role from the pulpit the following Sunday. "If Tammany had more leaders like Charles F. Murphy," he declared, "it would be an admirable organization."⁴⁷ In view of its source, such praise might well have embarrassed many a

hardened politician, but the attention it drew to the young East Side leader served only to heighten his popularity and influence.

Lieutenanship imposes limits on prestige and authority, and Murphy looked for a means of moving up. He had already missed one chance; in 1882 or 1883, Maurice Power, then leader of the Eighteenth, had been looking for a State Assembly candidate who would strengthen his leadership in the eastern part of the district. By the time Murphy expressed an interest in the seat, Power had promised his support to another man.⁴⁸ But perhaps Murphy was in a better position for having built his reputation as he had, for when Ed Hagan died in 1892, he told those at his bedside to "see that nobody gets the leadership but Charlie."⁴⁹ It was more than a simple question of direct legacy, however, for the aspiring district leader had to reckon with the wishes of Richard Croker.

Rumor had it that a rival (in fact, a relative of Hagan) planned to seek the approval of Croker early on the morning after Hagan's death. Having already once been late, Murphy determined that his own emissary would reach the boss that night. He consulted brewer James Everard at the Twenty-eighth Street Turkish baths and explained the situation. Speaking of his rival he said, "I don't believe he will do and feel that if he is named leader it won't be a year before the Republicans will control the district. The boys want me as leader." Everard dispatched his lawyer, David M. Neuberger, to arrange an appointment with Croker at the baths that night. Croker's first reaction was a sharp "Why don't he wait until the man is cold!"⁵⁰ But, "on second thought, he conferred the district leadership on 'the young fellow who beat the starting gun.'"⁵¹

A model district leader, Murphy ran a tight, clean, efficient organization, performed his duties well, and was always available to help his supporters. The yearly polls showed the effectiveness of the "Murphy system" when his district continued to pile up the largest majorities for the Tammany ticket. His technique was thorough; "He kept tabs on the vote, and if any resident in the district, believed to be a Democrat, had not voted by three o'clock in the afternoon, he received a card by messenger respectfully inviting him to the polls."⁵² The secret of success was accessibility,

and Murphy made it a practice to station himself beneath the old gas lamp in front of the Anawanda Club for several hours each night and there conduct the business of the district leader. "The Aldermen and Assemblymen were always within hailing distance, so that when a constituent had a favor to ask the matter could be settled then and there without any red tape."⁵³

But the unique and outstanding feature of Murphy's leadership was his determined effort to keep his district morally clean. He was steadfastly opposed to any graft in connection with saloons, gambling, or prostitution. Practitioners of "skin games" and corrupt police captains fell by the wayside in the Gas House when the boss gave the orders to clean out the grafters.⁵⁴ Certainly, his rejection of graft never meant that he scorned money-making; while no letters or ledgers remain as proof, the Murphy years coincided with the "era of honest graft," when the smart politician could get rich through "legal" contracts and still preserve his sense of morality.

Murphy's first-rate organization and political acumen paid off. Robert Van Wyck, Tammany mayor (and first mayor of Greater New York) elected in 1897 to cries of "Well, well, well, Reform has gone to Hell!" appointed him Dock Commissioner in that year.⁵⁵ The Commissionership was the only official salaried job, elected or appointed, that Murphy ever held, and the stocky Irishman was fiercely (though silently) proud of his position. From that day forward he was known as "The Commissioner."⁵⁶ In this capacity he accomplished two notable ends: he set up a system of dock leasing which would later be of great profit to Tammany politicians, and he gained a new friend, fellow Commissioner J. Sergeant Cram.⁵⁷

Friends are the lifeblood of the politician. Murphy's connection with Ed Hagan had yielded obvious benefits, but Sergeant Cram was significant in other ways. In brief, Cram was the man who taught Charlie Murphy "to eat peas with a fork."⁵⁸ No two men could have been more unlike in status or upbringing. Cram, a Harvard man of the leisure class, provided a strange contrast to the silent Irishman whose most important lessons had been learned in a shipyard and who reputedly dismissed his formal education by saying that "it was a rough school and that he had learned

little from books.”⁵⁹ But the two became inseparable. They took daily walks, often from Tammany Hall up Fifth Avenue toward Central Park. Or Cram might harness one of his renowned teams of horses, and a drive would replace the customary trek.⁶⁰ The friendship gave Murphy a valuable insight into a side of life with which he had had no previous contacts; for his future career, a knowledge of the “other New York” was to prove indispensable. Various accounts insist that the Commissioner’s customary reserve and dignity were accentuated by his acquaintance with the aristocratic Cram. Although no documentation exists to prove the point, Cram was probably the closest thing to Murphy’s early, unofficial, intellectual braintrust. The combination of the two on the Commission proved highly effective. Apparently, Cram was the thinker and Murphy the doer; a retrospective newspaper account contends that the “imagination” of the former, coupled with the “energy and power” of the latter, “made the Dock Department a marvel as a parent of sudden and money-making business enterprises.”⁶¹ Murphy is said to have assumed the Commissionership with close to \$400,000, which he somehow multiplied to nearly \$1,000,000 during his tenure.⁶²

A likely source of funds would have been the New York Contracting and Trucking Company, which Murphy founded in 1901 in cooperation with John J. Murphy (his brother), James E. Gaffney (an alderman), and Richard J. Crouch (a political henchman). But in later years, when testifying before a legislative investigating committee, Murphy disavowed that he had retained any financial interest in the venture, and no evidence exists to disprove his statement.⁶³ An interest would certainly have been lucrative. During Seth Low’s Fusion Administration, the company leased two piers from the city at a rental of \$4800 per year. City Commissioner of Accounts William Russell reported to the mayor that the profits accruing to the company on this investment totalled between \$60,000 and \$65,000 annually. Within two years the company acquired contracts, dependent in some way on the conduct of city government, which amounted up to \$15,000,000. It also gained large contracts from public service corporations, which, in turn, had to apply for city grants.⁶⁴ The company’s activities boomed while Murphy ran Tammany Hall.

Like the archetypal district leader sketched by George Washington Plunkitt, Murphy accepted the machine, played politics according to patronage-welfare rules, and saw his opportunities and took 'em. Yet he was to turn out to be the most accomplished boss among his contemporaries in the organization, and we must therefore ask what set him apart from his fellows. Already, by the 1890's, his Irish puritanical distaste for commercial vice stood out as a rarity in Croker's Tammany Hall. Early in the next century he would demonstrate that political power must be rooted in respectability.

II

"Sport, Two-Spot, and Joke": The Commissioner Takes the Hall

With his absorption in moneymaking and horseracing and his genius for the dishonest deal, Richard Croker conformed to the image of the clever, cunning Irish politician. It would be revealing to know what Murphy thought of his chieftain, but the Commissioner's taciturnity leaves that open to speculation. Yet, it was during Murphy's regime when Plunkitt wrote that anyone who dabbled in dishonest graft was not only a crook but a fool. Croker's downfall proved the point. When Croker bade farewell to the Wigwam in 1901, he left a post that was soon filled by the ablest, most imaginative leader in the Hall's history.

The Line of Succession

In Tammany circles Croker's word had been law since 1886. By the 1890's, however, the Tweed tradition of open graft exposed the Hall and its ruler to dangerous attacks. The Reverend Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst led off in 1892 with some most unministerly visits to the heart of the Red Light district and followed with some equally uncommon sermons revealing his findings. The Lexow and Mazet investigations, following fast on Dr. Parkhurst's crusade against the Tammany organization, disclosed shocking vice and corruption. Tammany's collection of "get-rich" schemes had multiplied many times over, and the investigators managed to link the politicians to everything from liquor dealings and gambling rackets to the "white slave trade." They found the police force securely under the thumb of the politicians from Fourteenth Street. Even New York, which had learned to shrug its shoulders at the exploits of the Tweed Ring, sat up and took notice.

Richard Croker was watching, too. The Fusion campaign of 1901, which swept President Seth Low of Columbia University into the mayoralty, was not only a triumph for reform but a direct

blow at Croker's personal authority. He "saw that the time had come," a contemporary wrote, "to inject some show of an element of respectability and reform into Tammany Hall."¹ Perhaps Croker altruistically resigned to relieve the Wigwam of the burden of his reputation. More likely, he abdicated because he was beaten and was too tired to start all over again. Retirement to the British Isles, where he boasted a stable of thoroughbred racehorses, was an appealing prospect. In 1901 he stepped down.

Tammany's way of contesting the respectability of a Seth Low was to feign respectability itself by replacing Croker with Lewis Nixon. A Naval Academy graduate, owner of a naval ship plant, and businessman, he belonged to the Hall's most reputable, "kid-glove" faction. He had served the Van Wyck administration as president of the East River Bridge Commission, and when Croker decided to stage his own graft investigation in 1900, Nixon was the logical choice to head the unusual Anti-Vice Committee.²

But efficiency in tracking down corruption hardly equipped him to take command of a pack of grafters. Nixon's problem was that he really was respectable. Tammany undoubtedly shared the sentiment of the liberal *Nation*, which termed Nixon's selection "as absurd as the appointment of a New England deacon to the command of a pirate ship."³ Nixon believed that he could change Tammany's ways singlehandedly, but when he laid down his plans for improving the organization, his underlings retorted that Richard Croker still ruled *in absentia*.⁴ The neophyte boss, frustrated after just four months in his role as figurehead, announced his resignation on May 14, 1902. "I could not retain the leadership of Tammany Hall and at the same time retain my self-respect," he stated flatly, "and there is no political preferment that I would take in exchange for that."⁵

Few Tammany regulars voiced distress over the loss of their reforming leader. Almost immediately, the Executive Committee appointed a triumvirate to rule in his stead. The first, Daniel F. McMahon, a district leader like his co-regents, headed a scandal-ridden local contracting firm. The second, Louis F. Haffen, president of the Borough of the Bronx, was the only important Tammanyite to survive the Fusion sweep in 1901. Charles Francis Murphy, sachem of Tammany Hall and commissioner of docks,

was the third.⁶ While they were equal in authority, the three soon distinguished themselves as individuals; as newspaper reporters observed, "Murphy shut his mouth tight, smiled at questions, but never so much as nodded his head in a yes or no. Haffen, on the other hand, talked to every one who would listen to him."⁷

The division of power proved clumsy and inefficient, and three-cornered bossdom gave way to one-man domination. Instead of a power struggle, "It was like an eruption of nature"; as McMahon and Haffen explained it, "When anything was to be done, Murphy was on the job; no one ever asked for him in vain; he seemed to have no time for himself, but all his time for Tammany."⁸ On September 19, 1902, a simple statement, approved by a vote of twenty-six to nine in the Executive Committee, made it legal: "Whereas, The experiment of a Committee of Three has proved the desirability of individual responsibility and leadership, Resolved, That the position and duties heretofore occupied and performed by the Committee of Three be hereafter occupied and performed by Charles F. Murphy."⁹

Murphy's Method

"I won't do much talking," Murphy warned a reporter inquiring about his election. "The vote speaks for itself. I will be at Tammany Hall every day, and spend the hours between 3 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon at work. There is plenty of work to be done, and the less talking the better."¹⁰

But before the new chieftain could begin the routine he outlined, there was indeed "plenty of work to be done." In an organization as sensitively heterogeneous as Tammany, legal title to authority did not eliminate challenges to the exercise of power. While the Hall had given Murphy the title, it was up to him to prove that he knew how to lead. The press greeted the new chieftain with a sorrowful "Tammany remains as rotten as ever."¹¹ Within the organization, Murphy met open hostility from the dissident Croker faction, led by John Carroll, deputy leader under the retired boss. The obstacles were large, but the man from the Gas House showed little hesitation. His first serious test came at the Executive Committee meeting which enthroned him. "Big

Bill" Devery, ousted as chief of police in the wake of the graft exposés of the 1890's, was determined to take a seat on the Executive Committee. Devery had had little use for Tammany's triumvirate; he dismissed them with a now legendary line when he wisecracked, "Charlie Murphy is a good sport, but Haffen is a joke and Dan McMahon is a two-spot."¹²

William Devery was chosen leader of the Ninth Assembly District in a primary election notable for its fraud and irregularity; it was an open contest to see which side could marshal more repeaters and provoke bigger ballot box scandals. Acting on principle but also from a shrewd awareness of his foe's strength, Murphy launched an arbitrary assault on the traditional rules of eligibility for membership in the Hall's governing body. Making it plain that he would not tolerate corruption, the boss ordered Devery's ouster from the organization. And Devery, "charged ... [with responsibility] for the red lights ... went."¹³

With more than a paper declaration to prove his power, Murphy immediately showed what he meant to do with it. Orders for the police force spelled out vigilance against "commercialized vice." Singling out Eighth Ward leader Martin Engel's ties with gambling dens and houses of ill repute, Murphy decreed an end to Tammany's Tenderloin-Bowery alliance. Proving the point, he sent "Big Florry" Sullivan to take over the Eighth Ward Clubhouse, while the other Sullivan boys joined ranks to throw startled men out of the brothels enjoying Engel's protection.¹⁴

Reforming Tammany Hall meant tightening up on internal administration, too. The new boss abolished the Finance Committee and set up a puppet treasurer; in fact, Murphy himself controlled the purse strings and intended to make no account of his financial transactions.¹⁵

Just as a distinctive Murphy style of personal perseverance in leadership grew up, a streamlined approach to the political power relationships within Tammany Hall soon developed. An easy working understanding among the district leaders and the boss, and a strong allegiance between the individual leader and his constituents made the organization function smoothly. Murphy consistently refused to recommend the appointment to public office of any man who did not have the endorsement of his district leader.

While bolstering the authority of each district leader in his own domain, Murphy tried to discourage activities among the leaders which might jeopardize the loyalty of their Democratic constituents.¹⁶ This method involved a serious risk, for it left a substantial margin for activity to a possibly unscrupulous, shortsighted group of hack politicians. Nevertheless, the boss managed to a great degree to strengthen the organization.

No matter how much latitude he may have given his lieutenants, Charles Murphy was his own decision-maker. He purposefully kept abreast of developments in the city through frequent consultations with lesser leaders, and he continually sought the opinions of a small core of advisers. Through a process which he labelled "my referendum," he carefully tested the views of others before advancing his own. Murphy played "umpire . . . [not] dictator."¹⁷ He absorbed the advice of those he trusted, and he generally followed their suggestions. But in no case were his actions the product of blind faith in experts or subordinates; the final judgment on serious matters was invariably Murphy's, and Murphy's alone.¹⁸

The simplistic view would have it that the Commissioner was another stereotyped political boss—an ex-saloon keeper of Irish extraction who came up the hard way. But this interpretation is essentially meaningless. Charles Murphy was unique—a person in his own right. His most obvious attribute was that he never made himself conspicuous; in a word, he was best known for his silence. "Mr. Murphy once told me," Mayor Jimmy Walker said, "that most of the troubles of the world could be avoided if men opened their minds instead of their mouths."¹⁹

Political analysts have described taciturnity as the mark of the shrewd politician; by implication, the successful leader consciously strikes a pose of reserve to keep his lieutenants and opponents guessing.²⁰ Whether Murphy adopted his rule of silence as a political tactic is a moot issue. More important, he avoided being conspicuous at all times.

Even in purely social situations among his immediate family, the Tammany leader was naturally withdrawn. On frequent spring or summer pleasure trips to Atlantic City, the Murphys often stopped at the Hotel Marlborough. Guests observing them at

mealtime "[remarked] that Mr. Murphy said almost nothing to his family even—in contrast to the volubility of the ladies of his family."²¹

Taciturnity was the hallmark of Murphy's political technique. It came across most notably and most frequently in three situations: at the Tammany council table, in the course of daily business at Fourteenth Street, and in the inner sanctum of the "Scarlet Room" at Delmonico's Restaurant. There Murphy ruled supreme, reaching decisions which preserved his authority and bolstered his power. Among the members of the Executive Committee, he was given to speak "in short, jerky, low sentences, seldom over twelve words long. Often a minute would elapse between sentences."²² Murphy's kind of silence, punctuated forcefully by brief and pointed statements, was calculated to impress. Murphy "does not talk much," claimed the *Weekly Union*, "but what he does say is well said."²³ The boss allowed so few people a full picture of his intentions and thoughts that he was an enigma around Tammany Hall. But he was shrewd; "One of the secrets of his power was that the 'boys' always thought he had something in reserve.... It was the ... [cards] he was holding back that gave him command of the situation." On the basis of the few careful hints he divulged, almost everyone shared in the Hall's "consensus that 'he had the goods and knew how to deliver them.'"²⁴

In all his encounters Murphy had a facility for quickly grasping the heart of even the most complicated legal or political issue.²⁵ He wanted the facts in every detail; to clarify a problem, he launched into pointed but "insatiable" interrogations.²⁶ As a political professional through and through, blessed with "an almost uncanny political foresight," Murphy was at his best when the fight was hardest. He drove his assistants ceaselessly; especially at campaign time, the boss was "all business."²⁷

In his contacts with the ordinary political and non-political masses who streamed daily to Tammany Hall, Murphy developed a style notable for its directness and brevity. The daily ritual at Fourteenth Street brought a motley assortment of men with pleas to be entertained and problems to be solved. The Chief, impassive and tight-lipped as usual, held court at his well-known roll-topped desk in the Wigwam.

Tammany underlings, officeholders, office-seekers, and many a humble East Sider found a ready ear in the person of the boss. He paid special attention to his district leaders, for whom he held "a sort of open house" one night each week. The process was swift and simple, and the results were generally reliable. "They'd all stand up, and one after another, they'd go [to his desk], and they were invited to a seat. They'd sit down, talk with him about their problems or things that he had to do. He very rarely made notes. He had a pretty good memory, and he evidently [took care of] things that they discussed with him..."²⁸

The Fourteenth Street Wigwam was the official center for political business, just as the corner lamppost had served as Murphy's office in the Gas House district days. But the Commissioner soon assigned to the Hall itself only the traditional routine, and moved the serious process of decision-making uptown to the luxurious, well-guarded second floor of Delmonico's Restaurant. Delmonico's bore little resemblance to a smoke-filled, bare-floored political haunt. Patronage by the wealthy had begun over a half-century before on South William Street, where "only the socially elect were admitted by its fastidious proprietors."²⁹ By the time Murphy came to power the restaurant had moved slowly uptown, leaving one Fifth Avenue location for another in the newly fashionable sections of the city. It retained its reputation for catering to the élite of the metropolis, and this image later gave Murphy's detractors an opportunity unjustly to allege his desertion of the humble East Siders from whose ranks he had risen. The procedure at Delmonico's was largely a repetition of that at Fourteenth Street, but the surroundings were considerably more awesome, and the problems entertained were often of greater magnitude.

Lunchtime signalled Murphy's arrival at Fifth and Forty-fourth, first by hansom cab and later in his own Fiat. Gaining access to the Commissioner was no simple matter. Upon his entrance "the cordon of attendants was immediately flung out, [and] those who obtained an interview had to run the gantlet."³⁰ A card identifying each visitor and explaining his mission would pass from outside doorman, to inside elevator boy, to liveried attendants standing watch at the door of the second-floor anteroom, and finally to "Smiling Phil" Donohue, who alone had the authority to enter

the "big room" where Murphy waited. Donohue decided which cards to present to the boss. If Murphy chose to see the petitioner, the massive panelled door would swing open just enough to admit the man in question, while still obstructing the view of those waiting in the outer chamber. The visitor would find Murphy seated at a huge table supported by legs embellished with carved mahogany tiger paws.³¹ A gilt-framed mirror reflected the scarlet fabric wall coverings, which complemented a thick red rug. The elaborate furnishings numbered "a heavy red plush mahogany carved armchair" beneath the mirror, several red mahogany buffets, and more than a dozen smaller chairs along the walls or at the table. This atmosphere sheltered the Murphy legend. Many politicians later swore that their futures had been protected or ruined in the renowned "Scarlet Room of Mystery."

If intrepid visitors to this "second Tammany Hall" expected to find Charles Murphy the devil described by newspapers, Charles Murphy in person undoubtedly surprised them. Hearst's familiar image of the ruthless, blustering boss in convict's stripes hardly portrayed the man behind the roll-topped desk or the mahogany table. Murphy was honest and frank, mild-mannered and considerate, and intensely loyal. All who knew him well attest to the moral blamelessness of his personal affairs.³² Above all, he was a man of his word. Murphy's promises were carefully considered and conservatively granted; but once made, they were binding, no matter how circumstances might change in the future.³³ If a request was feasible, it was carried out without delay. If not, the petitioner got straightforward reasons for the rejection of his demands. James Farley was among these unrewarded petitioners when he went to Mr. Murphy seeking the nomination for retiring State Senator Blauvelt's seat. Farley, representing Rockland County, recalls Murphy's reaction: "He very frankly told me that . . . our county was a small county population-wise, as compared with Richmond County, and they wanted the place, and he felt they should have it. I was terribly disappointed at the time, but the thing that always impressed me about Mr. Murphy was that when you went there you were to leave his presence knowing exactly what he could do—what he would do for you if he could."³⁴ There was no double-dealing when Murphy attacked political

problems; those with whom he dealt might not always have approved the decision, but they generally respected the methods, and they always knew immediately where they stood.

A Life of "Democratic Simplicity"

Political negotiations at Fourteenth Street or Delmonico's were of little concern to most of the people who returned the Tammany ticket each November. For them, the Hall was primarily a social and philanthropic agency. District clambakes, aid for widows, and food baskets for the poor on holidays cemented their allegiance to the Democracy. Cold, hungry people who were hardly literate did not care about municipal reform; Tammany satisfied their needs by catering to what they did care about.

Although he encouraged it, the welfare system was not an original idea with Charles Murphy. But while the practice dated far back into the nineteenth century, there was a recognizable distinction between the boss whose machine dispensed coal and turkeys as a political weapon, and the boss whose private actions revealed a sincere philanthropic spirit. Murphy was of the second kind, but few probably recognized this trait, because his silence on his personal charity more than matched his normal taciturnity. Many East Siders had a special reason to grieve when the Commissioner died, for they had lost their anonymous benefactor.³⁵ Murphy had his district leaders keep an eye out for particularly deserving cases, whom he supported out of his own pocket. As one whose trade was in understanding people, he delighted in small actions which might please others. Once, on his return from the national convention in San Francisco in 1920, he stopped to visit a Roman Catholic convent in New Mexico. In the course of conversation the sisters mentioned how much they missed having fish, which was unavailable in their particular area. Murphy quietly made arrangements with a seafood concern for weekly shipments to the convent, and the amazed sisters never discovered the identity of their benefactor.³⁶

Although spontaneous humanitarianism at home might pay political dividends, Murphy consistently shunned public attention. He made regular anonymous contributions to organized charities. One of the best-remembered instances of his selflessness occurred

early on a wintry morning in 1914, when the Third Avenue Car, returning Mr. Murphy to his Seventeenth Street home after a hotel banquet, rolled up against a fire hose. A three-alarm blaze raging at Eighteenth Street and Third Avenue had forced over a hundred scantily-clad people onto the streets in the below-zero cold.

"Instantly, Mr. Murphy was in action."³⁷ Arousing the owner, he sent the newly homeless into a nearby restaurant, where they were given hot food and coffee.³⁸ "A dozen evicted families were sent to his own home as a temporary refuge.... If one of his lieutenants was not on hand to carry a child to his Seventeenth Street residence or the restaurant, Mr. Murphy carried it."³⁹ The Commissioner delivered orders to police and civilians alike; "Go to every dry goods store, haberdashery and every other kind of store and get every stitch of wearing apparel you can find for these poor people," he urged. "Never mind how you get the stuff, get it, that's all."⁴⁰ Charlie Murphy himself paid every merchant for the clothing and for damages suffered when stores were opened forcibly that night.⁴¹ When he had done all he could for the unhappy families, he started home, still dressed in dirtied evening clothes and sporting a smashed high hat.⁴² Murphy's efforts here—an unexpected, unselfish, largely humanitarian venture—conformed perfectly to the Plunkitt doctrine. But for Plunkitt it was all part of a system. Look at his method:

If there's a fire in Ninth, Tenth, or Eleventh Avenue, for example, any hour of the day or night, I'm usually there with some of my election district captains as soon as the fire engines. If a family is burned out I don't ask whether they are Republicans or Democrats, and I don't refer them to the Charity Organization Society, which would investigate their case in a month or two and decide they were worthy of help about the time they are dead from starvation. I just get quarters for them, buy clothes for them if their clothes were burned up, and fix them up till they get things runnin' again. It's philanthropy, but it's politics, too—mighty good politics. Who can tell how many votes one of these fires bring me?⁴³

Such small actions by Murphy add a new dimension to the political chieftain and help to reconstruct him as a human being. In popular discussions of Tammany Hall, the well-known image of the organization often obscures the individuality of the personalities within it; soon, the personalities no longer exist in their own

right. Evaluating a *man* involves detaching him even briefly from his functional framework and seeing him as just a man, with the foibles, hopes, and personal traits that make each human being unique.

It is hard to distinguish the public and private faces of Charlie Murphy, for politics was at once his avocation and vocation. He worked at it furiously and exclusively, and he invariably enjoyed the effort. His interests and his knowledge were as broad or as narrow as the political sphere permitted; he read books rarely, if at all, and relied on newspapers to keep him informed of developments important to his job.⁴⁴ His personal library was stocked chiefly with religious works, and when he did pick up a book, it was more than likely a "purely devotional" volume, or an account of "orthodox church history [or] the lives of the saints."⁴⁵ His greatest talent was his acute understanding of, and ability to handle, human beings; he "preferred the company of men to the company of books."⁴⁶ In infrequent, brief, private discussions on political matters, he could be sharp and keen-witted, but acquaintances found him generally dull and uninformed on subjects outside that limited range.⁴⁷

Ignoring the city's cultural offerings, Murphy usually sought an evening's recreation in his neighborhood. Two or three times a week he would hold court in the "democratic surroundings" of Allaire's, a German eating and drinking establishment on Third Avenue, between Seventeenth and Eighteenth Streets. "Beer [was] the staple beverage," and while Murphy might sip a glass or two of light beer, he generally "indulged in little but Poland water."⁴⁸ On such occasions the boss was "the centre of an animated group"—a "distinctly neighborhood circle" consisting of Phil Donohue, Jim Foley (the father of James A. Foley), Tammany custodian Paddy Craig, and Magistrate Joe Moss.⁴⁹ Relaxing his customary reserve, Murphy enjoyed teasing Foley and Craig about their golf games.

A "great pedestrian," Murphy often coupled his Third Avenue forays with a walk around the neighborhood.⁵⁰ He might interrupt his tramp with a short visit to the Anawanda Club; and, "If a card game was in progress, he would join, but he never played for higher stakes than penny ante."⁵¹

As an adult, Murphy's only documented sport was golf, which he pursued as avidly and intently as he did politics. He took it up on vacations at French Lick Springs, Indiana, and Hot Springs, Virginia, and continued it at the Oakland and Shinnecock golf clubs, or on a private course on his estate at Good Ground, Long Island.⁵²

The house at Good Ground, which Murphy bought around the time he assumed the leadership of Tammany Hall, was "a rather spacious comfortable Long Island type of summer home located near the lighthouse on Shinnecock Bay."⁵³ Over the years he nearly tripled the value of his \$35,000 purchase.⁵⁴ His "farm," covering about fifty acres midway between Quogue and Good Ground, included "a couple of draft horses, three cows, half a dozen pedigreed pigs, and some fancy poultry. . . . [He] also had a duck pond dug and had a quacking flock paddling about on it. All these with a couple of Great Danes—his favorite pets—made up the Murphy household."⁵⁵ In addition to his country home, the buildings included a stable, barns, and a poultry house—"all in rustic style."⁵⁶ The Tammany leader enjoyed taking an occasional hand in the actual farm and garden work.

Murphy married when he was forty-four. His wife, the former Margaret J. Graham, was a widow of his own age who had been raised in the Gas House district. "It was rumored at the time of the wedding [June, 1902] that Mr. Murphy might have married this same lady twenty years before when she was still a spinster, but that his bashfulness restrained him from popping the question and a more attentive suitor won the prize."⁵⁷ Murphy adopted his wife's ten-year-old daughter, Mabel, but had no children of his own. "The Tammany Boss is very fond of his stepdaughter," a reporter once noted, "and she is very helpful to him."⁵⁸ On June 21, 1919, Mabel married State Senator (and later Surrogate) James A. Foley in a "quiet" ceremony at the Hotel St. Regis.⁵⁹ The Foleys also had no children, so that Murphy has no direct descendants.

Unlike her husband, Mrs. Murphy shied away from the political arena; as a friend once remarked, "I do not think Mrs. Murphy ever thinks about politics, except to wish that her husband was out of the game for good." Instead, she preferred to direct the domestic

scene at the Murphys' Manhattan home, a four-story brownstone at 305 East Seventeenth Street. Formerly the residence of George McClellan (the son of the famous Civil War general), the town-house overlooked Stuyvesant Square. Although staffed by two or three maidservants, the household was marked by "democratic simplicity."⁶⁰

The Murphy women kept strict watch over the Commissioner's attire, for which "gentle bossing" he was said to be "duly grateful." Though fastidious, Murphy was always so "much preoccupied" that "he would not know what sort of necktie he had on unless his attention was called to it." Mrs. Murphy and her daughter insisted on a daily inspection, and "not infrequently he [was] sent upstairs, like a bad boy, to change this or that in his attire."⁶¹

The son of an Irish tenant farmer, bred in Gas House slums, was tasting the best that moneyed America had to offer. Patterns of immigration called for a frantic second-generation effort to shake off the stigma of poverty and foreignness and to avoid the contempt that had greeted their parents. Murphy's rise somehow escaped the "self-conscious, anxious" struggle toward gentility and acceptance common to his conationals; he moved with apparent ease in political and economic echelons long the province of the established Anglo-Saxon gentry.⁶² Although among a small minority of immigrants' sons in his grasp of prosperity and respectability, Murphy symbolized a parallel second-generation trend toward "occupational advance" and social and cultural assimilation. By the turn of the century second-generation Irishmen were "more evenly dispersed through the labor force . . . less concentrated in manual jobs and more evident in the skilled trades, white-collar occupations, and the professions. . . ." ⁶³ Surely, the Irish were "still over-represented in the ranks of unskilled labor," but as the concentration in manual jobs and domestic service thinned out, there was a corresponding rise toward success through "independent business enterprise, journalism and the field of entertainment."⁶⁴

The "most conspicuous" of all roads to swift success were "politics and the law."⁶⁵ Capitalizing on ethnic solidarity, personal magnetism, and prevalent municipal disorder, Irishmen like Charles Murphy established themselves as dominant forces in local politics. Politics promised a "rapid rise in status and sub-

stantial financial rewards."⁶⁶ But political power was not just a ticket to the ranks of moneyed America; as much a responsibility as a luxury, party leadership hung on skill and—more precariously—on winners.

Capturing City Hall

Scarcely two months after his investiture as the sole ruler of Tammany in 1902, Murphy marshalled method and determination to face his first political test. The citizens of New York set out to elect a governor, and Murphy chose Comptroller Bird S. Coler, later Commissioner of Public Welfare, as the Democracy's candidate for the Albany seat. While Coler lost to Benjamin B. Odell, Jr., in the state-wide tally, the press hailed his 122,000-vote plurality in Greater New York as "the most brilliant victory ever won" by Tammany Hall.⁶⁷ By engineering "the greatest Democratic majority ever cast for a Governor in the history of New York County," Murphy, "it was conceded, even by his foes, earned his spurs . . . and insured the permanency of his tenure. . . ."⁶⁸ No one had expected victory for the neophyte boss; well aware of Republican dominance upstate, the public would have laughed at the idea that Murphy would soon establish a tradition of Tammany influence in Albany.

The mayoralty election of 1903 was another story. New York City was Tammany's acknowledged bailiwick, and the Wigwam hungered for power after two lean years under Seth Low's Fusion administration. Leaders in all parts of Manhattan were eyeing the boss to see whether he could deliver; a defeat, signalling two more years of Tammany isolation, might have meant Murphy's political downfall.

By any evaluation, Seth Low was the best mayor New York City had seen in decades. His narrow victory in 1901 had been based on widespread revulsion against the graft and corruption then typical of the Hall's methods.⁶⁹ Yet, just two years later, Murphy managed to unseat him. Why would the people opt to throw the reformers out? First, Low's administration was too suspiciously Republican for traditionally Democratic New York. Installing a non-Tammany administration called for a momentous effort, and the voters found it easier to revert to normalcy.

Without constantly witnessing glaring misgovernment, people tended to forget just how bad Tammany could be. At the same time, they demanded unusually high standards from a reform government. The reformers themselves had made big promises, and failure to fulfill them was held against them; small errors, recognized as commonplace under Tammany, were underscored blackly on the Fusion record.

Moreover, Fusion had to fight the image of the reformer as a puritan gentleman. Experience with high standards had taught New Yorkers that it might well be preferable for "purveyors of 'pleasure' . . . [to] pay blackmail to the police than . . . [for there to] be no 'pleasure' at all."⁷⁰ Enforcement of blue laws and an increased liquor excise tax won few friends for Fusion. Besides, as the epitome of a silk stocking, Low was personally objectionable to many New Yorkers.⁷¹ His unattractiveness appeared in his smile, which, with "no laughter back of it, no humor, and no sense thereof," touched off an "instinctive dislike for the mayor."⁷²

Finally, big business, representing the supposedly proper aristocracy, tired quickly of reform government. The large corporations, of course, depended on the goodwill of the city administration; at the moment, New York was prosecuting claims against water, gas, and electric companies, actions which Tammany, with a suitable payoff, could easily be induced to abandon.⁷³

But Plunkitt of Tammany Hall summarized it best when he said that reform committees were "mornin' glories—looked lovely in the mornin' and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on flourishin' forever." Why? Easy: "The fact is that a reformer can't last in politics. He can make a show for a while, but he always comes down like a rocket. Politics is as much a regular business as the grocery or the dry-goods or the drug business. You've got to be trained up to it or you're sure to fail."⁷⁴

Since the job of the machine was to nominate and, above all, to win elections, it was up to Charles Murphy to provide the man to convince New Yorkers that their perhaps uncomfortable aversion to reform was altogether justified. And Murphy had a perfect choice, respectable and well-known enough to counteract the Fusion image of propriety (again, the formula of fighting respectability by feigning respectability), but truly representative of the

organization and the subtle benefits that its name implied. The logical man was George B. McClellan, Jr., Tammany congressman in Washington for several terms and son of the eminent Civil War general. Realizing full well that a Tammany mayoralty could possibly spell the end of his political career but that refusal would mean political oblivion, McClellan reluctantly accepted the organization's summons to come home and lead the Democracy into battle against the reformers.⁷⁵

Through a masterly piece of strategy Murphy managed to demolish the Fusion forces before the election even took place. Edward M. Grout and Charles F. Fornes, comptroller and president of the Board of Aldermen in the outgoing administration, were up for re-election on the Fusion ticket. Murphy cleverly offered the Democratic endorsement to the two men, who accepted without hesitation and were promptly dropped from Seth Low's slate.⁷⁶ Having stolen two-thirds of the opposing ticket and adding to it the very image of aristocratic respectability, Murphy could not help winning.

Election night found McClellan and Murphy overlooking a Broadway jamboree in celebration of the Tammany victory. "Charlie," the new mayor said, "I wonder if they'll be cheering me two years hence." Murphy studied his first real protégé and answered prophetically, "If they're not, it won't be my fault, George. It'll be yours."⁷⁷

Having driven his machine to election victory, Charles Murphy—for all technical purposes—had temporarily accomplished his work on that night in 1903. But this is a rulebook principle, and the rulebook cannot be applied to Tammany Hall. The organization's work—and, more important, its payoff—only began when a new mayor was installed. Tammany custom dictated that Murphy would dispose of all appointive posts at the mayor's discretion as favors to the party faithful. But, against Murphy's objections, McClellan proceeded to select his own corporation counsel, mayoral secretary, Tax Board president, and commissioners of police, street cleaning, and health. "For other offices," he said, "I accepted the candidates of the organization. Murphy's candidates, while almost all district leaders, seemed to be a very decent lot."⁷⁸ The mayor soon discovered, however, that his chief assistants

suffered from "painful mediocrity" and that these subordinates were making a practice of going to Murphy for their orders and guidance.⁷⁹

By 1905, George McClellan was running for mayor to prove a point—to vindicate his performance of the last twenty-four months and to show the people of New York that they had cheered him with good reason that November night in 1903. Having fielded a ticket, Murphy, so McClellan claims, "retired to Delmonico's, where he had his headquarters, and left the candidates on the city ticket to shift for themselves."⁸⁰

It took a substantial amount of shifting—much of it extra-legal—to survive the race, for two separate organizations launched frontal attacks on Tammany's claim to the mayoralty. William M. Ivins led the Republicans into the contest, while publisher and former Tammany Congressman William Randolph Hearst mobilized the Municipal Ownership League as a political force.⁸¹ Ivins proved to be a negligible factor, but the Hearst-McClellan race was so tight that the journalist cried fraud and demanded a recount. Later accounts confirmed that repeaters had a field day, while ballot boxes suspected of irregularity ended up in the East River and Hearst ballots were frequently voided.⁸² The Court ruled in favor of a recount, but it prohibited a recanvass, so that officials were not permitted to disregard the improperly marked ballots which filled so many of the boxes.⁸³ The final tally gave McClellan 228,397 votes to Hearst's 224,925 and Ivins' 137,193.⁸⁴ The mayor retained a precarious hold on his office (all the more precarious because it was probably illegal), and Hearst's cartoonists took vindictive delight in picturing Boss Murphy in convict's stripes.⁸⁵ McClellan won, aside from the frauds, mainly because the anti-Tammany forces were split and because there had been no really flagrant examples of Tammany corruption and graft during the previous two years.

The victory offered little solace to Murphy. Forgetting his political "benefactor," the mayor set out to shake off the Tammany Tiger. McClellan claimed that as an "organization man" he "was perfectly willing to recognize Murphy as the head of the Democratic organization in New York County, and to appoint the men he favored on condition that the men he favored were fit." But the mayor's selections revealed only minimal consideration for the boss's wishes; for example, he insisted on ousting most of his first-

term department heads, whom he found of little value as administrators, and he replaced them with men opposed to Tammany.⁸⁶

Appointments were the crux of the McClellan-Murphy break, insofar as a cause can be pinpointed. Beyond that, however, there was the more basic question of independence; McClellan wanted to prove to his constituents that he could stand on his own two feet without support from a political boss.⁸⁷ And a man more interested in going back to Washington than in running New York City had even more justification for discarding the shackles of a concern which appeared unlikely to be of any help in furthering his hopes. Then, too, McClellan retained little of his original respect for Murphy, who, he charged, had disintegrated morally upon the development of his "acquisitive sense."⁸⁸

The strain in relations between the Wigwam and City Hall increased during McClellan's four-year tenure (the length of the mayor's term had been doubled). Lack of patronage provided a reliable source of irritation; the city put up \$100,000,000 for a Catskill water supply system, but thanks to the mayor, no benefits reached Tammany.⁸⁹ The Hall suffered the heaviest blow, though, when the mayor sent investigators out to track down misconduct in high places. Commissioners of accounts John Purroy Mitchel and Ernest Gallagher brought indictments against John F. Ahearn, borough president of Manhattan, and Louis F. Haffen, his Bronx counterpart. Queens chief Joseph Bermel chose to resign, and his successor, Lawrence Gresser, was subsequently ousted on the basis of charges brought by Governor Dix. With the exception of Gresser, who was an independent Democrat, the officials in question were all loyal Tammany men.⁹⁰ Murphy had good reason to reflect on the ingratitude of George McClellan.

The McClellan story summarizes Tammany's history at the polls in the Murphy era. City Hall's relations with the Wigwam ranged from independence to subservience. The rules of the system claimed booty for organization regulars. At the same time, Murphy disliked corruption, and many of his nominees believed in competent municipal administration. By learning to compromise these often conflicting aims, Murphy would produce during his career a succession of victorious state and local candidates unduplicated in any era of Tammany power.

III

The Consolidation of Power

Taking the Wigwam and then putting a man in City Hall had been the limit of the ambitions of most Tammany bosses. But Murphy went beyond Croker, Kelly, and Tweed, extending his influence outside the boundaries of Manhattan and emerging as the most powerful of New York State's sixty-two Democratic county leaders. Recognized as an accomplished maker of governors as well as mayors, he died while planning to run the most famous of his protégés, Al Smith, for President of the United States.

Greater New York

After the creation of Greater New York in 1897, Tammany's domain, previously confined to Manhattan Island, ran "from the Westchester line to Tottenville and from the North River to the Nassau County border."¹ Brooklyn, Queens, Richmond, and the Bronx brought their own Democratic county organizations into the new alliance, and, despite longstanding, internal organizational rivalries, Tammany set out to annex the neighboring machines.

By 1911 the New York *American* reported that "the affairs of the Bronx and Richmond are administered directly from Fourteenth Street."² Through some strategic efforts Murphy soon counted Queens leader Thomas Cassidy among his subordinates, and he then moved to consolidate his power over the less manageable Brooklyn organization. He struck the first blow in the 1903 election by nominating McClellan over the vehement objections of Kings County boss Hugh McLaughlin.³ Then Patrick Henry McCarren succeeded McLaughlin, and open warfare raged for six years. McCarren revived Brooklyn's Croker-era motto, taunting, "The Tiger shall not cross the bridge."⁴ The scrappy Irishman never hesitated to lay it on the line; "I would rather be a serf in Russia," he told his district leaders, "than a satrap of

Tammany Hall.”⁵ But while McCarren glared at the Tiger, Murphy quietly built up his own ranks in Brooklyn. He enlisted John H. Delaney to direct a sprouting “guerrilla organization,” and the seven leaders left over from the old McLaughlin camp soon fell into line behind the Tammany banner.⁶

Completing the conquest, Tammany persuaded Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice William Jay Gaynor to head its forces in the 1909 mayoralty contest. At the same time, Pat McCarren died, and John H. McCooey, the new Kings County leader, came docilely into the fold with all his cohorts.⁷ Maurice Connolly, who succeeded Tom Cassidy in Queens, seemed content to cement his organization’s alliance with Fourteenth Street.⁸

Murphy first marshalled his expanded forces to elect William Jay Gaynor mayor of New York. Like most of Murphy’s choices, the Brooklyn judge was an unexpected man to head the Tammany ticket. Normally, his independence and incorruptibility would have kept him securely on the Supreme Court, but Tammany needed a standardbearer to combat strong reform efforts.⁹ Gaynor was hardly a partisan; the option on his candidacy seesawed back and forth between Tammany Democrats and Brooklyn Republicans, neither of whom showed unusual enthusiasm for the judge. By record he belonged to Fusion; from the bench he proved himself a battler against corruption in politics, a defender of individual liberties, and a supporter of municipal ownership of subways. But Gaynor’s biographer hints that principle was not paramount when it came to running for mayor; hoping strongly for victory, “he was ready to put himself in the hands of whatever organization seemed most likely to bring about that happy circumstance—and he had already convinced himself that Mr. Murphy’s boys could deliver the goods.”¹⁰ Gaynor believed that he could win with Murphy, and Murphy thought he could take City Hall with Gaynor. This mutual conviction cemented the ticket.

Otto Bannard gave a rather bland color to the Republican slate, while the always-available William Randolph Hearst entered the campaign under the auspices of the Civic Alliance, better known as the Independence League or the William Randolph Hearst Municipal Ownership League.¹¹ Hearst was originally a Gaynor partisan; speculation has it that half-promised support from the

journalist, which would have boosted the judge's chances for victory, may well have influenced Murphy's nomination of Gaynor.¹²

Gaynor carried Greater New York with 42 percent of the vote, which he exceeded in New York and Richmond counties. Equally significant, with 25.9 percent of the ballots, Hearst trailed Barnard, who attracted 29.8 percent of the electorate.¹³ Yet, the city-wide results gave Tammany little cause for rejoicing, because the opposition overwhelmed nearly the entire Board of Estimate and Apportionment. Four of the five borough presidents were Fusionists, and Lawrence Gresser of Queens qualified as an independent Democrat. Comptroller William Prendergast and Board of Aldermen President John Purroy Mitchel brought the anti-Tammany tally to seven. In fact, only Mayor Gaynor represented Fourteenth Street, and his allegiance to the organization was reasonably suspect. Considering that the Board of Estimate was the functional governing body in New York City, the Hall had good reason to worry. In brief, the Board fulfilled the city's main legislative duties, chief among them financial appropriation and administrative control.¹⁴ Millions of dollars in contracts for municipal improvements were at stake, and many New Yorkers breathed a sigh of relief when control of the contracts was swept from Tammany's hands. Beyond that, the election of Fusionist Charles S. Whitman as district attorney of New York County posed a formidable check on common graft practices; an "honest, efficient" district attorney, backed by non-organization law officers, suggested to New Yorkers who cared that "Tammany malefactors [would] at least be brought to trial, that indictments [would] no longer be mysteriously 'lost,' and that the machinery of the law [would] remain intact."¹⁵

The main hope for Tammany lay in the adaptability of its man in City Hall, even though his authority was in many respects checked by the Board of Estimate. But Gaynor's appointments—and removals—could be construed only as a source of disappointment to his political benefactors. The new department heads, city magistrates, and minor officials won general acclaim for the mayor; there was genuine surprise when his choices reflected merit based on professional qualifications, rather than political influence. Patronage was only one sore spot. Efficiency and economy in

administration meant abolishing the outdated Board of Aqueduct Commissioners and overhauling the Bureau of Weights and Measures. Tammany men, formerly established securely in nonfunctional jobs, now found themselves unemployed.¹⁶ In sum, contemporary observers agreed that the Gaynor administration was unprecedented in its economy measures, honesty, reforms, and general respectability. And Gaynor—at least nominally—was a Tammany mayor.

Albany

Murphy won his first governorship in 1910, and thereafter, until his death in 1924, a Tammany-backed candidate held the executive mansion in Albany, except for the administrations of Charles S. Whitman from 1914 through 1918 and of Nathan L. Miller from 1920 through 1922. Disregarding the unwritten rule of non-interference in non-metropolitan affairs, Murphy sent Al Smith to Albany so often that Will Rogers quipped, "The man you run against ain't a candidate, he is just a victim."¹⁷ Still, as anyone familiar with city bosses might have warned, Murphy's success upstate was less consistent than it was in the city. Not only was he more vulnerable to national anti-Democratic tides like the one that swept Al Smith out of the executive mansion in 1920; he also had to cope with Democratic candidates who were not happy warriors.

One of them was William Randolph Hearst. In 1906 Murphy backed the millionaire publisher as the regular organization candidate for Governor of New York State. This was a strange alliance, for in the mayoralty election of the previous year Hearst had called for the jailing of Murphy, and the Hall had shouted "radical," "destructionist," and "socialist" at the candidate of the Municipal Ownership League.¹⁸ Why Murphy made an about-face is open to speculation, but it would seem that, irrespective of what he really thought of Hearst, instinct told him that he had no other choice but to go along with his former antagonist.

Hearst had already been placed in the running by his Municipal Ownership League, newly named the Independence League. (Hearst mistakenly believed that a new name would obscure past defeats, but he overestimated popular gullibility.) He had declared

a platform of "municipal ownership of public utilities, election law reforms," and full-scale war against "criminal combinations of capital."¹⁹ Charles Evans Hughes, known throughout the state as a result of his investigation of the insurance companies, was the Republican designee. Had Murphy entered a third candidate, it was certain, so the newspapers said, that he would have come out third.²⁰ We may conjecture that Hearst, with his Democratic newspaper chain, was a better risk as an ally than as a foe.

Murphy pressured State Senator Thomas F. O'Grady into seating the requisite number of Hearst delegates on the Membership Committee at the Buffalo convention. "Boys," O'Grady later said, "I have done the dirtiest day's work of my life."²¹

Willing to play the game according to the rules, the boss buried grievances in the face of a common Republican enemy. The publisher, however, played according to his own rules, and lost. "Murphy may be for me," Hearst exclaimed, "but I am not for Murphy and never will be."²² Hearst went down to defeat by a margin of 58,000 votes, although the rest of the Democratic-Independence League ticket won.²³

When Hughes' second term ended in 1910, Murphy renewed his bid for an upstate bastion and successfully named John A. Dix as the next governor. A former banker and lumber-paper company executive from Glens Falls and Albany, Dix was chairman of the Democratic State Committee upon his election as governor in 1910. His previous political experience included a four-year term as chairman of Washington County's Democratic Committee, during which he set up and led a statewide organization of Democratic county chairmen.²⁴ Murphy was smart enough to make Dix appear to be his own master. Newspaper reports claimed that the boss kept Tammany in the background at Dix's inaugural, and the governor's cabinet included no real Tammany men. Murphy, even then said to be eyeing the national scene, realized that Tammany's traditions and associations might be a strong handicap in state or national politics.

But all of this was for show. In fact, Dix was properly humble and complacent. George McClellan (not an unbiased source) painted a graphic picture of the extent of the new executive's powers:

As governor, Dix was far from a success. He was utterly subservient to Murphy and only achieved fame by designing for himself as chief of the National Guard a uniform of much gorgeousness which he wore on state occasions until laughed out of it by a disrespectful press.

With John Dix in the state house, Murphy tested his grip on the legislature and decided that he was in a position to name the successor to United States Senator Chauncey Depew in 1911. Since there was no direct election of senators, the choice rested with the New York State Legislature. After Dix's inaugural the Wigwam moved into Albany's Ten Eyck Hotel, and the party went into caucus. With Democrats in control of both houses, their approval was tantamount to election. Speculation centered on two main candidates: Edward M. Shepard and "Blue-eyed Billy" Sheehan. Then a corporation lawyer with an unsavory reputation, Sheehan had served as Democratic leader of Buffalo until 1894, when he left the city in the wake of "election frauds charged against his party."²⁶ Mayor Gaynor helped launch a drive to keep the nomination from him; chief among the insurgents was Dutchess County's outspoken young senator, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Shepard, also a lawyer, had been—largely at Murphy's instigation—the Democratic candidate for mayor against Seth Low in 1901.²⁷

Those who attended the party caucus were obligated to support the selection of the majority when it came time for the final vote in the legislature. But nonattendance meant that one could vote as he pleased, and the insurgents had to weigh the chance of attending and forcing the choice of a man other than Sheehan, against not attending and reserving their dissident votes for the floor session.²⁸ Roosevelt prevailed upon eighteen Democratic assemblymen to join him in boycotting the meeting, so that only the ninety-one participants were legally bound to support Sheehan. It took 101 votes to elect a Senator.

The first ballot in the legislature gave Sheehan the ninety-one votes and Depew all eighty Republican votes, and listed the insurgents' votes as scattered among several candidates.²⁹ For ten weeks and sixty-four ballots, the insurgents held out, while Tammany courted the Dutchess County senator by making him chairman of the Forest, Fish and Game Committee.³⁰ Murphy suggested Dan

Cohalan, one of his earliest political advisers, as a possible compromise candidate; when he was deemed unacceptable, the boss put forth the name of Samuel Untermyer, another counsellor. But perhaps Murphy really shared the feeling of Franklin Roosevelt, who said, "We believe a great many of our Democratic constituents don't want [Sheehan] . . . to be the United States Senator," for the boss hesitated to press the Irishman's candidacy.³¹ "Murphy," Roosevelt biographer Frank Freidel postulates, "was supporting Sheehan only to fulfill a political obligation."³² The Democrats finally settled on State Supreme Court Justice James O'Gorman, whose seat on the court was quickly filled by Daniel Cohalan. Roosevelt's insurgents claimed a symbolic victory in their curb on Tammany's upstate power. Yet, a second glance shows that O'Gorman was much more closely allied with the Wigwam than was William Sheehan. In fact, the upshot of the Albany affair was that Murphy, relieved of the embarrassing political commitment to Sheehan, managed to send a thoroughgoing organization regular to the Senate Chamber in Washington.

The other side of Capitol Hill provided Murphy's next—and most disastrous—candidate. Dix's term expired in 1912, and, with a reluctant sanction from Murphy, the Democratic Party drafted Congressman William Sulzer as the next governor of the State of New York. To all outward appearances, Murphy withdrew from any determining role and left the choice to what he was fond of calling a truly "open convention." Nevertheless, those less friendly toward the boss charged that he in fact rigged the convention to make Sulzer's selection inevitable. There is no really satisfactory answer; the best evidence indicates that Murphy was no more than lukewarm toward Bill Sulzer's candidacy.

Since Dix's inability to administer state affairs blocked his renomination, Sulzer seemed a reasonable compromise. He impressed his party as a happy antidote to Progressive candidate Oscar Straus, who was feared for his capacity to attract a large, normally Democratic Jewish vote. As chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Sulzer had won the approval of many Jewish organizations by taking up their demand for abrogation of the Russo-American treaty on the grounds of Russian persecution of their co-religionists.³³ Beyond that, Sulzer's Congressional

record identified him as a supporter of "progressive legislation" aimed at "industrial and social reform."³⁴ Thus, he might lure those independents who would naturally gravitate toward the Progressive ticket.³⁵ Remembering that statewide Democratic victories had been rare and judging Dix's impression on the populace, the Democracy needed every vote it could get.

Campaigning as the "unbossed candidate," Sulzer rounded up enough votes to establish himself firmly in the Executive Mansion. Yet his tenure was to be unexpectedly shortlived. Sulzer's celebrated impeachment, which led to a Fusion victory in New York City in 1913 and to the return of the Republicans to Albany in 1914, will be related in the next chapter. Here it is relevant to note that the unprecedented ouster did not cause the Hall's collapse; as if to prove that the Sulzer action was a mistake, and not a policy, Murphy bounced back to win the mayoralty with John F. Hylan in 1917.

"Hearst, Hylan, and the Hohenzollerns"

By 1917, Murphy had to win. His grant of power was only conditional on fulfilling his end of the political bargain, which meant that intra-organizational support had to be bought with patronage. For four years Murphy had enjoyed no control over political appointments and no ready access to disposition of profitable contracts. During Wilson's administration Washington made no effort to compensate for the local Democracy's deficit. Cut off in many cases from their very livelihoods, Tammany regulars were getting restless. Many wondered if the Hall could survive four more years of exile; "The reelection of Mayor Mitchel," one magazine suggested, "would mean the end of the Tammany organization as a dominant force."³⁶

Brooklyn County Court Judge John F. Hylan entered the fall battle against Morris L. Hillquit of the Socialist Party, William Bennett for the Republicans, and John Purroy Mitchel, this time an independent candidate. On the face of his qualifications, which were noticeably meager, Hylan hardly deserved to win.³⁷ But several factors, none due to Hylan himself, sent Tammany back to City Hall in November. Not the least of these was the support of William Randolph Hearst, whose influential newspaper empire

was still an ally to reckon with. The Democracy's platform spelled "Hearst" in every line when it pledged "public ownership and operation of all traction systems, including marginal railways and docks, gas, electricity, and the telephone, as well as terminal markets, storehouses, and refrigerator plants."³⁸ But Hylan's most useful asset turned out to be the personality and campaign tactics of his chief opponent, Mayor Mitchel. Much to the consternation of the Republican organization, Mitchel had been defeated in the primaries by ex-State Senator William Bennett.³⁹ Forced to run as an independent, he thus further divided the anti-Tammany forces. The result fit into a simple formula: when the opposition failed to unite, Tammany won.

Upon accepting his renomination earlier in the fall, Mitchel had set the tone of the whole contest by declaring, "I will make the fight against Hearst, Hylan, and the Hohenzollerns, against Murphy . . . and all the Tammany brood...."⁴⁰ The United States was embroiled in the tensions of the European war, and the city's press did not hesitate to drive the point home; "The hotheaded and open supporters of Kaiserism, those who are too zealous to seek to scream their purposes, are for Hillquit; but the cooler, more sneaking, hence more dangerous disloyalists are for Hylan," editorialized the *New York Globe*.⁴¹

Focusing the campaign on national issues, instead of local problems, Mitchel took his stand on a loyalty plank and repeatedly accused the opposition of un-Americanism. He charged Hylan with membership in the Friends of Peace, an organization formed by a German agent.⁴² Editorial opinion insisted that this emphasis was the mayor's worst tactical mistake.⁴³ Beyond that, Mitchel fell into the trap that beckoned to most reformers. They concentrated so exclusively on principles, efficiency, and standards that they somehow overlooked the human element involved in municipal affairs. Thus Mitchel, said to be welcoming support from the cultured classes and from big business, "utterly failed to make the plain people of the city feel that he [was] their friend, their supporter, their servant, their leader, their Mayor."⁴⁴ The "plain people" held the mass of votes essential to elect a ticket. Perhaps that helps to explain why a John F. Hylan, with blessings from Hearst and the Wigwam, won a four-year lease on City Hall.

In 1921 Hylan was reelected by an unprecedented 64.1 percent majority.⁴⁵ When Murphy died three years later he had to his credit three governors (Dix, Sulzer, and Smith), three mayors (McClellan, Gaynor, and Hylan), two United States senators (O’Gorman and Royal S. Copeland, elected in 1922), and a list of protégés who bloomed after his death (including Mayor Jimmy Walker, who was to resign in disgrace before the end of his second term, and Senator Robert F. Wagner, who was to be the author of famous New Deal legislation in housing and labor). None of Murphy’s predecessors—not Croker, not Kelly, not Tweed—enjoyed his power on the municipal, state, or national level.

Under Murphy’s men, terms like “efficiency,” “economy,” “merit,” and “reform” had more than their customary hollow meaning. The boss’s job was not to govern, but to have the city governed; this objective he achieved, though in some instances at the expense of his machine. But where Tammany played a truly important role, official defiance of the Wigwam failed to kill it. In other words, the turkeys and the ice and coal handouts continued, as did the personal contacts and the security. Here the machine always provided something which Reform was incapable of achieving, and that was why the beneficiaries stood up for the organization. Protection of small jobs, perhaps in the form of a license for a peddler’s cart, survived even under independent administration. Open graft, tied closely to saloons, brothels, and gambling houses, suffocated, and there Murphy sided with the authorities. So-called “honest graft,” on the other hand, managed to survive and flourish; but that will require its own explication in the next chapter.

Within the framework of this system, Tammany men in high places ran free as few Tammany men had before. At the same time, they realized that politics was a game of compromise; for example, with a Murphy-dominated legislature, Governor Dix was well aware that concessions on appointments might be the only way to insure passage of his legislative program. What counted, in the end, was that Murphy had the power—all at once—to put these men in office, to allow a sensible give-and-take, and to retain strict control over the organization on Fourteenth Street.

The caliber of Murphy's candidates for city and state offices was a good index of how and why he played the game. He rarely used high office as a political reward, because he realized that men who asked for such a gift were incapable of winning. He could justify such patronage on a lower level, because he was a product of the system and the system demanded employment for the faithful. But he knew that party hacks could never be elected without a drawing card at the top of the ticket. Here was the crux of the mayoral selection process: New York's municipal elections took place in off years. The straight party sweep was impossible; a candidate for City Hall could not ride into office on the coattails of a governor or a President. Staking one's political life on free silver or low tariffs made no sense, because the focus was strictly local. It was up to the mayor to carry the ticket. And when people began to look closely at the standardbearer, a party's success with election frauds and ballot theft was not enough to elect a man of incompetence.

According to the formula of nominating to win, pragmatism, more than principle, dictated choices. Producing a winning slate involved several considerations. One was the old ethnic appeal. At the turn of the century, ethno-religious politics meant recognizing the claims of Irish Catholic and native Protestant Americans.⁴⁶ Indeed, the New York Democracy was so markedly an Irish preserve that, as the politicians remember it, "in the throes of balancing a . . . state ticket," Murphy "once lamented: 'Can't anybody find me a good, vote-getting, Democratic Episcopalian?'"⁴⁷ More recent newcomers, chiefly Jews and Italians, began to win limited recognition in the middle years of the Progressive Era, but it was not until the time of La Guardia that minority group patronage and pressures prompted consistently balanced appointments and tickets as we know them today.⁴⁸

Ethnic, religious, and geographical factors were less important than the vision and ability of Murphy's candidates. Sometimes his selections combined both principle and pragmatism; when he made the Hall the vehicle for an Al Smith or a Robert Wagner, he opted for quality, and he won. His knack for choosing the right man for the moment put City Hall under the direction of a George McClellan and a William Gaynor, both acknowledged to

be among the more distinguished mayors of Greater New York.⁴⁹ Although their rapport with Murphy was limited, each embodied a large measure of independence, integrity, and respectability; in the face of reform movements, these were the characteristics that would attract votes. But sometimes availability as a candidate obscured fitness to hold an office, and certain of Murphy's choices, like Mayor Hylan and Governor Dix, were considerably less praiseworthy. Dix, for example, had been the "man for the moment" in 1910, but when he proved incapable as a statewide administrator, he failed to receive a second nod from Tammany Hall.⁵⁰

Murphy made a mistake in nominating John Dix, but the worst mistake of all was the one that revived all the old condemnations of extra-legal maneuvers and graft-infested machines. This new barrage of attacks on the Tammany system exploded in 1913, when the New York State Legislature impeached Governor William Sulzer.

IV

His Most Serious Mistake

William Sulzer was just short of his fiftieth birthday when he took the oath of office in Albany on January 1, 1913. Having left the State Assembly, after serving as speaker during his fifth term in 1893, he had gone to Washington as Tammany's congressman from the East Side's Tenth District. His predominantly Jewish constituency re-elected him to nine successive terms, during which he established a sound record of support for progressive legislation. Sulzer's brilliant oratory, ungainly figure, and rugged features reminded observers of Henry Clay, and he consciously cultivated gestures, dress, and even an unruly shock of hair in imitating the great statesman's style.¹

Politically ambitious, Sulzer urged himself on the state Democracy as a gubernatorial candidate at least five times during his congressional tenure. When Murphy reluctantly accepted him as the organization's nominee in 1912 to preserve party harmony, Sulzer promised to be a popular, appealing standardbearer. Although a product of Tammany Hall, he spoke the language of reform. But while Murphy had backed the independent-minded spellbinder, Sulzer, claiming to be "his own" governor—"the people's governor"—broke with the Hall over the familiar Progressive Era issues of patronage, graft, and direct primaries.

Impeachment

Before the end of his first week as governor, Sulzer launched a full-scale investigation of state administrative departments to root out corruption, inefficiency, and waste. Based on the Committee of Inquiry's findings, the state architect, adjutant-general, and prisons superintendent were promptly removed. Evidence of gross misuse of highway contracts and fraudulent road repairs led Sulzer to dismiss State Highways Superintendent C. Gordon Reel in

March, and to appoint John A. Hennessy special commissioner to investigate that department.²

Millions of dollars in contracts for improvements granted on a less-than-businesslike basis made highway construction a profitable source of income for Tammany-affiliated contractors. Scrutiny of the highway department's operations brought little comfort to the Hall. Although he later denied it, Murphy apparently decided that James E. Gaffney, friend, co-founder of the New York Contracting and Trucking Company, and ex-alderman, should be named to succeed Reel. Sulzer balked, as he had on several lesser appointments suggested by Tammany Hall, and the city's press exclaimed in unison that it was "Gaffney or war!"

Whether or not Murphy admitted engineering it, the skirmish over Gaffney touched off a long-brewing explosion, which appeared before the public as an impasse between the governor and the legislature. The boss and the governor had been sparring over patronage and policy ever since Sulzer's nomination, but the real battle lines were drawn on the issue of direct primaries. Following election reform promises in the Democracy's 1912 platform, Sulzer campaigned to institute direct primaries in elections for all state offices.

But the organization stole Sulzer's issue, and in February, 1913, Senator George A. Blauvelt introduced the Tammany-approved election reform bill, which made only certain minor changes in the primary system. Most important, it failed to extend the scope of primaries to include nomination of state officials.³ Having split with Murphy over Gaffney, the governor jumped into the Blauvelt debate, denounced the bill as a poor excuse for reform, and set forth his own recommendations for sweeping changes in the electoral system. The core of his message—and the most radical suggestion—was the proposal that state conventions be abolished in the interest of truly representative democracy.⁴

Sulzer's stand was pragmatic as well as principled, for he wanted a vehicle to higher office. Patronage disputes with Tammany Hall foretold that he would be abandoned in the next gubernatorial election, and direct primaries seemed to be the only means of circumventing an unsympathetic state convention and of recapturing the Democratic nomination. Moreover, attracting Woodrow

Wilson's attention could be a boon to future aspirations, and the passage of his bill, as a clear anti-organization coup, would meet with favorable reaction in Washington.

In April the legislature overwhelmingly affirmed the Blauvelt proposal, which Sulzer slapped down with a stinging veto. Trying to gain support for his own bill, the governor summoned the chairmen of the Democratic County Committees to Albany and delivered an ultimatum: those failing to rally their legislators behind the measure would be expelled from the party.⁵ Sulzer swore to "defeat and to crush the Democrats who would make the Democratic party of New York the laughing stock of the people; who would make the Democratic party of New York a political hypocrite and a political failure."⁶ Rejecting the governor's proposals, the legislators repassed a slightly modified Blauvelt bill on May 3.

Calling a special legislative session in mid-June to reconsider direct nominations, Sulzer made good his threats to replace unfriendly party regulars throughout the state with his own supporters. Decreeing political slaughter of organization appointees, he also unleashed a string of vetoes destroying nearly every bill favored by Tammany Hall, including such reform measures as the Foley-Wagner workmen's compensation bill and the Murtaugh hydro-electric bill. Moreover, he made it clear to legislators interested in particular proposals that support for direct nominations would be the price for the survival of their legislation.⁷

The legislature reconvened on June 16, and little more than a week later, Sulzer's primary bill met its second defeat. On June 25 both houses again approved the Blauvelt proposal.⁸ Unwilling to tolerate Sulzer's assault on their prerogatives, the resentful legislators authorized an investigation into methods used "to influence . . . votes . . . on election or primary legislation," and into the campaign finances of any statewide candidate in the 1912 contest (namely, Sulzer).⁹

The Frawley Legislative Investigating Committee, which conducted the inquiry, had been established during the regular session of the legislature to explore the conduct and financial administration of state departments and institutions. On August 13, on the basis of malpractices documented in the Frawley report on

Sulzer's activities, the Assembly voted to send to the State Senate eight articles of impeachment against the governor. Impeachment proceedings began September 18, and on October 17 Sulzer was found guilty of "wilfully, knowingly and corruptly" falsifying his statement of campaign receipts and disbursements (Article I), of perjuring himself in swearing to the validity of the statement he filed (Article II), and of suppressing evidence sought by the Frawley Committee by barring attendance and testimony of certain witnesses (Article IV).¹⁰

A month of testimony and debate had persuaded the High Court of Impeachment of Sulzer's innocence on five other counts. Among these, the third and fifth articles contended that the governor had bribed witnesses to withhold testimony from the Investigating Committee, and had prevented and dissuaded one man from answering a summons to testify. Article VI accused him of larceny in using unrecorded campaign contributions for personal investment in stocks through brokers on the New York Exchange. According to Article VII, he had "promised and threatened to use such authority and influence of said office of Governor for the purpose of affecting the vote or political action of certain public officers. . . ." ¹¹ Elaborating the stock exchange charges, Article VIII accused Sulzer of manipulating legislation designed to influence the price of securities in which he was speculating.

The impeachment scandal shocked the public, for Sulzer had compiled a creditable record of support for progressive legislation, first in Congress and then as governor, as the next chapter will show. Why he behaved as he did is unclear, although his motives must have been personal and political. Rehashing charges and counter-charges, motives and personal hatreds, the press reinforced the popular notion that Sulzer's impeachment was provoked by a vengeful political boss representing the most corrupt of all Democratic machines. Vying for control of New York State, Sulzer and Murphy "broke on the rock of right and wrong." Their split, the governor insisted, was "not on account of appointments . . . [or] legislation, although we differed seriously from beginning to end regarding both. The 'chief' . . . wanted me to do what I knew to be wrong. . . . the limit came when I was faced with stopping John Hennessy's investigations of corrupt highway contracts or

facing impeachment.... He went ahead exposing graft and I was removed from office."¹²

Though Murphy himself may not have profited from graft, he protected his followers who did so. But regardless of the initial reasons for pressing charges against William Sulzer, it is clear, on the basis of the Frawley Committee report, that the governor was validly impeached for crimes actually committed.

The Gaffney-Hartog Scandals

"I have never done anything wrong," Charles Murphy insisted when questioned about the impeachment, "but it is a question of me going to jail or of ousting Sulzer from the Governor's chair. You cannot trust that man in what he says now."¹³

As the evidence showed, Sulzer was in fact guilty, but just how innocent was the leader of Tammany Hall? That Murphy was soiled by the world around him cannot be denied, but he was considerably less tainted than his predecessors. Although investigations sponsored by successive governors kept the Commissioner's name constantly in the headlines, the flamboyant exposés of graft, graft, graft obscured one important fact: Murphy's complicity in any of the wrongdoing was never proved in or out of court.

Formerly, men on all levels of the Tammany organization had been identified—in the public eye, and in actual fact—with the seamiest side of the city. Saloons, gambling houses, and brothels flourished under the watchful protection of Tammany men and the municipal police force, and these condoners and promoters grew rich from the payoffs that were all part of the game. Murphy refused to tolerate these practices, and under his aegis Tammany Hall went "legal."¹⁴ Where could Tammany men find free-flowing money in the business world? From legal (or ostensibly legal) contracts, answered Murphy. And so, under the Commissioner's tutelage, "honest graft" came to be the standard method of operation.

Honest graft! A laughable contradiction in terms at first sight, but it embodied a scrupulous distinction in the minds of Tammany men. While run-of-the-mill saloon graft or blackmail was unconscionably dishonest, the skillful honest grafter was the man who could echo George Washington Plunkitt's "I seen my opportunities

and I took 'em."¹⁵ The formula was simple: "Supposin' it's a new bridge they're goin' to build. I get tipped off and I buy as much property as I can that has to be taken for approaches. I sell at my own price later on and drop some more money in the bank."¹⁶ Inside information on proposed city improvements, some of which the boss may have instigated himself, meant a clear opportunity to acquire an advantageous bargaining position and capture a nice profit.

For Murphy, this kind of graft had its own ethical code. The boss, as Arthur Krock remembers,

... was terribly against the Kansas City kind of political organization, which got its supporting funds out of prostitution and crime. He believed it was perfectly all right to get it out of concessions on taxations, or contractor's fees, and things of that kind, but he would have nothing to do with what he considered immoral things... He wouldn't protect a criminal and get the money for that, but he would take money from concessions on taxation. If your taxes should be five thousand, he'd make them three, and you'd put up one. That was all right.¹⁷

There were three channels through which honest graft could be expected to pay off—"contracts for government work, wise use of advance information on [upcoming] legislation, and ... co-operation with industrial and financial magnates."¹⁸

One group particularly adept at the game were those involved with the New York Contracting and Trucking Company, which was linked to Murphy in the 1900's through friend Gaffney and brother John Murphy.¹⁹ After its early success in dock leasing, the company looked for bigger prizes. The Pennsylvania Railroad's plans to establish service in Manhattan had long been blocked by the Board of Aldermen's refusal to grant a franchise permitting use of city streets for tunnel approaches and a terminal. Suddenly, on the recommendation of Alderman Gaffney, the railroad's request was granted when it agreed to let a \$2,000,000 contract for excavation of the terminal site to the New York Contracting and Trucking Company. Another firm had registered a bid of just \$1,600,000.²⁰

Soon thereafter, a franchise application from the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, previously held up for three years, was approved when the railroad decided to give a \$6,000,000 construction contract to Gaffney and company.²¹ Testifying at a

subsequent investigation, railroad president Charles F. Mellen revealed that the New Haven distributed nearly \$1,500,000 among local politicians before it could secure desired changes in the charter of its affiliate, the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad.²² Moreover, the investigation showed that the company paid one and a half or two times the amount of its original contract (over and above the \$6,000,000) "in buying up elapsed franchises, in obtaining certain changes in the original franchise and in taking care of certain persons in Tammany Hall 'because of their nuisance value.'"²³ While Charles Murphy was never personally implicated in any of the irregularities in contract letting, James Gaffney's sensitive position raised valid questions about Tammany's involvement.

In return for "expert advice" on strategy to win contracts for the city's Catskill Aqueduct, Gaffney received two payments of \$15,000 from the contracting firm of Mason & Hanger.²⁴ Bradley, Gaffney, and Steers, another of his Tammany-allied companies, figured prominently in the Hennessy highway investigations during the Sulzer administration. The concern garnered contracts stipulating use of a patented road cement which happened to be available almost exclusively from one of its members.²⁵ Original contract prices were raised, and raised again, and the work that was done grew progressively shoddier.²⁶ Specifications were frequently altered after contracts had been awarded, and the inspectors were usually untrained Tammany men. As John Hennessy proved in his investigation of the state architect's office, these conditions were far from unique to highways.²⁷

In view of this corruption, many have said that William Sulzer's impeachment was engineered as a determined effort to keep Tammany's top ranks out of jail. Several lesser politicians were not quite so lucky; Bart Dunn, a friend of Murphy's and himself an associate district leader, landed in prison on charges of graft and conspiracy in connection with his company's highway work.²⁸ As for Murphy, one friend insisted that he "always scrupulously avoided personal profit from municipal contracts."²⁹ Probably the boss accepted some share of the gains, but no incriminatory evidence was ever actually uncovered, and District Attorney Charles Whitman's 1914 John Doe inquiry failed to provide grounds for criminal

action.³⁰ Whitman conducted the January investigation on the basis of Sulzer's graft charges against Murphy and members of the Hall in the previous November's local campaign. Instead of yielding the damning evidence he had promised, Sulzer gave to the Grand Jury no more than a recounting—to be repeated many times over in future years—of his battle with the boss. Taciturn "Mr." Murphy went so far as to offer to take the stand himself to refute Sulzer's undocumented accusations.

The aftermath of at least one business deal proved that Murphy took an occasional fling at "legal contracts" as a moneymaking venture. One Louis N. Hartog, engaged in selling Malto Dextrine (a base for beer) to the British government in 1918, lacked the necessary influence to obtain large supplies of glucose (the base for Malto Dextrine) from the Corn Products Refining Company.³¹ Assured by Tammany district leader James H. Hines that Murphy had the influence he needed, Hartog sold the boss a 20 percent interest in his North Kensington Refinery.³²

Less than four months later, Murphy decided to pull out of the company and demanded a rebate on the \$175,000 he had advanced, plus certain sums to cover past and future profits.³³ In 1919 Hartog lodged a \$10,000,000 suit for breach of contract, charging use of threats and intimidation, and alleging that Murphy's terms of withdrawal had ruined his business.³⁴ Murphy's countersuit to recover his \$175,000 investment was brought to trial four years later. Hartog was irate at losing the boss's influence, but Murphy repeatedly claimed, "I never could see that I was going to be of any benefit other than to put in my money."³⁵ The men finally settled out of court.³⁶

Although Murphy's withdrawal from the refinery was a purely private action, the reasons he gave were linked directly with his public reputation. The Commissioner balked when Hartog insisted on increasing the price of Malto Dextrine from eight to fourteen cents a pound.

"I am going out of the business," Murphy declared, "because I can't afford to stay in this business—the head of Tammany Hall profiteering on foodstuffs, especially war time."³⁷

Breach of contract is poor business ethics, but it occurred here in a private business transaction. What is more important is Murphy's

alleged violation of the public legal code. Based on information from Hartog, a Grand Jury indictment against Murphy, his lawyer, and various men connected with the Corn Products Company was returned on June 23, 1920. The charge was conspiracy—"that [they] entered into an agreement not to report the earnings of the . . . Company and thereby evaded paying excess war profits taxes."³⁸ In 1921 the presiding state supreme court judge dismissed the indictment on the grounds of insufficient and inappropriate evidence.³⁹ That judge was Robert F. Wagner, Sr.

"Murphy Must Go!"

While Murphy may not have been above reproach, he was much cleaner than Richard Croker, and certainly cleaner than the image of the corrupt boss created in the 1913 mayoralty election. Yet, in the hands of the opposition, the contract graft issue turned into a highly effective anti-Tammany campaign weapon.

Bearing the stigma of the Hennessy investigations as well as that of the Sulzer impeachment, the Democracy entered the 1913 contest behind candidate Edward E. McCall, an undistinguished party regular who had been a lawyer and a state supreme court judge before becoming chairman of the Public Service Commission. The tense political atmosphere called for a more attractive man, but as Murphy explained, "I told McCall that I would be for him. . . . Conditions had changed when the time to make the nomination arrived. McCall insisted that he could be elected and, although I knew he could not be, he had my promise. That taught me a lesson."⁴⁰

On the surface, the Democrats were campaigning against Fusion candidate John Purroy Mitchel, formerly Commissioner of Accounts and President of the Board of Aldermen, and most recently Collector of the Port in the Gaynor administration. But their real opponent was William Sulzer, both in person and in reputation. Sulzer stumped New York City in 1913 against Murphy, McCall, and Tammany Hall, and "Nobody paid any attention to John Purroy Mitchel." McCall, and especially Sulzer, got constant press coverage. "The result was that on election day, people went to the polls and voted not *for* John Purroy Mitchel, but *against* Tammany Hall—which meant that they *had* to vote for . . .

Mitchel."⁴¹ Mitchel won the mayoralty race with 57.1 percent of the citywide votes, as compared with McCall's 37.3 percent. In Manhattan the Fusionist led by 53 to 41.8 percent, while in Brooklyn he increased his majority to 60.2 percent and held McCall to just 34.2 percent. Even the most reliable Democratic districts swung into the Fusion column; Murphy himself was unable to stem the anti-Tammany tide, and Mitchel took the Commissioner's own district with 47.3 percent of the ballots, although McCall managed a comparatively respectable 44.5 percent.⁴² Nearly all of the Wigwam's nominees for aldermen, the judiciary, and other county offices were swamped, and the Hall retained only one of sixteen votes on the powerful Board of Estimate.⁴³

Mitchel's citywide sweep spelled the beginning of a long, painful exile for Tammany. Ousted from official authority on many levels, the Democracy retreated to the bleak prospect of four years of political starvation. Just before election day, the *New York Times* had called Murphy "the unquestionable ruler of the Democratic Party in the State of New York. He got that title honestly in 1910 when he forced the nomination of Dix on the Rochester Convention. He has proved his right to it by driving Sulzer out of the Governorship."⁴⁴ But while Sulzer's impeachment may have shown the boss's statewide power, the mayoral upset which it caused stimulated widespread anti-Murphy sentiments. Hostility from Republicans or "goo goos" (as professional politicians termed good government reformers) was a commonplace, but this time the cries of "Murphy must go" came from reform and organization Democrats in New York, and even from party progressives like Woodrow Wilson and William Gibbs McAdoo in Washington.

Within three months after Mitchel's election, anti-Tammany Democrats in the city had organized and reorganized many times over; whether the groups called themselves the Jeffersonian Alliance, the Allied Democracy, or the Committee of 250, they shared a common aim: to wrest party leadership from Charles Francis Murphy.⁴⁵ But, in response to a representative National Democratic Club resolution demanding his "retirement from all participation in party affairs," the Commissioner calmly remarked, "I'm the leader of Tammany Hall and I'm going to remain the leader of Tammany Hall."⁴⁶

While newspapers editorialized that Murphy was "already done for politically," and that "his race . . . [was] run," he knew better.⁴⁷ Announcing that "I am going to stay here as long as I live," he dismissed reports that he was contemplating retirement as the product of the "Committee on Rumors."⁴⁸ As he recognized, the opposition was really nothing new. Back in 1907 former Congressman Jefferson Monroe Levy had announced a Democratic conference on dethroning "the most autocratic Czar that ever headed Tammany Hall,"⁴⁹ and in 1912 both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Jacob L. Ten Eyck had led statewide crusades against Murphy's particular brand of bossism.⁵⁰

Measuring the newest skirmishes against former assaults and testing his strength in the executive committee, Murphy apparently found enough support to satisfy him that neither the Wigwam nor the state Democracy would soon change hands. But the Commissioner was unprepared for close—and unfriendly—surveillance of Tammany Hall from Washington. Treasury Secretary William Gibbs McAdoo coordinated the initial anti-Murphy strategy. According to the press, McAdoo still smarted from the state organization's rejection of his gubernatorial aspirations in 1912. Interpreting the rebuke as a partly personal insult from Murphy, the cabinet official started a drive to oust the Commissioner from the forefront of the New York machine.⁵¹ Hoping to develop a personal political machine in New York State—probably as a springboard to a Presidential nomination—McAdoo collaborated with Colonel Edward N. House and others to unite anti-Tammany forces into a rival Democratic organization known as "The New Democracy."⁵² Collector of the Port Dudley Field Malone, a Wilson appointee with a firm grip on city patronage, divided his time between Washington and New York in conferences on a possible "state purge."⁵³

When the first McAdoo scheme failed, national party figures looked to other measures against Murphy. Although no details were made public, the New York *American* hinted that McAdoo, William Jennings Bryan, and Franklin D. Roosevelt would join forces as a "Board of Strategy." The three were almost type-cast as attackers of Murphy—Bryan for his personal hatred of the Tammany boss, McAdoo for his desire to become an important political

factor in New York City, and Roosevelt for his insurgent efforts upstate. The heart of the plan was to reduce still further the patronage available to Murphy. "By convincing the organization that under Murphy it [could] expect no patronage . . . the Administration [believed] it [could] bring about a revolt in Tammany Hall."⁵⁴

At first, President Wilson supported House, Malone, and McAdoo; met readily with New York Governor Martin Glynn to discuss possible reorganization of the state Democracy; and established a clear policy of funneling federal patronage outside traditional Tammany channels—if he chose to give New York any patronage at all.⁵⁵ But with the onset of the 1914 gubernatorial primary campaigns, he retreated to an official position of precarious neutrality between machine and anti-machine forces. Fearing that a serious party split would invite Republican victory in November, the President hoped for a viable compromise, and finally backed the Democracy's designee, Glynn, who lost to Charles S. Whitman in the fall election. During the latter's two terms in Albany, Wilson's administration followed a policy of limited conciliation. The President's secretary, Joe Tumulty, granted Murphy enough patronage and discretion on appointments and nominations to prevent Tammany sabotage of the national party's programs and candidates.⁵⁶

While the tension between Wilson and Murphy dwindled, the Commissioner faced more important rifts at home. In July of 1917 the *New York Sun* could not remember conditions ever being "so bad as they now are. Every district clubhouse harbors men who openly declare their opinion that Boss Murphy should step down and let the rank and file of the organization have a voice in restoring harmony to the Democratic party in New York County."⁵⁷ Announcement of the municipal Democratic ticket touched off spurts of revolt within the organization; the *Times* of August 20 reported "open rebellion in Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx," and documented the defection of district leader and Surveyor of the Port Thomas E. Rush because of Supreme Court nominations.⁵⁸ One day later the *Sun* noted that Tammany leaders in five counties had declared war on the Hall.⁵⁹

The 1917 mayoralty campaign sent the solidly Democratic Sullivan clan scurrying to support Fusionist Mayor Mitchel. The

Sullivan Club, nearly two hundred strong, denounced Tammany's leaders as a "selfish group and the corporations they favor . . . [a] little coterie of greedy men . . . utterly out of touch with the progressive principles of democracy as expressed by President Wilson." Labelling Murphy a creature of Delmonico's and Good Ground, unlike "the poor man's friend" Mitchel, Patrick Sullivan, president of the club, charged the Commissioner with focusing the upcoming campaign on the "bunco issue of the rich against the poor."⁶⁰ This was no ordinary outburst of independent zeal; "Big Tim" Sullivan had been a district leader years before Charlie Murphy succeeded Ed Hagan, and the family had long held a large section of the East Side as a feudal fief for Tammany Hall. The Sullivans knew Tammany inside out; how many New Yorkers might think the Sullivans were leaving a sinking ship?⁶¹

Few did. And despite five years of organizational turmoil, Tammany Hall rallied to carry the city at the polls that November. With national progressives, upstate reformers, and many Tammany regulars against him, Murphy ran John F. Hylan, the choice of William Randolph Hearst, for mayor on the Democratic slate in 1917.

Playing to party harmony, Murphy rounded out the ticket with Charles L. Craig for comptroller, David H. Knott for sheriff, and Alfred E. Smith for president of the Board of Aldermen. With the Republicans divided between nominee William Bennett and incumbent Mitchel (forced to run as an independent), and with Morris Hillquit polling the largest socialist vote in the city's history, Judge Hylan won City Hall by a 158,500 ballot plurality.⁶²

"Stop Murphy"? Even those who shouted loudest failed to topple the Commissioner. His unique staying power was due in no small measure to his growing awareness of civic responsibility. Certainly, it would be naive to insist that all was clean and orderly in Tammany Hall during this decade. The record, and common sense, show otherwise. Plunkitt's formula for honest graft still involved party regulars in dishonest actions. But at the same time, New Yorkers were treated to the curious phenomenon of the boss of Tammany Hall condemning a business operation as "profiteering." Would Richard Croker ever have said that he could not afford to make that kind of money? A man who openly admitted

that he was "in it for his own pocket" would hardly have cared much for distinctions in the sources of his profits.

Why did the newspapers proclaim corruption and ignore the slow, subtle change in Tammany attitudes, policies, and personalities? For one thing, they had long been in the habit of assaulting the organization—and attacks on certain features of the *system* of machine government were justified. In fact, the press probably did document the parallel, positive current running through the Hall, although most contemporary journalists might have denied it. They all recorded (with less fanfare than was given to their graft exposés, of course) the elections and the legislation, the names and the actions, that built the change, but they rarely, if ever, stopped to fit the evidence together and evaluate the process they were documenting.

Charles Murphy may have been equally oblivious—at least in the beginning—to the magnitude and meaning of the pattern he was engineering. Yet, while Murphy ruled Tammany Hall and while his Democratic cohorts held sway in Albany, New York State awoke in the midst of the Progressive Era.

Tammany Reformers in the Progressive Era

Following the scholarship of Alfred D. Chandler Jr., George E. Mowry, and Richard Hofstadter, contemporary historians commonly define twentieth-century Progressivism as a movement generated by the white-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant urban elite caught in a squeeze between corporations and labor.¹ That many Progressive leaders were of that sort cannot be denied. Yet such men as William Jennings Bryan, Robert M. La Follette, and Woodrow Wilson, although white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, were different from Theodore Roosevelt, Henry L. Stimson, and Charles Evans Hughes in that they were not big-city men. Nor can the "status-revolution" thesis account for a Charles Murphy of New York or a James Michael Curley of Boston, whose big-city immigrant constituencies consistently supported national Progressives.

"Murphy" and "Progressivism"? Surely, those must be contradictory terms. Murphy was the man of the Gaffney-Hartog scandals, the man who impeached Governor William Sulzer, the man from whom Fusionist John P. Mitchel stole the mayoralty in 1913, the man whom William Randolph Hearst urged New Yorkers to throw into jail—and most important, the boss of Tammany Hall. Yet Robert S. Binkerd, a former secretary of the Citizens Union during the Progressive Era, has written: "Tammany was in flux, so that . . . the reformers were no longer in the exclusive possession of reform. . . . That was a very subtle change which I have never seen referred to very much."²

The Progressive Era signalled another important change in Tammany Hall. Traditionally, the organization had been provincial, agreeing with George W. Plunkitt that even Brooklynites were "natural-born hayseeds," and suspiciously eyeing upstate New York as foreign territory. "Upstate Democrats! I didn't know there was any upstate Democrats," Boss Croker once ex-

claimed.³ Forays to Democratic National Conventions won "cries of derision," for, "in their larger relations the American people [would] . . . not tolerate the kind of leadership that they [took] . . . as a matter of course in their municipal affairs."⁴ Yet, under Charles F. Murphy, Tammany vied with the kingmakers at the party's conventions and ultimately put forth its own man for President of the United States.

Whose Man in the White House?

When the Tammany delegates boarded the Convention Special for Baltimore in 1912, New York State had recently become the province of Charles Francis Murphy, who had his own men securely in Albany and even in Washington. By the time Murphy reached the Free State in late June, Democrats the nation over were watching two men—New Jersey's Governor Woodrow Wilson and Missouri's Champ Clark, speaker of the House of Representatives in the Sixty-second Congress. A third man, all too familiar to the party, was watching carefully, too. Having led the ticket to defeat in three previous contests, William Jennings Bryan could hardly expect to be renominated. Nevertheless, he intended to have his say about the party's next standardbearer, and he might be forgiven the hope that a deadlock between Wilson and Clark would send the convention rallying back to the Cross of Gold.

Clark's first-ballot lead jumped on the tenth, when Charles Murphy abandoned Ohio Governor Judson Harmon, the choice of the "financial element," and swung the ninety-man New York delegation behind the Missourian.⁵ Bryan, an avowed enemy of the Tammany men, soon threw Nebraska's support to Wilson; when the governor finally went over the top, even the Murphy contingent was trailing along with him. Where Murphy's sympathies lay is hard to say; when Illinois boss Roger Sullivan, equally intent on killing any Bryan aspirations, decided to cast his state's votes for Wilson, the Tammany leader reportedly commented, "You are doing the right thing, Roger. New York would go to Wilson, too, if our support on account of the attitude of Bryan might not hurt him more than it would help him. Wilson, as President, will not do anything for you or me, but to nominate him is the right thing to do. It is up to us to forget personal advan-

tages or preferences and act for the party's and the country's good."⁶ Backing Clark to send Bryan into the opposite camp, and then climbing aboard the Wilson bandwagon in time to speak up on the final tally was masterly strategy typical of a pragmatic big-city boss.

"Mr. Murphy," the New York *Telegram* reported on June 23, "is a bigger factor here today than any Tammany Hall leader has ever been in a National Convention."

When the new President was inaugurated the following March, Tammany Hall, unique in Washington's panorama of "spectacular sights," made the capital city "sit up and take notice."⁷ The "silk-hatted, gray-gloved New Yorkers" were given a first-rate sendoff at home to the tune of the "Fourteenth Street Lyrics": "Fifteen hundred glistening tiles,/Fifteen hundred hopeful smiles—/C.F. Murphy and his wiles/Are going to Washington."⁸ In Washington, where the band broke into strains of "Tammany," the braves marched smartly up Pennsylvania Avenue behind their leader; when they passed the reviewing stand, President Wilson turned to his wife and exclaimed, "That's Charlie Murphy."⁹

Despite Tammany's role in the pomp and celebration, Murphy's sober evaluation set the tone for the relationship between Fourteenth Street and the White House during the next four years. When he warned Roger Sullivan that the new President would "not do anything for you or me," he accurately described the lack of patronage that seriously weakened Tammany's grasp of New York. But Wilson's initial efforts to unseat Murphy failed, and at the 1916 convention in St. Louis the New Yorkers, following former Governor Glynn's fiery anti-war keynote address, joined the roaring delegates in acclaiming the President's renomination.¹⁰ "Tammany," *Collier's* reported, "is said to be sincere in its support of Wilson. For once it is not accused of seeking spoils only."¹¹

The election saw a hesitant agreement that the boss would back the national ticket if the President agreed to leave the city domain alone and to stop any Washington interference on the side of Fusion in the next year's municipal campaign. Some semblance of cooperation with the National Committee was seen as the only assurance of Tammany survival during the coming four years.¹²

The Democracy's efforts in behalf of the ticket met with only limited local success, for Wilson lost New York State and carried New York City by no more than 40,000 votes.¹³

Jubilant after eight years of power, the nation's Democrats moved westward to San Francisco in 1920, where the New York convention delegation was quartered in the St. Francis Hotel. Murphy took a strong hand in the nomination of Ohio's Governor James M. Cox against the claims of William Gibbs McAdoo, Murphy's long-time rival.¹⁴ Recognizing Murphy's role in his own selection and deferring to regional protocol, Cox sent his manager, Edmond H. Moore, to seek the boss's approval of New York's Franklin D. Roosevelt, early Tammany foe and Assistant Secretary of the Navy, as the nominee for vice president of the United States. A surprised Murphy said that, despite his dislike for Roosevelt, he would be glad to go along with Cox. After all, "That was the first time that anyone in the national convention ever asked his approval on anything or ever sought his advice, and he was grateful to Cox even for the recognition."¹⁵ Because of this unheard of "courtesy" to a Tammany man, Murphy claimed that he "would vote for the devil himself if Cox wanted [him] to."¹⁶

"San Francisco," editorialized *World's Work*, "represents the greatest triumph in the history of Tammany Hall. A Presidential candidate whom it has favored has never before been received with anything except contempt in a national convention."¹⁷ Or, as the *New York Times* concurred, "Tammany has emerged from the . . . Convention of 1920 with greater honor and credit than has been its portion at any other convention within the memory of the present generation in politics."¹⁸

Charles Murphy's rise to a commanding national position in the Democratic Party depended on more than the sheer numerical strength of the Empire State. The power belonged to Murphy, not just to New York. The ever-watchful press credited him with three qualities designed to win respect: other national leaders, the journalists said, readily recognized that the Tammany boss was "strong with his own people"; they acknowledged his success in dealing with heads of opposing factions; and they admired his "rugged determination to fight by deeds rather than by words."¹⁹

The Happy Warrior

With this new stature Murphy was ready to nominate his own President of the United States in 1924. Having groomed his man for nearly a dozen years, he began, just as methodically, to lay the groundwork necessary to capture the party's votes. Murphy's general convention strategy had developed several years earlier at French Lick, Indiana, where he struck up an informal pact with his counterparts in other key states. Illinois' Roger Sullivan (who would be replaced after his death by George E. Brennan), Pennsylvania's James M. Guffey, and Indiana's Tom Taggart used to join Murphy at Taggart's French Lick summer resort, where they conferred on a general plan of action for an upcoming convention. Agreement among the Big Four meant that "they could go a long way toward swinging . . . [the convention], and thereby greatly increasing their prestige and power."²⁰ In San Francisco Taggart, Murphy, and Brennan held firm against McAdoo, and when Murphy and Brennan met at French Lick in November, 1923, the *Times* speculated that their "influence in the next Democratic National Convention would be second to that of no other party leaders."²¹

Murphy doubtless hoped to marshal the French Lick forces behind his man in 1924. It was not that they could dictate the convention's choice, but the spectacle of these pivotal state delegations marching and voting in unison would produce a powerful mass psychological effect. Why not direct this force toward the nomination of Alfred Emanuel Smith?

During his terms as governor of New York State, Al Smith had compiled an outstanding record, so that it was not idle dreaming on Murphy's part to say that his final goal was to put one of Tammany's men in the White House.²² To give his candidate every advantage, he joined the New York *World's* crusade to bring the national convention to the Empire State. With Arthur Krock as an informal intermediary between Murphy and Democratic National Chairman Cordell Hull, the deal was finally arranged, and Madison Square Garden prepared to welcome the Democratic throngs.²³

Murphy conducted endless secret negotiations with delegations the country over, but he died on April 25, just a few weeks before

the customary French Lick conference. In their obituaries the newspapers reported substantial political spadework in behalf of the Smith candidacy; by April, Murphy had already lined up powerful Democratic leaders in Illinois (Brennan), Ohio (Cox and Durbin), Pennsylvania (Guffey), New Jersey (Silzer and Edwards), Maryland (Ritchie), and all New England (except Homer S. Cummings of Connecticut).²⁴

George Brennan quickly volunteered to spearhead the Smith drive, but Tom Taggart was pledged to the candidacy of Indiana's favorite son, Senator Samuel M. Ralston.²⁵ Nevertheless, Murphy had alerted the nation's press to his intentions, and after his death there was a storm of speculation over Smith's fate. One side of the debate insisted that without Murphy's support Smith's candidacy would collapse; the other held that Smith might stand a better chance untainted by the Tammany sponsorship. But any political professional took—at least in retrospect—a more sober view, best summarized by Democratic State Chairman Herbert Claiborne Pell. "We entered that Convention," Pell felt, "with . . . a fair, not a good, but a fair chance of victory."²⁶ James Farley assessed Smith's chances more bluntly; Murphy's death, he suggested, never "had any effect at all on Smith," because "Smith could not be nominated for the presidency at that time. There was just no chance to get a two-thirds majority."²⁷

Casting over one hundred ballots before settling for John W. Davis, the convention caused press and professionals alike to wonder whether Murphy would have held out for Al Smith. The *New York Times*, for example, lamented the leader's loss with the prediction that no one but Murphy, however loyal, would have stuck with Smith until the very end.²⁸ The more informed, however, felt certain that Murphy would have been wise enough to use his authority to stop the Democratic dissension that helped elect Calvin Coolidge in November. The convention first split over a platform plank condemning the Ku Klux Klan. The fight that exploded when a stronger plank was proposed made many Americans believe that the Democrats favored the Klan. "If Murphy had lived," Herbert Pell suggested, "he would have had sufficient control of the New York delegates and sufficient respect from the leaders of the Convention to have prevented this Klan fight, and

left the already fairly strong plank as it was.”²⁹ More important, he would probably never have permitted the uncontrolled succession of ballots; more likely, he would have forced the McAdoo camp into a compromise, and the convention would have seen an early withdrawal of the Smith and McAdoo candidacies, since neither “had any possible chance of winning.”³⁰

Regardless of the outcome of the 1924 convention, the very fact that Al Smith could be recognized as a serious contender for the Presidential nomination hinted that a fundamental revolution had occurred in Tammany Hall. Think of it for a moment: a Tammany man seeking the Democratic nomination in 1924—and winning it four years later. Richard Croker had never so much as nominated a governor, and yet Charles F. Murphy was seriously presenting his candidate to the whole country. Something far-reaching must have happened for millions of Americans—who could afford to be principled about their *national* government—to see a potential chief executive in a man born and raised in Tammany territory.³¹

In building a “solid and reputable footing for Smith,” Murphy did the only thing he could do; in the larger political view, he “made Tammany respectable,”³² so that able young men like the Happy Warrior continued to graduate from “the Charlie Murphy Institute.”³³ Murphy wanted a responsible political organization, not a Croker-Kelly-Tweed Tammany Hall, and it was his plan to develop capable, farsighted young people who could govern well with the support of his machine. It was no accident that men like Al Smith, or Robert Wagner, and not just party hacks, grew up within Tammany Hall. As the Commissioner himself explained:

Formerly, it was difficult for young men of talent and ambition to get into public life. They were discouraged at every step by those already in who wished to keep the influence within as narrow bounds as possible. I encouraged the selection of young men for public office, particularly for legislative positions, encouraged them to develop their talent, to keep free from demoralizing influences, to speak their minds, do what was right and develop character and a reputation which would do credit to themselves and reflect favorably upon the organization and my leadership. These young men went out into public life and made good. . . . They gave you a different viewpoint of what Tammany Hall is and its aims and aspirations.³⁴

This simple statement signalled a change, not just within the Hall, but a change in the ruling elements in New York State,

which came to mean a new orientation in what people might expect from their government. When those with the power to govern began to share popular expectations and assumptions, the entire state looked forward to more responsible, responsive, compassionate administrations.

Al Smith was just one of a new type of organization men who developed politically under the tutelage of Charles Francis Murphy. They were different, as the *New York Post* (no Tammany sympathizer) explained, in that they “are not of the old Tammany brew of hacks and tools of the boss. They are strong partisans, waging keen partisan war, but with clean weapons. They have ideas of their own. If their ideas clash with those of the organization, they will probably end by doing the organization’s bidding, but not until after they have spoken their minds—and their opinions carry weight.”³⁵

Some governed in elective office, and some unofficially. Among the latter was Ed Flynn, boss of the Bronx and later chairman of the Democratic National Committee, who claimed, “Whatever knowledge of politics I have, I learned largely through Mr. Murphy.”³⁶ Surrogate James A. Foley (earlier a state senator), the Commissioner’s son-in-law, was another prominent protégé; nothing made Murphy quite so proud as the often-repeated acknowledgment that Foley was one of the most outstanding men ever to have reached the Surrogate’s Bench.³⁷

Even Jimmy Walker behaved himself when Murphy was around. As a state assemblyman and then as a state senator “Beau James” sponsored significant reform-minded legislation. When he took over as Senate Democratic floor leader in 1919, he called Murphy for the expected directive on patronage distribution. The Commissioner’s response expressed his attitude toward his young men. “You’re the leader, aren’t you, Senator Jim?” Murphy asked. “Use your own judgment. If it’s good, you’ll be an asset to the party. If it isn’t—well, the sooner we find it out, the better.”³⁸ Walker became mayor of New York City in 1925 and later resigned after well-publicized scandals and inquiries. Yet, the political Jimmy Walker of the Seabury investigation was far different from the same public official of the state legislature during Murphy’s lifetime.

By far the most noteworthy pair of Murphy's protégés were Robert F. Wagner, Sr., and Alfred E. Smith. Their careers are already well known. Wagner distinguished himself in the state legislature, where he served as majority leader of its upper house; he later held the lieutenant-governorship, and then began an equally outstanding career as a judge of the State Supreme Court. In 1926, running on the same ticket that sent Al Smith back to Albany for the fourth time, Wagner defeated James W. Wadsworth in the race for the United States Senate seat. While in Washington he compiled a first-rate record as a leading congressional champion of New Deal measures.

After more than a decade in the state legislature, Al Smith became, in rapid succession, sheriff of New York County (elected in 1916), president of the city's Board of Aldermen (elected in 1917), and governor of the State of New York (elected to a first term in 1918, defeated in 1920, and reelected in 1922, 1924, and 1926). His governorship was outstanding for its attention to social and political reform, and his administration was unique in the high quality of his appointees. "People often expressed astonishment that this governor, a product of Tammany Hall, was giving the state the most non-partisan administration it perhaps had ever seen. The credit for it belongs mostly to Governor Smith, but also in part to Charles F. Murphy."³⁹

Nowhere was there any hint of bucking the machine in order to give New York decent government. From the beginning, Murphy made it clear that his claim on Smith was limited; "I shall be asking you for things, Al," he once said, "but I want to say this to you: You understand these things much better than I do. If I ever ask you to do anything which you think would impair your record as a great governor, just tell me so and that will be the end of it."⁴⁰

Here, then, was the key: Al Smith was a thoroughgoing machine regular, but he was a reformer, too, and his governorship progressed in nearly perfect harmony with the wishes of Charles Francis Murphy. The boss not only agreed to the programs Smith set up, but he also approved when the governor surrounded himself with reform-minded advisers like James A. Foley, Abram I. Elkus, Joseph M. Proskauer, Belle Moskowitz, and Robert Moses.⁴¹ For a

long time good government and the machine had, by definition, been almost completely antithetical; but now, under the leadership of Robert Wagner and Al Smith, forward-looking New Yorkers would find that the machine was with them.

"War Board" Politics: New York State Moves to the Left

The fresh talent in Tammany Hall framed policy and executed reforms. Those closest to Charles Murphy noted a distinguishable shift in Tammany's outlook and methods, marked most obviously by a change in the boss's inner circle of advisers. In the early years Murphy's chief consultants were Daniel Cohalan, "the happy, optimistic Irishman," and lawyer John Quinn, "the grim, sardonic, silent type of Irishman."⁴² Others included Samuel Untermyer and corporation lawyers John D. Stanchfield and Morgan J. O'Brien. From the business world Murphy attracted Thomas Fortune Ryan and Anthony Brady.⁴³ At that time, as always, the decisions were ultimately Murphy's, but the counsel on which he based them tended to be narrower and more conservative. As Jeremiah Mahoney has explained it, the first advisers were "reactionaries . . . [who] were looking out for their own interests."⁴⁴ But by 1911 the cast of counsellors began to change; Murphy not only advanced the political interests of his "young men," but he listened to their ideas and liked what he heard. As a consequence, the Commissioner became "progressive"—"a bigger and better man in every way."⁴⁵ Whether the schemes were his matters little; what counts is that he recognized men of ability and consented to their programs.

There were various levels of advice and advisers. The men might congregate at Delmonico's or at Canoe Place Inn, near Murphy's and Smith's Long Island homes. They were experts—"leading lawyers and well-trained business men." Murphy rarely contradicted a policy recommendation from these specialists; "If he placed his confidence in a man, he allowed that man to make the decision."⁴⁶ After all, as the Commissioner often said, "If these men do not understand this thing, who does?"⁴⁷ Regular weekend meetings at Delmonico's drew together legislative leaders and "laymen" of the above-mentioned caliber. According to Al Smith, the group included "Martin Littleton, Congressman Tom Smith, Senator Wagner, and myself; and from time to time individuals

were called in who had special knowledge or information on some piece of legislation. These meetings were largely for the purpose of discussing measures of benefit not alone to the city but to the whole state, and to map out party strategy."⁴⁸

Al Smith, Tom Smith (secretary of Tammany Hall), Wagner, Foley, and Jeremiah Mahoney (Wagner's law partner, member of the Hall's Executive Committee, later Commissioner of Accounts and State Supreme Court judge) were the young men closest to Charles Murphy. Mahoney grew in influence after his election as leader of the Twenty-ninth assembly district in 1916. Among his most constructive contributions as a counsellor was the founding in 1919 of a permanent "War Board" of advisers and strategists to "make the organization more progressive and of greater value to the community." As he put it, "One time I said to him, 'Mr. Murphy, every campaign we get the brains of our party together for three or four weeks to write the speeches and to advise candidates. Then we break up. Why don't we continue that "War Board" in existence?'"⁴⁹ With the boss's approval Mahoney drew together men like Public Service Commissioner Daniel O'Brien, John Delaney (who later held O'Brien's post), Fire Commissioner Joseph Johnson, Assemblyman Joseph Callahan (later justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court), mayoral adviser Charles Kerrigan and, of course, Smith, Foley, Walker, and Wagner. The War Board's function was clear-cut: as Mahoney said, "We just thought out the problems."⁵⁰

The answers these men found for the problems they tackled formed the progressive policy of the state Democratic Party for over a decade. The enactment of that program set the New York legislature squarely among those most willing to accommodate prevailing reform sentiments. What kind of ideas were they? Mahoney, with understandable pride, points to the War Board's advocacy of "the cause of the underprivileged, the cause of labor . . . the social security program."⁵¹ Beyond that, Tammany fell into line behind governmental reforms—direct primaries, home rule for New York City, women's suffrage. None of these policies was original with the New York Democracy, of course; each represented a phase of the nationwide Progressive movement. As expressed in the states, the Progressive impulse rested on three broad

principles: to remove "corrupt special influence" from the economy, to alter the governmental structure to permit more direct popular participation in civic affairs, and to expand the functions of the government to meet growing social and industrial needs.⁵²

These principles took shape as specific reforms. Among those championing fundamental change in the Empire State were non-governmental citizens' reform groups, liberal newspapers like Hearst's *American* and Pulitzer's *World*, and, occasionally, reform-minded public officials. Among the first to take the crusade into high office was Charles Evans Hughes, governor of New York from 1907 through 1910. As a proper white Protestant lawyer, Hughes was appalled at revelations of immorality in government and business. Caught up in the fervor of his class to purify society, Hughes achieved the enactment of several essential, forward-looking measures. For example, he proposed land and water conservation and development projects. Laws governing banking and insurance practices were of special concern to the former insurance investigator; and, "Perhaps his most important business reform measures involved the creation of an up-to-date State Public Utility Commission."⁵³ Concentrating heavily on legislation to benefit labor, the governor won approval for measures setting safety and health standards and working hours in factories, mines, tunnels, and railroads. "Employees' rights in the courts were more clearly defined,"⁵⁴ and "in 1910 New York became the first state to pass a *compulsory* workmen's compensation law, although in 1911 her highest court ruled that statute unconstitutional."⁵⁵ Hughes held out a new hope for the children of New York through improved child labor laws and through universal public education. During his second administration he lobbied strongly, although unsuccessfully, for governmental reforms like direct primaries, the simplified ballot, and democratized parties.⁵⁶

Certainly, change was in the air, but its direction and intensity depended on those in a position to turn it into law. Hughes' successors—Dix, Sulzer, and Glynn—held office during four of the most crucial years for the Progressive movement in New York State. Despite Dix's failings as an administrator and Sulzer's impeachment, both contributed their support to forward-looking legislation. More important, in 1911 and 1913 both houses of the

state legislature fell into the Democratic camp, with Al Smith as speaker of the Assembly in the latter year and Robert Wagner as majority leader of the Senate. It was under these extraordinary legislators that the pleas for reform successfully penetrated Tammany Hall. Having lived among working people all his life, Smith, at least, knew about their conditions, their difficulties, and their hopes. A catastrophe made these problems come alive for the public.

On March 25, 1911, a spectacular fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist Company claimed the lives of 146 New York City workers.⁵⁷ Trapped behind locked doors nine floors above Washington Place, the men and women jumped from the windows of the blazing Asch building, suffocated, or were trampled to death. Triangle, a million-dollar blouse manufacturer, employed hundreds of Italian and Jewish immigrants, many of them children, for meager wages under deplorable working conditions. In 1909 the newly unionized workers, backed by some of the richest women in the city, had held out against the company in a thirteen-week strike, only to have their demands for union recognition rejected, as well as their "demands . . . for adequate fire escapes and for open doors from the factories to the street."⁵⁸ "... [To] maintain discipline, to prevent pilfering, and to keep out union organizers," the doors were kept locked during working hours, and departing employees were forced to pass a daily inspection at the appointed exit.⁵⁹

On March 25 that particular exit led directly into the fire. If the doors had been unlocked, if the men who owned Triangle had thought to install a sprinkler system, or if New York's fire safety laws had been less blatantly inadequate, those immigrant workers might not have lost their lives. But, as one pastor sermonized, "Someone was too eager to make money out of human energy to provide the proper safeguards and protections."⁶⁰

Unable to determine whether the owners knew that the Washington Place door was locked during working hours—and during the fire—a jury acquitted "shirtwaist kings" Max Blanck and Isaac Harris of charges of manslaughter.⁶¹

Popular indignation over the circumstances of the Triangle fire led the state legislature to establish a special Factory Investigating Commission in June, 1911. While the most obvious problems were

fire prevention and factory conditions, the group received a "mandate broad enough to include the general problems of labor relations in the state."⁶² The chairman and vice-chairman of the nine-man commission were Robert F. Wagner and Al Smith.

While the Triangle fire incensed the populace at large, the investigation sparked a new social consciousness among those in politics.⁶³ The commission unearthed incredible laxity in factory legislation, and appalling facts about female and child labor, unsanitary and dangerous working conditions, and inhuman working hours. By 1914 the commission added several dozen new laws to New York's labor code, including measures "limiting the hours of labor of women and children, abolishing night shifts for them, bringing canneries under the labor law, providing seats with backs for women workers, and prohibiting the employment of women immediately after childbirth."⁶⁴ The commission's recommendations, enacted into law under the guidance of Smith and Wagner, opened the way for a flood of progressive measures.

The Legislative Record

The new legislation began in 1911 and continued at a reduced rate through 1912, but by far the most constructive year was 1913.⁶⁵ Enjoying the infrequent luxury of Democratic control of both houses of the legislature, Tammany leaders helped themselves to the chairmanships of nearly every important committee. "Up-state Democrats," the *New York Times* remarked, "must content themselves with a few crumbs from the Tammany table."⁶⁶ Holding 98 of 150 seats in the Assembly and 32 out of 51 in the Senate, the Democrats, under the control of Tammany Hall, would clearly determine the outcome of any vote.⁶⁷

Republicans, Progressives, and independent Democrats watched in disbelief as Tammany turned to reform. First, acting on the recommendations of Senator Wagner's investigating commission, the last of the factory legislation was passed, completing, in Henry Moskowitz's words, "the most enlightened labor code ever placed on the statute books of any state."⁶⁸ On March 14, Governor Sulzer signed the first factory bills of the session, one regulating sanitary conditions in all work rooms, and the other prohibiting women from working between the hours of 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.⁶⁹

Just three weeks later, the governor approved several more Tammany-backed measures. In addition to the Walker fire insurance bill, these laws authorized establishment of a State Industrial Board with jurisdiction over working conditions in dangerous trades and general health and safety; required that owners maintain sanitary quarters for their workers and provide washrooms and lockers in all foundries; prohibited smoking in factories and called for installation of fire alarm signal systems in factory buildings, with fire drills to be held under official supervision; required inclosure of elevators and hoisting shafts in the buildings; and stipulated that physical examinations be given all children employed in factories.⁷⁰

On May 10 the governor rounded out the factory legislation, signing measures prohibiting employment of girls under 21 in factories between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m., and employment of children in "operation of dangerous machinery and at trades injurious to their health." A third measure regulated bakery conditions, and a fourth, recalling the Triangle tragedy, required "ample fire escapes and exits" and made provisions preventing overcrowding in factory buildings.⁷¹ At the same time, Sulzer approved the Doty and Dorst bills concerning working hours and vacations for railroad employees, and the Hearn bill, setting the daily wage for laborers and mechanics working on State canals at two dollars.⁷²

Within less than four months, the *New York Times* observed, this legislature "put on the statute books more legislation for the benefit of labor than any Legislature for the past twenty years."⁷³

Beyond institutionalizing time and safety standards for workers and meeting the special needs of women and children, the legislature reorganized the Labor Department, giving it "ample power to enforce the law and initiate further reforms."⁷⁴ New York finally recognized the necessity of providing widows' pensions, stricter tenement regulations, scholarships for the underprivileged, and public employment agencies.⁷⁵ Striking against police involvement in prostitution and gambling, the legislators created a Welfare Commission to enforce laws in these areas.⁷⁶

Consistent with traditional Progressive concern for economic policy, the legislature concentrated heavily on financial and business reforms. It ratified the Federal income tax amendment, and

strengthened the State Public Utility Commission. In addition, "The insurance, banking, and stock market industries were brought under even tighter control, and so were the cold storage and other businesses of vital concern to the consuming public."⁷⁷ On February 20 Sulzer signed into law measures "for the protection of [insurance] policy holders."⁷⁸ And on March 7 the State Insurance Department gained "supervision and control over the promoting of insurance companies, the sale of their securities, and the holding of capital stock."⁷⁹ In December the Senate approved measures governing formation of mutual insurance companies and subjecting insurance rates to approval by the Employers Liability Commission.⁸⁰

On March 25, by a vote of 85-34, the Assembly passed the Levy Bill, requiring incorporation of the New York Stock Exchange. And, the *Times* of March 26 further reported, Senator Wagner changed his mind and decided to support it in the upper house, thereby guaranteeing its passage. Envisaging further curbs on Wall Street speculation, legislators sent to the governor a bill requiring brokers to deliver to customers memoranda detailing the buying-selling transaction, and another making it a felony for brokers to "trade against the customer's orders in stocks or bonds."⁸¹ In banking, a commission was created to revise relevant statutes.⁸²

Looking at utilization of natural resources, the Democrats "moved far beyond Governor Hughes' position" on conservation, and "committed their party to the principle of public ownership, generation, and distribution of electric energy."⁸³ On May 1 the Murtaugh-Patrie Hydro-Electric Bill, authorizing an "experiment in the ownership and operation of hydro-electric plants under State auspices," passed the Assembly by a vote of 98-21, and the Senate 32-5.⁸⁴ Similarly, a "series of measures that increased state aids to agriculture provided further evidence of the Democratic administration's conviction that the government's role must be expanded to fit modern conditions."⁸⁵

This is not to say that the legislative session prior to the impeachment trial was of a single, non-partisan, Progressive piece. On the one hand, in an area traditionally ripe with partisan bounty, the Assembly passed the much-needed Highway Department Reorganization Bill without Tammany's stalling for assuran-

ces of patronage.⁸⁶ On the other hand, a Senate-passed bill blessed, in the words of the *New York Times*, a "Tammanyized State Civil Service Commission."⁸⁷ The City Democracy backed bills increasing the salaries of the State Architect and Highway Commissioner.⁸⁸ Setting a record for labor reforms, the Tammany-dominated legislature also included a record 879 bills affecting New York City—an increase of 60 percent over the preceding year. "Many of these," according to the *Times*, "[raided] the New York City Treasury or [contained] feature [*sic*] violating the home rule principle."⁸⁹ Finally, legislation promised in the Democratic party platform was often forgotten or defeated; for instance, the Sunday-opening bill for saloons was killed, and there was no legislation strengthening the law against corrupt elections.⁹⁰

Reconvening after Sulzer's trial, the legislature reaffirmed its Progressive orientation by approving, in swift succession, bills authorizing workmen's compensation, direct primaries without state conventions, simplified ballots, direct election of United States Senators, and a popular referendum on a state constitutional convention.⁹¹ Spurred on by Governor Martin H. Glynn's special message asking what the staid *New York Times* headlined as "radical laws," legislators passed during the second week in December "more constructive legislation . . . than other Legislatures have enacted in an entire session."⁹²

Workmen's compensation was assured of easy passage, since the same legislature had approved the Foley-Walker bill during its spring session. Governor Sulzer had vetoed the measure on May 16, but legislators resurrected the concept in a more comprehensive bill, covering hazardous trades with higher compensation rates than those originally proposed.⁹³ The Assembly unanimously (110-0) reaffirmed its belief in the expansion of government responsibility toward its citizens, and the Senate added three Republicans to a solid Democratic majority to ratify the measure by a vote of 35-6.⁹⁴

Electoral reform was at the very core of traditional Progressive zeal for clean, almost apolitical government. Passing the Cullen-Levy Act in May, the legislature institutionalized home rule by granting to each city "power to regulate and control its own property and local affairs."⁹⁵ And women's suffrage achieved the

first step in its struggle for acceptance in January, when it passed the Senate by 40-2 and the Assembly by 128-5.⁹⁶

But the changes put through in December were considerably more far-reaching. Direct primaries passed the Senate on December 11 by a vote of 44-0, with two Democrats and four Republicans absent, and Minority Leader Brown excused from voting. The uncommon spectacle of "Senators Frawley and C.D. Sullivan, seasoned Tammanyites," voting to abolish state party conventions brought "considerable laughter" to the Senate Chamber.⁹⁷ The Massachusetts ballot (retaining the party emblem) and the constitutional convention referendum both won on a straight party vote, 31-13, with the Senate's sole Progressive Republican joining the Democratic majority.⁹⁸ Eleven months earlier, New York had become the third state to ratify the Seventeenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, providing for direct election of United States Senators.⁹⁹ A measure providing state machinery to implement the amendment passed the Senate without opposition on December 11.¹⁰⁰

Electoral reform met with similar enthusiasm in the Assembly, where direct primaries and the Massachusetts ballot, previously sources of heated controversy, passed "virtually without debate," the first by a vote of 109-0, and the second with four dissenting votes.¹⁰¹ As in the Senate, the tally on the constitutional convention was a partisan 86-21, and on Senatorial elections, a unanimous 109-0.¹⁰²

When the December session had convened, the *New York Times* reported "amusement and some suspicion" among Republicans and Progressives over "the zeal for reform which [appeared] to have taken possession of the out-and-out Tammany members...."¹⁰³ By adjournment, a look at the legislative record could well have turned amusement and suspicion into approving puzzlement, for, true to press predictions, the Tammany temper had changed so much that previous "bitter opposition" melted into "a policy of acquiescence in anything Gov. Glynn . . . [recommended] in the way of popular reforms."¹⁰⁴

Because of this about-face, the year 1913 stands at the very height of the Progressive movement in New York State. Indeed, the reforming impulse was at its strongest among political powers

during the period 1911–1914, an interregnum between two Republican administrations. Going well beyond Hughes' beginnings, legislative efforts contrasted sharply with Governor Whitman's emphasis on "ripper bills" and with his reactionary attempts to undo much of the progress of the previous four years.¹⁰⁵ In these peak years, Democrats occupied the Executive Mansion and ruled both houses of the state legislature on two occasions. And all during that time those Democrats took their orders from Tammany Hall. The reformers spelled out the programs, but the Democracy became the agent of change. Muckraker Lincoln Steffens was not so far wrong when he suggested "that the leading grafters themselves should be the leaders in this 'reform movement'. . . . Let's give up the good men and try the strong men."¹⁰⁶ In New York the "strong men" were strong because they controlled the votes. Ed Flynn summarized the paradox better than anyone else: "You have to remember," he said, "that none of the progressive legislation in Albany could have been passed unless . . . [Charles Murphy] urged it and permitted it to be passed."¹⁰⁷

Recent revisionist writing has described leaders of the urban, immigrant masses as molders of twentieth-century American liberalism. Certainly, there was more to Progressivism than a middle class protecting its own values and power. The movement had room for both a Theodore Roosevelt and a Charles F. Murphy.¹⁰⁸ The boss himself did not leave behind any statement to suggest intellectual or emotional commitment to the principles underlying the Progressive movement. But those who knew him best insisted that he really cared; "Being a man who himself had come up from lowly surroundings," Al Smith explained, Murphy "took a keen interest in bills embodying social legislation."¹⁰⁹ And, as Ed Flynn elaborated, the boss grew in office so that he "adjusted his thinking to a real belief that government might, through an expansion of its functions, serve the people in new and helpful ways."¹¹⁰

Caring, as even Flynn would acknowledge, was also good politics. In 1911 Frances Perkins, then a young social worker, visited Fourteenth Street to enlist the boss's support for the factory buildings legislation pending before the state legislature. "Mr. Murphy, solemn dignity itself," Miss Perkins recalled, "received me in a

reserved but courteous way. He listened to my story and arguments. Then, leaning forward in his chair, he said quietly,

"You are the young lady, aren't you, who managed to get the fifty-four hour bill passed?"

I admitted I was.

"Well, young lady, I was opposed to that bill."

"Yes, I so gathered, Mr. Murphy."

"It is my observation," he went on, "that that bill made us many votes. I will tell the boys to give all the help they can to this new bill. Good-by."¹¹¹

Granting reforms, Murphy foresaw, could be smart politics, so long as those reforms did not seriously undermine the power of the machine. As Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia eulogized, "He was a great leader, because he kept his hand on the pulse of the people..."¹¹² He gauged the popular will and when the demand for change was high, he granted the reforms that he could afford.¹¹³

Home rule for New York City was good politics, and it was safe enough as well; considering the tradition of Republican rule upstate, why not try to lessen Albany's grip on the normally Democratic metropolis? Murphy was less enthusiastic about direct primaries, but after battling with Sulzer on political grounds, he swung the organization behind proposals for electoral reform. His motives are open to speculation, for there is no evidence to explain his about-face in so short a space of time. Certainly, a desire to block the governor can help to account for his early support for the ineffectual Blauvelt bill. Reportedly the deathblow to any political machine, the primaries were less lethal than they sounded. In order to gain the signatures necessary for nomination and to command support and public exposure in a primary campaign, a candidate needed an efficient organization. Not many independents could afford the time or money to build their own machines, so that the Democracy's candidates, backed by the experienced Hall, had more than an even chance. The same was true, on a larger scale, for direct election of United States Senators. Municipal ownership of public utilities, the keynote of the Democracy's 1917 platform, sounded upstanding, but it also represented a broad source for organization patronage.

Women's suffrage was good politics, too. Murphy's own conservative, Irish Catholic bent ran counter to the feminist crusade,

but when he realized that the Nineteenth Amendment would surely be ratified, he directed Tammany men in the legislature to urge New York's approval. As soon as it was passed, he made certain that women were given associate places on the district executive committees in the city, and in 1920 Tammany's convention-bound entourage included a female delegate-at-large.¹¹⁴ This course typified Murphy's reaction to reform: if change was necessary and inevitable, why not make the Democratic Party the vehicle for reform?¹¹⁵ The Commissioner's pragmatism paid dividends. As one of his few interviewers reported, "Several leaders of the Women's Party said he turned the National tide in favor of the Suffrage Amendment."¹¹⁶ While it is easy to exaggerate, one point remains quite clear: if women were to have the vote—and they were—there was a good chance that they might vote the ticket of the party that had helped them win their rights. And if it was easy for Tammany to hold sway over a majority of the uninformed men who peopled so much of New York City, how great might be its influence with equally bewildered women.

Finally, the social legislation. These bills consistently strengthened Tammany's hold on the urban masses, whom they benefited.¹¹⁷ Although he was attuned to the problems through personal experience, Murphy was less a formulator of policy than an assenter to policies deemed desirable by Smith, Wagner, Foley, and Mahoney. They, not he, were the braintrusts, and, following his principle of faith in experts, he "leaned quite heavily on, and gave considerable consideration to, the advice . . . [they] offered."¹¹⁸ Murphy's function was permissive, not creative, but it was crucial.

Despite its pragmatism, Murphy's willingness to play reformer illustrated his sense of civic responsibility. He had come to care about the future of the party, and about the image projected by his political protégés. Perhaps, some suggest, he wanted to build up an appearance of respectability only as insurance in his quest for the White House in 1924. But there seems to have been more to his design; in 1918 he told Governor-elect Smith, "I am anxious to see you make good so that we can show the people that a young man who has come from the lower east side and has been closely associated with all the phases of party activity, can make good."¹¹⁹

And six years later, on the eve of the national convention, Murphy volunteered, "If it will help Smith I'll agree to step into an airship the night he's elected and get out for good."¹²⁰

To many he seemed a cunning but ignorant dictator, wholly concerned with feeding his patronage-hungry followers. ("As boss of Tammany Hall," charged the *Journal*, "he was and is a speculator in public rights. . . ."¹²¹) In private, he told new officials to refer booty-hungry district leaders to him, and promised to cope with their demands.¹²² In 1921 the newly-elected district attorney, Joab H. Banton, visited Murphy at Tammany Hall, and received the most complete exposition ever recorded of the Commissioner's theory of personal responsibility and the power of appointment. Pointing out the prominence and vulnerability of the district attorney's office, Murphy emphasized the importance of its being respected by the public. He advised Banton to follow "[his] own judgment and [his] own conscience" in granting or refusing pleas in behalf of those under investigation or indictment, and volunteered to deal with any organization man who caused Banton trouble. The Commissioner further explained that he would recommend appointments of men he considered capable of serving on the district attorney's staff, but that Banton, as the "final judge" of their qualifications and integrity, reserved the right to reject suggestions and demand new names.¹²³

Above all, Charles Murphy was a political professional intensely loyal to his organization. His overpowering aim was to strengthen the Democratic Party, and in that sense he was unlike the traditional Progressives of the 1910's.¹²⁴ While devoted reformers wanted clean, almost apolitical government, Murphy, brought up within Tammany Hall, worked to perfect the system. The Progressives stood for liberalism in the sense of eighteenth-century democracy; to Murphy, responsible government involved a ban on commercial vice and a determined cultivation of young men of intelligence and ability. He never seriously thought about such Progressive issues as broad economic policy and internationalism.¹²⁵ In short, Murphy's Progressivism was a market-basket liberalism that concentrated on social welfare and economic reforms for the masses. And attention to such needs of the public, after all, was the technique that had always kept machine politics going.

At the peak of the Progressive Era, the most populous state in the Union answered to the orders of an untutored politician from the Irish slums of the Lower East Side. His background and his political system had worked against the prominence he had attained. Yet, caring about respectability and responsibility in government, he had acquiesced in the progressive ideas of his protégés. Largely thanks to Charles F. Murphy, political power concluded an entente with reform, so that by 1924 the New York State Democracy faced squarely the complexities of the twentieth century.

Through "Human Spectacles"—and More

When Charlie Murphy died, Arthur Krock has said, "the brains went out of Tammany Hall."¹ Or, as Jimmy Walker once phrased it, "The brains of Tammany Hall lie in Calvary Cemetery."²

Even in 1924 a few understood the Commissioner's contribution to Tammany Hall, and it became ever more apparent as the organization he piloted began to decline as a political force. On the most basic level, his machine so often captured New York City's government for one simple reason: Tammany Hall wore "human spectacles." The pivotal factor in local politics was the people—their individual welfare, their likes and dislikes, and their hearts. Tammany won out because it appealed to these; its opponents lost because they appealed to intellect and staked their campaigns on theories of good government. The Hall developed a real mastery of the irrational element in politics. On a municipal scale, the ordinary citizen (and there were countless more ordinary citizens than thinking, knowledgeable voters) worried chiefly about his friendships, his job, and his food. When a political machine offered to satisfy his needs, he was unlikely to criticize its methods of administration.

Reform administrations failed repeatedly because they "attempted to deal with . . . municipal government as though it were a private corporation, and they a board of directors whose only aims were efficiency and economy," explained a veteran Republican district leader of the Murphy era.³ His party so often lost, he said, because it "[forgot] that a city administration must have a heart as well as a head. . . . The mayor . . . must be a little brother, friend, and comrade."⁴ Winning popular approval never forced a mayor to be a sloppy executive; the only prohibition was against governing straight out of a political science textbook.

Like any Tammany man, Charles Murphy knew this intuitively. But, unlike his predecessors, he also saw that he would need more than "human spectacles" to build a steady foundation for long-term power. Earlier Tammany bosses had profited from the graft of the Tenderloin and assumed that the Hall's "welfare work" would be enough to guarantee control of New York City. Murphy, on the other hand, came to realize "that a political organization cannot survive and grow broader on patronage alone, without political ideas and virtue, but must shrivel up and die of worse than dry rot."⁵ Politics, he knew, was more than a matter of coal in the winter and chowder parties in the summer.⁶

When asked to name his most noteworthy achievements, the Commissioner volunteered that he had taken the police out of politics. "... Tammany's evil repute," he said, "came from its association with the police. ..."⁷ Department officials had habitually contributed to and worked for the organization's tickets. "In return they looked for political influence to secure promotions, transfers, easy berths, and what was more demoralizing—to get them out of trouble with their superiors and the law when they got into it for failure to perform their sworn duties."⁸ Murphy's solution was to break the connection between the organization and the police by urging the appointment of non-Tammany police commissioners, and to try to dissociate both Tammany and the police from dishonest graft. Did he succeed with the police? He thought so, and certainly the department underwent slow improvement. Further, the Hall virtually eliminated blackmail and saloon graft from its own ranks.

Murphy's second achievement was the more significant and enduring: he turned Tammany Hall into a training ground for respectable men who governed, not just men who looted. His unmatched record of victorious nominees included several run-of-the-mill politicians, to be sure; but more important, he managed to build responsible officeholders of real quality within the Tammany framework. Murphy's curriculum offered practical political skills; combined with the bright ideas of his "young men," it consistently produced winners. *Good* men—and Murphy knew how to spot them—could afford some independence without forfeiting the Commissioner's admiration.

By molding Tammany Hall into a builder of mayors, governors, and even presidents, Murphy insured its persistence—at least until his death. In 1924 the organization was at its height; within the next decade, however, a multiplication of forces began, slowly but surely, to kill traditional political machines. Had Murphy lived, Tammany Hall might well have survived the competition of the New Deal instead of declining into a crippled political club. Losing its “human spectacles” role to the New Deal would not have interfered with the Hall’s function as a source of candidates in the larger political arena. But Murphy’s successors fell like all the others; men of narrower vision and more limited personal force than the Commissioner, they lacked the ability to be a major power in the state and nation.⁹ Attempting to trade on past political laurels was ineffective, and relying mainly on personal favors became a sure sign of sharp decline. The political machine whose only positive strength rested in its social welfare activities lost out to the whirl of pressures that coalesced in the New Deal.

This is not to say that bosses are by now extinct. Urban politicians continue to intercede in behalf of the faithful, although contemporary metropolitan concerns—like crime, race relations, and urban renewal—differ in quantity and quality from those of the Murphy era. Elections still pit “reformers” against “bosses,” and the names of Connecticut’s John M. Bailey or Chicago’s Mayor Richard J. Daley, to mention but two, illustrate the persistence of machines with recognizable political influence. Indeed, Tammany Hall itself is a continuing, although substantially altered, force in New York politics.

And yet, it is still accurate to write the obituary of the old-style political machine, and to date it at the coming of the New Deal. Franklin Delano Roosevelt showed that the state could offer reform and security. Unlike many early Progressives, Roosevelt reformers believed that government should play a directing role in society. Richard Hofstadter has labelled Roosevelt

the first major leader in the history of American reform to surmount the old dualism, so troublesome to the Progressives, between the political ethos of the urban machine and that of nativist Protestant America.¹⁰

Roosevelt displaced old-style machine politics because conventional bosses had outlived their usefulness. Most machines failed to act in their constituents' best interests, since they established no permanent institutions to benefit the working class. Livelihood and position depended on too many precarious variables when the boss tried to run everything. Significant economic advancement was incompatible with powerful machines; without a lower-class group to exploit and to cultivate through patronage, the machine's function as the great provider (in return for proper support at the polls) would no longer be meaningful.

The old boss system gave way to the New Deal because social welfare became the business of the Federal government. The logic of the transition rests on one basic factor: the flow of immigration to the United States was virtually shut off in 1924. Unlike his groping, conservative predecessor of 1900 or 1910, the man of the 1930's no longer sought the same identification with a political benefactor of immigrant parentage. Much had happened during the intervening years. Part of it, with the growth to maturity of a second or third generation, meant de-emphasized ethnic affiliations, and, instead, a growing class feeling bred in economic upheaval. By the end of the Republican 1920's the urban masses were ready for a "new deal."¹¹

Changing immigrant populations, combined with the impact of World War I and the Depression, meant that city-dwellers came to be content with a social welfare system more consistent, though less personalized, than Tammany Hall's. The transitional years between the 1920's and the 1930's raised problems too fundamental and complex to be solved by paternalistic handouts. Where individuals could no longer cope with their situation, the Federal government moved in and set up aids like Social Security, minimum wage, and unemployment insurance.¹²

In a way, then, the progressive legislation that Tammany Hall fostered in the 1910's developed into a system which ultimately undermined the role of the old-style machine. As these bills testified, even Tammany men realized that, in some areas, government would have to correct the anachronisms and set the rules. The State, not the boss, would have to help the helpless. And, as Oscar Handlin explains,

The machine that opened to the immigrants the prospect that the State might be the means through which the beginnings of security could come thereby assured itself of their loyalty. It also opened up the possibility of a very limited and very tentative collaboration with the reformers.¹³

When Murphy instructed his men in the legislature to back factory laws, he won wide popular approval. But at the same time he consented to the trend which finally overwhelmed ordinary political machines. Did he destroy his own creature? Perhaps, because such men as Al Smith and Fiorello La Guardia, while serving as a bridge between reformers and bosses, eventually carried the reform into the New Deal, and left the machines behind. Still, Tammany would have declined regardless of the Progressive direction taken by New York State officials, for the deterioration of the traditional machine was a national phenomenon.

Most political bosses "did not know what to do with power once they got it. . . . They never thought of politics as an instrument of social change. . . ." ¹⁴ The Smiths and the Wagners, on the other hand, consistently saw positive ends for the power they exercised. And so, in many ways, did Charles Francis Murphy. Indeed, conceded the normally hostile *Evening World*, "Murphy will be recorded as the first [Tammany] leader who had actual influence of a *constructive* nature in the Legislature of the State of New York." ¹⁵ (Italics mine) As his closest advisers knew, "he realized . . . that political parties couldn't remain static. . . . [They] told him that a political party had to become an instrument to serve the people. . . . He got that idea, and he followed it." ¹⁶ His imagination and his permissiveness distinguished him from other traditional political bosses. Ed Flynn argued that Murphy probably did see politics as a vehicle for social reform; he was at least willing to trust the judgment of his protégés, who knew that society might benefit from a more flexible and diverse function for government.

Power has always been a common denominator among political bosses. The New York *Gaelic American* proudly claimed that Murphy was "the most powerful leader that Tammany Hall has ever had." ¹⁷ But any man who comes to control an organization like Tammany must be strong. To give greater praise to the accomplishments of a Murphy because he had more power than a Tweed or a Croker

is essentially meaningless. The party structure and the traditional prominence of the Democracy in New York politics provided the basic tools. What counted was the road the boss decided to follow; in other words, the only reasonable way to evaluate a political boss is to analyze the way he used his power. And here we must look at two interrelated factors: first, his personal values, and as a corollary, whether he was out for something more than self-enrichment; and second, his vision and his attitude toward other men of even greater vision. Trying to say why a man sought power is a purely speculative exercise; but the pattern followed once he had gained it is revealing.

Certainly, Murphy had some interest in moneymaking. He left an estate of over \$2,000,000; considering that his Tammany post was formally unsalaried, that was a fair accomplishment.¹⁸ But Murphy was unlike Richard Croker in that "money, clearly, was not his first god."¹⁹ His own morality determined his attitude toward the graft practices that had made the Wigwam notorious. Those who knew him well have testified to his concern for honesty and efficiency in government.²⁰ On the whole, he selected and supported candidates to that end. Richard Croker drove and dictated; Charles Murphy led and listened.²¹ Many of the men whom he sponsored for high office developed, in Lincoln Steffens' term, into "principals," not "heelers." And after all, as Steffens concluded, it is "*only* principals [who] will give life to—anything."²²

Under Murphy Tammany Hall came as close as it ever did to forthright respectability. But it would be naive to suggest that the whole picture of the Murphy era is bright. First, his rule was not of a single piece. As Jeremiah Mahoney has said, the influence of new advisers, combined with the solidification of Murphy's personal authority, marked a recognizable growth and improvement. But even during the peak years of progressive reform, the record was not homogeneous. This period produced a new morality, the factory laws, and such officials as Al Smith. It also produced contract graft, the Sulzer impeachment, and such candidates as Dix. One finds that it is impractical to assess Murphy's administration simply as "good" or "bad."

A more useful distinction, perhaps, is between the man and the system. When Charles F. Murphy died, even the men and the

newspapers which had criticized him most vehemently acknowledged, somewhat grudgingly, that he outranked any other Tammany man in the quality of his rule.²³ But the praise in these eulogies was inevitably overbalanced by a continuous condemnation of the Tammany system of government. Some writers were so accustomed to denouncing the machine that they were unable to separate Murphy and judge him as a man; others drew the fine line and gained a better perspective for their evaluation.²⁴ That distinction is essential. Big-city political machines inevitably bred corruption at the same time that they performed positive functions. The political ineffectiveness of the metropolitan gentry allowed machines to cripple viable democracy. If responsible, capable citizens had been willing to wrest government from the bosses at an early date and to grapple with the problems bosses knew how to handle, then the American city might have developed without the political machine as we have known it in our history. Given the framework of the organization, however, we may judge its leaders on a relative standard: what did they do with their power within the system? Charles Murphy was a product of the whole Tammany ethos; to demand that he should have destroyed or abandoned the machine and should have exerted political influence independent of it is unreasonable. But assuming the institutional structure as a fixed basis—however bad it might be—we can then praise Murphy the man for turning the machine toward some new and creative ends.

To separate this man from his milieu is difficult, because he so often hid behind the facade of Tammany Hall. Because of his unusual taciturnity, Murphy was an enigma to most of his contemporaries. Newspapermen, to whom we owe a large debt for his historical survival, delighted in one particular anecdote which epitomized, and yet threw into glorious confusion, the public picture of the Tammany leader. At one of the Wigwam's traditional Fourth of July celebrations, as the story goes, a reporter spotted "the chief" in his famous pose of complete silence.

"What's the matter with the Boss—can't he sing?" the man asked Tammany Secretary Tom Smith.

"Sure he can. Why, the chief used to sing with a quartet in his younger days. He can yodel some, take it from me."

“‘Why didn’t he join in “The Star-Spangled Banner” then?’

“‘Perhaps,’ said Smith, tipping a wink, ‘perhaps he didn’t want to commit himself.’”²⁵

But when Charles Francis Murphy put Tammany Hall behind such men as Al Smith and Robert Wagner, he committed himself more significantly than the historical public has ever fully acknowledged.

Notes to Introduction

1. The term "marginal men" is from Arthur Mann, introd. to William L. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York, 1963), p. xv.
2. "The Defeat of Tammany — A National Service," *Independent*, LXXV (August 7, 1913), 293.
3. Raymond Moley, *27 Masters of Politics in a Personal Perspective* (New York, 1949), p. 120. See Edward Flynn, *You're the Boss* (New York, 1947).
4. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*.
5. Reporter W. Axel Warms, however, corroborates the impression that Murphy rarely took pen in hand. According to Warms, the infrequent statements from Tammany Hall were written by the organization's secretary, Tom Smith, after Murphy told him what to say. See "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," *New York Times Magazine* (February 22, 1914), 5. It was not a case of Murphy's inability to write, but simply his indisposition to do so.
6. Isabel Paterson, "Murphy," *American Mercury*, XIV (July, 1928), 347. She terms Murphy the "political equivalent of the Forgotten Man of William Graham Sumner, who is never taken into account because he cannot be definitely classified, although the social structure pivots on him."

Notes to Chapter I

1. *New York Telegram and Evening Mail*, April 25, 1924. From the Edwin P. Kilroe Collection of Tammaniana at Columbia University, hereafter referred to as EPKC.
2. Harold Zink, *City Bosses in the United States* (Durham, 1930), p. 160.
3. Information on Murphy's early life is unfortunately incomplete. In secondary accounts M. R. Werner's *Tammany Hall* (New York, 1928) gives the most detail; Gustavus Myers' *History of Tammany Hall* (rev. ed., New York, 1917) and Zink's *City Bosses in the United States* are also useful. But the best sources are the New York newspapers of April 25 and 26, 1924, cited specifically hereinafter.

Factual disagreements are common. For instance, the *New York Evening World* of May 1, 1924, EPKC, insists that the baptismal record of the Church of the Immaculate Conception on Fourteenth Street lists Murphy's birthdate as June 21, not June 20.

According to the *New York American*, April 26, 1924, EPKC, his birthplace was on Twentieth Street near Avenue A. When Murphy was in his early teens,

the family moved to 503 East Fifteenth Street (New York *Evening World*, May 1, 1924, EPKC).

4. New York *Evening World*, May 1, 1924, EPKC.

5. New York *Sun*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

6. Zink, *City Bosses in the United States*, p. 148.

7. New York *Times*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.

8. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, p. 79.

9. Robert Ernst provides an appropriate description of the political development of the typical saloon keeper. "Prominent politicians flattered and aided him. Sometimes they presented him with public office, enabling him to dole out jobs and privileges to his neighbors and to increase his political prestige as well as the patronage of his establishment. As saloon keepers became important cogs in the Tammany machinery, their places served as headquarters of the political gangs and were the favorite meeting places of the politicians." *Immigrant Life in New York City, 1825-1863* (New York, 1949), p. 163.

10. Quoted in *New York City Guide* (New York, 1939), p. 187.

11. *Ibid.*

12. The *Guide* tells the reader that terror and violence were not the only elements in the life of the young men of the Gas House; "in their lighter moments," the account reads, "they organized courageous volunteer fire companies and dallied with 'the girls with the swinging handbags' who inspired the song, the *Belle of Avenoo A.*" *Ibid.*

13. Redistricting in New York makes it difficult to write retrospectively of specifically numbered assembly districts. Every account ties Murphy (and Edward Hagan, his predecessor as district leader) to the Eighteenth District; yet, maps and census reports for 1892 indicate that the geographical area which Murphy inherited was in fact known as the Twelfth District (bounded by Fourth Avenue on the west, Twenty-ninth Street on the north, Seventeenth on the south, and the East River). By 1895, however, the Eighteenth District coincided with Murphy's bailiwick, although its precise street limits may have varied slightly from year to year. By at least 1920 the district was again the Twelfth; its boundaries, which also changed over a period of years, were roughly Sixteenth and Seventeenth streets on the south, Third and Lexington avenues on the west, the River on the east, and anywhere from Forty-fifth to Fifty-fourth on the north, depending on the year. In any event, the core of the section which Murphy represented in the party councils remained constant, and for reasons of clarity and consistency this study will refer to him only as leader of the Eighteenth Assembly District. Those interested in numbering and in district boundaries should consult assembly district maps on slides at the Municipal Reference Library in New York City, as well as *Searchlight*, X (October, 1920), 11.

14. *New York City Guide*, p. 187.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

16. The Gas House-Stuyvesant Square area comes to life in three additional sources: "'Silent Charlie,' the Mayor Maker," *Literary Digest*, LXXXI (May 17, 1924), 40; Paterson, "Murphy," 348; and New York *Mail*, February 11, 1918, EPKC.

17. These and the following statistics are taken or derived from the *Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900* (Washington, D. C., 1901), Volume I, Part I: "Population."
18. "What Is an American?", in Edith Abbott, ed., *Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem* (Chicago, 1926), p. 418.
19. Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1940), p. 80.
20. Ernst, *Immigrant Life in New York City, 1825-1863*, p. 193. My figures are computed on the basis of his Table XIV.
21. *Ibid.*, Table XV, pp. 194-196.
22. For much of the impressions of nineteenth-century New York I have relied upon Lloyd Morris's spirited account, *Incredible New York* (New York, 1951), *passim*.
23. This information is derived from Elting E. Morison, *Turmoil and Tradition: A Study of the Life and Times of Henry L. Stimson* (New York, 1964), pp. 62-63.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64. As Morison observes, many of these men, of course, later held state and national offices.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 61-62.
26. Interview with Jeremiah T. Mahoney, New York City, November 6, 1964.
27. Edwin P. Kilroe, Abraham Kaplan, and Joseph Johnson, "The Story of Tammany," *Tammany: A Patriotic History, 1786-1924* (New York, 1924), p. 38, EPKC.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
29. Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963), pp. 221-222.
30. Kilroe, Kaplan, and Johnson, "The Story of Tammany," p. 50.
31. Roy V. Peel, *The Political Clubs of New York City* (London and New York, 1935), pp. 65-67, and James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (New York, 1921), II, 399.
32. Mann, introd. to *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, p. xiv.
33. Oscar Handlin, "The Immigrant and American Politics," *Foreign Influences in American Life*, ed. by David F. Bowers (Princeton, 1944), pp. 90-91; Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (New York, 1951), pp. 206 and 213; Mann, introd. to *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, pp. xix-xx.
34. *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p. 67.
35. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, pp. 25-26. Plunkitt, one of Murphy's fellow sachems, probably expresses what Murphy the assembly district leader would have said if he had ever articulated a political philosophy at the time (i.e., 1880's and '90's).
36. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
37. *Autobiography* (New York, 1931), p. 400, quoted in Richard Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform* (New York, 1955), p. 177.
38. James Bryce offers a useful analysis of the preoccupation of the gentry: "While these causes were transferring power to the rougher and more ignorant element in the population, the swift developments of trade which followed the

making of the Erie Canal and opening up of railway routes to the West, with the consequent expansion of New York as a commercial and financial centre, had more and more distracted the thoughts of the wealthier people from local politics, which required more time than busy men could give, and seemed tame compared with that struggle over slavery The leading men, who fifty years earlier would have watched municipal affairs, and perhaps borne a part in them, were now so much occupied with their commercial enterprises or their legal practice as to neglect their local civic duties, and saw with unconcern the chief municipal offices appropriated by persons belonging to the lower strata of society." *The American Commonwealth*, II, 380.

39. Lincoln Steffens, *Autobiography* (abridged ed., New York, 1958), pp. 190-195.

40. *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1950), p. 22. By 1908 Gerard became an Associate Judge of the New York State Supreme Court through Murphy's influence (see *ibid.*, p. 19), and was subsequently ambassador to Germany and treasurer of the Democratic National Committee.

41. The details are not altogether clear here. Some call Biglin the boss of the Eighteenth Assembly District.

42. "'Silent Charlie,' the Mayor Maker," 42.

43. *New York Times*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.

44. See the *New York Evening World*, May 1, 1924, EPKC. According to this article, the Murphys, in order of age, were Daniel, Charles, William, John, Thomas, Katherine (Nolan), Anne, Mary (Healy), and Margaret (the wife of Fourth Deputy Police Inspector John J. Cray). Harold Zink notes that one of the boys served on the police force (*City Bosses in the United States*, p. 148), but no one except Charles ever achieved significant success. Zink further notes that two nephews won appointments to West Point and Annapolis, and one served as private secretary to Ambassador James W. Gerard (*ibid.*, p. 161).

45. *New York World*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.

46. "'Silent Charlie,' the Mayor Maker," 42.

47. *New York Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

48. *Ibid.*, May 6, 1924.

49. *New York World*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.

50. *New York Times*, April 26, 1924, EPKC. The basis for the information is a *Times* interview with Neuberger.

51. Richard Barry, "Mr. Murphy—the Politicians' Politician," *Outlook*, CXXXVII (May 14, 1924), 54.

52. *New York Telegram and Evening Mail*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

53. *Ibid.*

54. *Ibid.* John T. Hettrick, newspaperman assigned to the Lower East Side beat, corroborates newspaper reports at the time of Murphy's death on the subject of corruption in the Gas House. "Murphy had the best Tammany Hall club in New York," he said. "As a matter of fact, you must give all credit to Mr. Murphy, he kept his District clean from a moral standpoint." *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1949), II, 188.

55. Werner, *Tammany Hall*, p. 457. The Greater City, incorporating all five boroughs, came into existence in 1897. See Wallace S. Sayre and Herbert

- Kaufman, *Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis* (New York, 1960), p. 13.
56. Nearly all the obituaries noted that, around the turn of the century, Murphy began to frown on the use of the old, familiar appellation "Charlie," and insisted instead on being called "Chief," or more often, "Commissioner."
57. *New York World*, April 26, 1924, EPKC. Searches have unearthed no more specific information on the dock leasing.
58. W. A. Swanberg, *Citizen Hearst: A Biography of William Randolph Hearst* (New York, 1961), p. 233.
59. *New York Sun*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
60. *New York Telegram and Evening Mail*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
61. *New York World*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.
62. "'Silent Charlie,' the Mayor Maker," 42. The author attributes this wealth to his "salary, perquisites, and shrewd speculations."
63. *New York Times*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.
64. Charles M. Stebbins, *Tammany Hall: Its History, Organization and Methods* (Brooklyn, 1921), pp. 72-76, EPKC. He uses this information derogatorily, insisting that the company was only a new means of securing graft.

Notes to Chapter II

1. Myers, *The History of Tammany Hall*, p. 295.
2. *Ibid.*
3. "The Real Tammany," *Nation*, LXXIV (May 22, 1902), 401. The Irish-Catholic, pro-Tammany *New York Weekly Union* called Nixon "a mettlesome man who had little patience" (October 18, 1902). The *Weekly Union* is on file in the library of the American Irish Historical Society in Manhattan, cited hereinafter as AIHS.
4. Myers, *The History of Tammany Hall*, p. 296, and Werner, *Tammany Hall*, pp. 482-483.
5. Werner, *Tammany Hall*, p. 482.
6. Myers, *The History of Tammany Hall*, pp. 297-298.
7. *New York Telegram and Evening Mail*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
8. Barry, "Mr. Murphy—the Politicians' Politician," 54.
9. *New York Times*, September 20, 1902. Another version of the resolution, only slightly different in wording, was reported by the press in 1924. See, for example, the *New York Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
10. Quoted in the *New York Times*, September 20, 1902.
11. *Ibid.*, editorial, September 21, 1902. "There is no hope for the city," the *Times* lamented, "but in Tammany's complete and continued defeat."
12. *Ibid.*
13. *New York Telegram and Evening Mail*, April 25, 1924, EPKC. According to the *New York Times* of September 20, 1902, Devery's credentials were refused

on the basis of formal charges "that he had won a majority of the voters at the primaries last Tuesday [September 16] by fraudulent methods."

14. Paterson, "Murphy," 349-350.

15. Franklin Matthews, "Charles F. Murphy, Tammany's New Ruler," *Review of Reviews*, XXVIII (September, 1903), 341.

16. Interview with Ferdinand Pecora, New York City, November 30, 1964. Herbert Pell describes the obvious disadvantage in Murphy's policy toward his district leaders' authority. Pell attributes the general inadequacy of the New York Congressional delegation to the fact that Murphy insisted on leaving the choice for Congressional nominations in the hands of the respective district leaders. Pell concludes that Murphy himself probably would "have been very glad to have better men." *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1951), I, 276-277.

17. New York *Sun*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

18. New York *Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

19. Quoted in Gene Fowler, *Beau James: The Life & Times of Jimmy Walker* (New York, 1949), p. 325.

20. See, for example, M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, ed. by Seymour Martin Lipset (Garden City, New York, 1964), II, 203: "... the boss is naturally reserved, coiled up—he has no confidant; this is wiser, at least he is sure not to be betrayed."

George W. Plunkitt captures the idea somewhat more graphically: "We've got some orators in Tammany Hall, but they're chiefly ornamental. ... The men who rule have practiced keepin' their tongues still, not exercisin' them. So you want to drop the orator idea unless you mean to go into politics just to perform the skyrocket act." Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, p. 8.

21. Personal letter from Thomas Ollive Mabbott, November 15, 1964. His grandfather, Thomas S. Ollive, vice president of the National Biscuit Company, was among the Murphys' fellow guests at the Marlborough on at least one occasion. According to Professor Mabbott, the Ollives "had a table ... next to that of Mr. Murphy, his wife and daughter in the American plan dining room. ... People had regular tables more or less the same year after year, if regular visitors—and knew people who sat at neighboring tables, said 'Good morning' and so on." He adds, "The hotel was not a place for political gatherings—the Murphys went to retire from all that."

Lawson Purdy, active in contemporary civic and political affairs, corroborates Professor Mabbott's impression. "Murphy," he says, "was inscrutable and very closemouthed. I have sat next to him at dinner parties and I was able to get all of three words out of him." *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1948), p. 22.

22. New York *Evening Post*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

23. September 27, 1902, AIHS. This comment was made upon Murphy's selection as leader of Tammany Hall. It should be noted that there are two different issues of the *Weekly Union* dated September 27; the schedule of printing seems to have been somewhat irregular.

24. New York *Evening Mail*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

25. Pecora interview.
26. New York *Evening Post*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
27. "A Peep into Murphy's Brain," *Literary Digest*, XLVIII (March 7, 1914), 517. This story is derived from a New York *Times* article (unidentified) written by W. Axel Warms (probably "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being"). According to Warms, Murphy's foresight "is not based on intuition altogether. Murphy before a campaign maintains what some of his friends characterize as a secret service, placed in the field for the purpose of sounding public sentiment among voters in all walks of life. He never trusts the opinion of his political advisers on this subject. The politicians who consort with Murphy at Delmonico's tell of meeting the most surprizing [*sic*] sort of men in elevators and in the corridor adjoining Room 4 on the second floor. There are bankers, business men, lawyers, teachers, men drawn from every walk of life, who could have no adequate conception of the intricate business of running a political machine. They are the eyes and ears of Boss Murphy." "A Peep into Murphy's Brain," 527. The role of the "secret service" is corroborated in "Mr. Murphy, 'Politician,' Thinks of Retiring," *Literary Digest*, LXII (September 13, 1919), 104.
28. Interview with James A. Farley, New York City, November 7, 1964. Farley was a witness at many of these gatherings when Murphy "used to hold forth, so to speak."

John T. Hettrick recalls these "whispered conversations" where "you couldn't hear Charley Murphy's voice five feet away, it was always in a minor tone." *Reminiscences*, II, 190.

29. Morris, *Incredible New York*, p. 4. According to W. Axel Warms, it was J. Sergeant Cram who first attracted Murphy to the restaurant. See "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5.
30. This particular description of the pageant at Delmonico's is taken from the New York *Morning Telegraph* of April 26, 1924, EPKC, but it is repeated in substance in several other accounts.
31. New York *Evening Post*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
32. For example, Jeremiah T. Mahoney insists without qualification on Murphy's honesty and impeccable personal character. Mahoney interview. James Farley, who also knew the Commissioner, although perhaps less well than Mahoney, described him as "an honorable man," a "very mild spoken man, and a very fine gentleman." Farley interview.
33. James W. Gerard, associate New York Supreme Court judge and later ambassador to Germany, testified that Murphy "didn't want to give his word unless he was very sure he could keep it." *Reminiscences*, p. 22.
34. Farley interview.
35. New York *Evening Post*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.
36. New York *American*, April 27, 1924, EPKC.
37. New York *Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
38. The *World* gave two accounts of this episode—one that was contemporary, and one at the time of Murphy's death. In the intervening decade some of the details became twisted. For example, the earlier report claims that the homeless took refuge in Allaire's Restaurant, while the retelling insists that Murphy

"routed out the owner of Scheffel Hall, a famous beer garden on Third Avenue . . . and had all the homeless herded into the hall." These details, of course, are really inconsequential; the substance of the story remains the same, and that is what is important.

39. New York *World*, February 13, 1914, EPKC.

40. New York *Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

41. *Ibid.*

42. New York *World*, February 13, 1914, EPKC.

43. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, pp. 27-28.

44. Writing in 1914, *Times* reporter W. Axel Warms said that "of late, [Murphy] has preferred to have 'Charley' Ackerman tell him what is in [the newspapers]." "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5.

45. Paterson, "Murphy," 354; Fowler, *Beau James: The Life & Times of Jimmy Walker*, p. 72. The claim of the American Irish Historical Society that Murphy read its *Journals* and held a "profound and abiding" interest in "American history and historical articles" is probably more chauvinistic than accurate. The statement comes from "Charles F. Murphy Memorial," *Recorder*, III (September, 1926), 12, AIHS.

46. New York *Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

47. Harold C. Syrett, ed., *The Gentleman and the Tiger: The Autobiography of George B. McClellan, Jr.* (Philadelphia and New York, 1956), p. 95.

48. Warms, "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5. Warms describes himself as "one who has watched him [Murphy] critically for many years." The name of the restaurant is documented in the New York *Journal*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

49. Warms, "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5.

50. *Ibid.*

51. Interview with Reuben A. Lazarus, New York City, December 21, 1964. On one occasion Lazarus was at the card table when the Commissioner dropped in at the club, played for about an hour, and left after winning "a few cents. . . . He hardly spoke during the game," Lazarus recalls. "I was told by many people who knew him well that he was a word-economizer."

52. Zink, *City Bosses in the United States*, p. 162, tells of Murphy's affiliation with these clubs. Following a political campaign, Murphy could always be found relaxing at French Lick or Hot Springs. See the New York *American*, November 20, 1918, EPKC.

53. Personal letter from Catherine Smith Quillinan, August 5, 1965.

54. The New York *Morning Telegraph*, April 26, 1924, EPKC, which reports the purchase value, adds that the estate was eventually worth nearly a quarter of a million dollars. But the New York *Times*, April 26, 1924, EPKC, seems more nearly correct in its estimate that Good Ground would probably bring about \$100,000 on the market. See below, footnote 55.

55. Warms, "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5; New York *Evening Post*, April 25, 1924, EPKC. Other reports speak of a kennel of prize bulldogs at Good Ground.

After Murphy's death, the estate at Good Ground (later known as Hampton Bays, Long Island), along with the rest of his property, was put up for sale. According to the *New York Times* of December 31, 1924, the estate was sold the day before to Anthony R. Conti of the Lido Venice Club, 35 East Fifty-third Street. "The property," the *Times* reported, "was held at \$90,000 and includes about 500 acres of land, improved, with the Summer residence of the late Tammany Hall leader. It has a six-hole golf course and out-buildings with a large frontage on Southampton Bay." Conti apparently planned to develop the area as a summer resort similar to the famous Lido in Venice. But on August 16, 1950, the *Times* noted that Good Ground was again on the market, offered this time by Mrs. Basil O'Connor. "The property is being considered by builders for development purposes," the article said. There are obvious statistical discrepancies in the various reports about Good Ground—e.g., six-vs. nine-hole golf course, and 50 vs. 500 acres. The 50-acre estimate sounds more reasonable, however.

56. Warms, "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5.

57. *New York Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC. Mrs. Murphy died of heart disease on September 30, 1933. In an obituary notice the next day, the *New York Times* commented that she had for several years been "active in charitable work, particularly in the field of Catholic charities." Her funeral, held October 3, drew many of the political leaders prominent during her husband's long career. She was buried in the family vault in Calvary Cemetery, Queens. See the *Times* of October 4, 1933. Her estate, valued at "more than \$20,000," was left to her only daughter, Mabel. *Ibid.*, November 9, 1933.

58. Warms, "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5.

59. *New York Times*, June 22, 1919. At that time Foley was Democratic Minority Leader in the State Senate.

60. Quoted in Warms, "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5. The information about domestic life on Seventeenth Street is primarily from Warms. Murphy apparently moved there in 1898.

61. *Ibid.* One particular anecdote illustrates the singleminded fastidiousness of the Tammany leader. As Warms tells the story, it was the day in the fall of 1913 that the Democratic City Convention denied Mayor Gaynor's bid for renomination. "Mr. Murphy, as he was entering his motor car to go to the convention hall, tore the lining of his coat. The slit was one which would not show, and a friend who was with the Tammany Chief at the time told him it was more important that they should reach the convention hall in good season than that the coat should be mended or exchanged. But Murphy would not hear of it. He re-entered the house, and the convention was kept waiting while he changed his clothes."

62. William V. Shannon, *The American Irish* (New York, 1963), offers sound insights into second-generation adjustment. He notes that, by the turn of the century, "the majority of Irish were still members of the working class and, in hard times, they were not much above the subsistence level. Only a fortunate few had achieved financial and social success . . ." (p. 131). Many of the latter were the middle-class Irish who "were trying to live down the opprobrium

deriving from the brawling, hard-drinking, and raffish manners of the 'shanty Irish' of an earlier generation" (p. 142). Certainly, Murphy seems to have outdone the typical rising Irish-American in the degree of his financial success and the self-confidence of his adjustment.

63. Dorothy Ross, "The Irish-Catholic Immigrant, 1880-1900: A Study in Social Mobility" (Unpublished Master's Essay, Columbia University, 1959), pp. 18 and 116.

64. *Ibid.*, pp. 12 and 116.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

66. *Ibid.*

67. New York *Evening Journal*, quoted in the New York *Weekly Union*, November 8, 1902, AIHS. In Manhattan and the Bronx, Coler led Odell by 192,735 to 106,131. "Official Canvass of the County of New York," *City Record* (December 22, 1902), 9. See also the New York *Times*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.

68. New York *Evening Journal* and New York *Evening Telegram*, quoted in New York *Weekly Union*, November 8, 1902, AIHS. The *Weekly Union* editorialized proudly that even "the Mugwump and Fusion papers . . . accord to Murphy's leadership, intelligence and sagacity beyond anything they were ever willing to concede to Tammany leadership heretofore within the past 15 years."

69. According to corrected newspaper figures reported two days after the election, Low carried Greater New York by a 52.7 percent majority. What is remarkable is not that he carried New York County by just 50.7 percent of the votes, but that he carried Tammany's bailiwick at all. (The kind of opposition Low had to overcome is illustrated by Edward M. Shepard's solid lead of 65.4 percent in Murphy's Eighteenth Assembly District.) In suburban Brooklyn his plurality of 25,539 over opponent Shepard gave him a comfortable 56.3 percent of the King's County ballots. His Richmond County majority of 53 percent was more consistent with his overall average, but he lost Queens County with only 48.6 percent of its final tally. The source for these statistics (my computation) is the New York *Times*, November 7, 1901. At present, it is impossible to obtain the officially certified Board of Election results for the 1901 mayoralty contest.

70. Sydney Brooks, "Tammany Again," *Living Age*, CCXL (January 9, 1904),

72. Much of the above information is derived from the account of this perceptive Englishman.

71. Gustavus Myers, "The Triumph of Tammany Hall," *Independent*, LV (November 12, 1903), 2662-2663.

72. Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities* (New York, 1907), p. 286. As Steffens put it, the mayor's "most useful virtues—probity, intelligence, and conscientiousness—in action [were] often an irritation; they [were] so contented."

73. Brooks, "Tammany Again," 73.

74. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, pp. 17 and 19.

75. The basic source on McClellan is Syrett, *The Gentleman and the Tiger*.

76. Mahoney interview. Mahoney says that Murphy's action "created a political sensation."

77. John Heffernan, *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1950), pp. 39-40. McClellan's election proved more than Tammany's durability;

it pointed up just how tightly Murphy controlled his own district. While the Congressman carried all of Greater New York by a 53.1 percent margin, he claimed 73.2 percent of the votes in the Eighteenth Assembly District. These percentages are based on returns reported in the "Official Canvass of the City of New York," *City Record* (May 18, 1904), 5, 9, 64, 76, and 80.

78. Syrett, *The Gentleman and the Tiger*, p. 183.

79. *Ibid.*, pp. 197-198.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 223.

81. John K. Winkler, *William Randolph Hearst: A New Appraisal* (New York, 1955), pp. 126-127, tells of Hearst's early thoughts of the White House, resulting in a 1902 "alliance" with Charles F. Murphy. Hearst offered his support in the campaign to send Bird Coler to Albany, and in return Murphy sent Hearst to Washington as a representative of the midtown Eleventh District.

82. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

83. "New York's Contested Election," *Outlook*, LXXXI (December 23, 1905), 945*-7.

84. Winkler, *William Randolph Hearst: A New Appraisal*, p. 143.

85. See, for example, the *New York Journal*, November 10, 1905, EPKC.

86. Syrett, *The Gentleman and the Tiger*, p. 230.

87. Jeremiah T. Mahoney says that McClellan "tried to show the people that he was not bossed by anybody and that he didn't need Mr. Murphy any more. . . . But there was no question about it, he owed everything to Murphy, but then he sort of ran out on Murphy." Mahoney interview.

88. Syrett, *The Gentleman and the Tiger*, p. 169.

89. *New York Sun*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

90. *New York Times*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.

Notes to Chapter III

1. *New York Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

2. *New York American*, January 16, 1911, EPKC.

3. *New York Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Heffernan, *Reminiscences*, p. 39.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

7. McCarren died as a result of an operation during the campaign. William A. Prendergast analyzes McCarren's reaction to the Gaynor candidacy: "He realized that he would have little or no influence with Judge Gaynor if he were elected mayor, and it would deprive him of the influence that he had in the city government with Mr. Herman A. Metz as comptroller." *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1951), II, 277.

8. *New York Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.

9. See Allan Nevins and John A. Krout, eds., *The Greater City: New York, 1898-*

- 1948 (New York, 1948), p. 74. The editors evaluate Gaynor as honest and capable, "one of those few seekers of public office who have within them elements of greatness." Robert S. Binkerd concurs, crediting Gaynor with "a real mind" and "genuine, disinterested, intellectual impulses He had a big enough mind that to start some things just because they were the right thing to do, was to him a sufficient reason for starting something, which you don't often find in a municipal office." *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1949), p. 12.
10. Mortimer Smith, *William Jay Gaynor, Mayor of New York* (Chicago, 1951), p. 61. Much of the information on Gaynor is based on Smith's lively account.
11. Actually, during this period Hearst remained relatively faithful to his "principles," while Murphy shifted from opposition to endorsement and back to opposition. The 1906 gubernatorial race on the Tammany ticket, after all, was hardly Hearst's idea. Theirs was a running battle-alliance which continued well into the next two decades and which came particularly to the fore in the election of John Hylan as mayor in 1917 and in the judgeship elections of 1923.
12. Smith, *William Jay Gaynor, Mayor of New York*, p. 60, and Winkler, *William Randolph Hearst: A New Appraisal*, p. 167.
13. These percentages are computed on the basis of election reports in "Official Canvass of the Votes Cast in the Counties of New York, Kings, Queens and Richmond at the Election Held November 2, 1909," *City Record* (December 31, 1909), 12, 110, 160, and 165. In Murphy's home district publisher Hearst led Bannard by 29.2 to 18.9 percent, while Gaynor won 47.6 percent. *Ibid.*, 6.
14. "The New York Campaign: The Outcome," *Outlook*, XCIII (November 13, 1909), 572.
15. "The New York Election," *Living Age*, CCLXIII (December 4, 1909), 632.
16. Smith, *William Jay Gaynor, Mayor of New York*, p. 84, and William B. Shaw, "The Men Who are Governing New York City," *Review of Reviews*, XLI (March, 1910), 302 and 306. Sidney Reid, in "Tell It to Gaynor," *Independent*, LXIX (August 18, 1910), 335, states that Gaynor also managed to break the connection between the police and liquor dealers, end the influence of politicians over the police, and end illegal and brutal police methods. This assertion may have seemed valid then (and Murphy certainly supported such moves), but the Becker-Rosenthal murder scandal two years later suggests that Reid's judgment may have been premature.
17. Oscar Handlin, *Al Smith and His America* (Boston and Toronto, 1958), p. 72.
18. Winkler, *William Randolph Hearst: A New Appraisal*, p. 141.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
20. New York *Herald Tribune*, May 4, 1924, EPKC. Or, as Merlo J. Pusey suggests, "Murphy was willing to team up with his former enemy because he had broken with Mayor McClellan and was frightened by Hearst's vote-getting power." *Charles Evans Hughes* (New York, 1951), I, 174.
21. Winkler, *William Randolph Hearst: A New Appraisal*, p. 149.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
24. "John Alden Dix," *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (New York,

- 1933), XXIII, 226. Dix's opponent in the 1910 contest was Republican Henry L. Stimson.
25. Syrett, *The Gentleman and the Tiger: The Autobiography of George B. McClellan, Jr.*, p. 290. The observations on national politics come from an unidentified newspaper clipping of January 3, 1911, EPKC.
26. Prendergast, *Reminiscences*, III, 340.
27. Jeremiah T. Mahoney, in his *Reminiscences*, p. 13, states: "I think Charles F. Murphy had more to do with the selection of Shepherd [*sic*] as the Democratic candidate [in 1901] than anybody else. They needed a good man. And Murphy was a smart fellow." An unidentified newspaper article in the Kilroe Collection tells that Murphy was in a tight spot in 1911; if he followed the dictates of J. P. Morgan, of the Pennsylvania Railroad interests, and of Gaynor and Dix, his choice would have been Shepard. While Sheehan satisfied certain district leaders, the resulting antagonism could have meant the loss of considerable patronage. Shepard, however, was termed too much of a "highbrow" for the organization. I do not think that this article is conclusive, but its observations are interesting.
28. Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship* (Boston, 1952), p. 101.
29. Elliott Roosevelt, ed., *F. D. R.: His Personal Letters, 1905-1928* (New York, 1948), p. 161.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
31. Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship*, p. 109. Roosevelt went on to explain that their opposition to Sheehan was not personal, but that he was also "altogether too closely connected with the traction trust in New York City."
32. *Ibid.*
33. New York *Herald Tribune*, May 4, 1924, EPKC.
34. Jacob Alexis Friedman, *The Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer* (New York, 1939), p. 23.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
36. "A Final Blow at Tammany Hall," *World's Work*, XXXIII (February, 1917), 355.
37. "Murphyistically reasoning," quipped the often caustic *Evening World*, "principle is an obstacle. Brains are dangerous. Character is a risk. Hence Hylan." November 5, 1917, EPKC.
38. New York *Times*, August 9, 1917, EPKC.
39. William Bullock, "Hylan," *American Mercury*, I (April, 1924), 448, tries to account for Mitchel's primary defeat. The mayor's closest friends, he says, "were indicted for fraud against the city; the very next week, mainly by reason of these indictments, he was beaten in the Republican primary." The multi-ticket fight meant that "Hylan was given what the politicians picturesquely term a walkover."
40. "Hearst, Tammany, Mitchel, and America," *Literary Digest*, LV (October 13, 1917), 11.
41. November 6, 1917, EPKC.
42. Bullock, "Hylan," 449. Hylan denied the association. Hillquit, of course, was running on an openly anti-war platform; he received just a few thousand

votes less than Mitchel, and Bennett ran a poor fourth. "New York's Return to Tammany," *Literary Digest*, LV (November 17, 1917), 12.

The formula that "divided opposition means Tammany victory" was peculiarly applicable in this election. Since Bennett accounted for slightly more than 8 percent of the five-borough vote, his candidacy's effect on Mitchel's fortunes was probably more psychological than material. Bennett's votes added to the incumbent's 23.1 percent would still have fallen far short of Hylan's city-wide total of 46.6 percent of the ballots. Unlike most minor party candidates, Hillquit, running only slightly behind Mitchel, played a crucial role in the final tallies. Mitchel picked up the most votes in Manhattan (27.2 percent, as compared with 46.3 for Hylan), but fell to 21.4 percent in the usually more profitable Borough of Brooklyn. He ran just over 19 percent in the other three counties. These figures are computed on the basis of election returns reported in "Official Canvass of the Votes Cast in the Counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens and Richmond at the Election Held November 6, 1917," *City Record* (December 31, 1917), 25, 160, 225, 315, and 338.

43. See, for example, "The New York Election," *Nation*, CV (November 8, 1917), 500: "The stupidity of the Mayor's loyalty issue is patent if one considers that in view of his characterization of his opponents as pro-German it may be inferred abroad that five-sixths of the city is opposed to the war."

44. Oswald Garrison Villard, "The New York Mayoralty Election," *Nation*, CV (October 25, 1917), 448.

45. This percentage is computed on the basis of figures reported in the "Official Canvass of the Votes Cast in the Counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens and Richmond at the Election Held November 8, 1921," *City Record* (December 31, 1921), 11, 94, 133, 203, and 222.

46. For an informed discussion of the relative insignificance of ethno-religious ticket balancing in the Murphy era, see Theodore J. Lowi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor: Patronage and Power in New York City, 1898-1958* (New York, 1964), pp. 33-44. Nevertheless, Murphy was hardly oblivious to the importance of minorities other than the Irish. According to James J. Hoey, he "converted the Germans, naturally Republican, to Democracy; held Jews and Italians and other racial groups when there was danger of their alienation, but what was still more marvelous, converted the Harlem colored population to Democracy and induced these citizens in the last two elections to cast their votes for Governor Smith and Mayor Hylan." "Hon. Charles F. Murphy," *Journal of the American Irish Historical Society*, XXIII (1924), 239.

47. Tom Wicker, "Washington: Mr. Johnson's Surprise Choice," *New York Times*, July 21, 1965. As Wicker added, Murphy "had just the man in Franklin D. Roosevelt but unfortunately F. D. R. was then anti-Tammany." The source of this anecdote is *Times* columnist Arthur Krock, who says, "I first heard it in the Manhattan Club, from the Tammany judges and other New York City office-holders who gathered there daily while I was a member. But whether it is apocryphal or not I don't know. . . . It seems to me now, [however,] as at the time, that it has every mark of authenticity." Personal letter, July 22, 1965. But regardless of the veracity of this story, an historically documented source cor-

- roborates its relevance. As Warren Moscow notes, "the Irish vote was nearly always so 'safe' that . . . Murphy . . . was constantly on the lookout for some good Protestant to run for public office, to pick up some additional support. The Irish were his, regardless." *Politics in the Empire State* (New York, 1948), pp. 44-45.
48. Lowi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor*, p. 41. As he notes, it is axiomatic that "the representation of a new minority in places of power occurs long after it has reached considerable size in the population and electorate" (p. 39).
49. Sayre and Kaufman, *Governing New York City: Politics in the Metropolis*, pp. 694-695.
50. New York *Herald Tribune*, May 4, 1924, EPKC.

Notes to Chapter IV

1. See Friedman, *The Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer*, pp. 15-20; Werner, *Tammany Hall*, pp. 529-530; Edwin Platt Tanner, "State Politics from Cleveland to Sulzer," *History of the State of New York*, ed. by Alexander C. Flick (New York, 1935), VII, 193.
 2. Friedman, *The Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer*, pp. 45-50. Apparently, Sulzer finally appointed John N. Carlisle to fill the highway department post. See *ibid.*, p. 89.
 3. Friedman (*ibid.*, p. 73) describes the Blauvelt bill as containing "a number of provisions intended to reduce the expense of the primary and election machinery, [proposing] an increase in the time allowed for filing independent designations for the primaries, and a reduction in the number of signatures required for independent nominations."
 4. *Ibid.*, p. 74. Evaluating the significance of this issue, one magazine argued that "if Governor Sulzer had been willing to yield this one point, and allow the politicians to have a primary-election law that retained the State convention, nothing would have been heard of any impeachment proceedings against him." *Review of Reviews*, XLVIII (September, 1913), 261. This analysis is somewhat simplistic; the roots of the impeachment were, as will be shown, more fundamental.
- Other provisions of the governor's bill included "the elimination of the party emblem from primary ballots, the prohibition of the use of party funds in primary elections, the framing of party platforms by a party council composed of members of the state committee and candidates for state offices, a reduction in the number of names required on a nominating petition, and publicity of all expenses incurred in connection with candidacies for nomination." Friedman, *The Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer*, p. 74.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
 6. New York *World*, April 28, 1913, EPKC.
 7. Friedman, *The Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer*, pp. 88-92.
 8. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 125. The concurrent resolution providing for the inquiry was introduced on June 25 by Republican Senator George F. Thompson. According to Friedman, its wording can be found in the *Senate Journal*, Vol. II, Appendix II, 77-78.

10. The above and following information on the Articles of Impeachment is taken from the Proceedings of the Court for the Trial of Impeachments, *The People of the State of New York by the Assembly thereof against William Sulzer, as Governor* (Albany, 1913), I, 46-55, EPKC, hereafter cited as *Impeachment Proceedings*. The final vote on the articles is recorded in *ibid.*, II, 1723 and *passim*. The impeachment turned mainly on campaign financing, as described in Article I. Sulzer's statement had listed receipts of \$5460 from 68 contributors, balanced against expenditures of \$7724.09, but the article charged that he neglected to mention another \$8500 in checks from eleven contributors. Estimates on unreported cash contributions ranged as high as \$43,950. See also *Impeachment of Gov. Sulzer*, EPKC, a compilation of newspaper opinion edited under the auspices of the New York World.

11. *Impeachment Proceedings*, I, 54.

12. Quoted in the New York *Mail*, November 3, 1917, EPKC. While Sulzer gloried in the role of the injured saint, journalists and political personalities testified to his unscrupulousness. Republican William Stiles Bennet, active in national politics, noted, first, that Sulzer undertook some questionable dealings in connection with furnishing the executive mansion. Sulzer reputedly returned a \$700 rug to W. M. Whitney & Company for credit to his *personal* account. Bennet further states, "He was also in two or three shady transactions in connection with the buying and selling of stocks. The Democrats handled it very admirably. They impeached him on somewhat general grounds—very few of these specific things—and then went around to the Republicans, whose votes they had to have, and showed them what they really had. For the credit of the state, they weren't bringing those things forward." *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1951), II, 118.

13. Quoted in New York *Evening Post*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.

14. This process was gradual and comparative, to a certain extent. The more blatant examples of graft tied to immorality were quickly eradicated, but at least during McClellan's administrations vestiges of the old order continued. For example, the Fire Department found that it had purchased rotten hoses, and contractors sold worn-out cobblestones to the city "at the price of first-class Belgian block." New York *Mail*, February 12, 1918, EPKC.

15. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, p. 3.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

17. *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1950), p. 3.

18. David Loth, *Public Plunder: A History of Graft in America* (New York, 1938), p. 215, EPKC.

19. Although Murphy apparently helped to found the company during his tenure as Dock Commissioner, the extent—if any—of his subsequent involvement in its activities is unclear. According to Zink, *City Bosses in the United States*, pp. 161-162, John Murphy, Gaffney, and Richard Crouch "owned five shares

- each of the stock of the company, and the remaining eighty-five shares belonged to some mysterious person whose identity never came to light."
20. *New York Mail*, February 12, 1918, EPKC; Stebbins, *Tammany Hall: Its History, Organization, and Methods*, p. 76, EPKC; Myers, *The History of Tammany Hall*, p. 311.
 21. Stebbins, *Tammany Hall: Its History, Organization, and Methods*, p. 76. The contract covered construction of roadbed and tracks for the New York, Westchester and Boston Railroad, a subsidiary of the New Haven. See also Allan Franklin, *The Trail of the Tiger* (New York, 1928), p. 279, EPKC.
 22. *New York Mail*, February 12, 1918, EPKC.
 23. Stebbins, *Tammany Hall: Its History, Organization, and Methods*, p. 76.
 24. *New York World*, September 5, 1913, EPKC.
 25. Stebbins, *Tammany Hall: Its History, Organization, and Methods*, p. 84.
 26. For example, in Rockland County, the Tammany district leader contracted to rebuild three miles of road for \$31,000, which money he got even though the road of sand and broken stone (instead of gravel, as specified) broke up in the first storm. The execution of another contract saw the local Democratic boss receive \$10,000 over the original contract price, even though the road was only half as thick and two and one-half feet less wide than originally stipulated. Editorial, *New York Globe*, August 24, 1913, EPKC.
 27. See Friedman, *The Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer*, p. 46.
 28. Myers, *The History of Tammany Hall*, p. 389.
 29. Quoted in Barry, "Mr. Murphy—the Politicians' Politician," 54.
 30. Friedman, *The Impeachment of Governor William Sulzer*, pp. 262–263.
 31. *The People of the State of New York against Charles F. Murphy*, Arthur J. Baldwin, Ernest B. Walden, John A. McCarthy, James E. Smith and Corn Products Refining Company (a corporation). Supreme Court, County of New York, in extraordinary term, 1918, p. 1, EPKC. Hereinafter cited as *Corn Products Case*. As 1918 was a war year, supplies of glucose were restricted by the United States Government, and the Corn Products Refining Company (a Standard Oil concern) appeared to be the only eastern seaboard source of large quantities of the corn syrup.
 32. *Ibid.*, p. 2; *New York Sun*, October 20, 1919, EPKC.
 33. *New York Sun*, October 20, 1919, EPKC.
 34. *New York World*, October 22, 1919, EPKC.
 35. Quoted in *ibid.*, October 26, 1919, EPKC. This same insistence is repeated in substance in the *New York Times*, April 20, 1923. Murphy's suit was based on Hartog's failure to form a legal corporation after Murphy had paid for stock in it. See *ibid.*, April 23, 1923.
 36. *New York Post*, January 14, 1923, EPKC. This article documents the resolution of the \$10,000,000 suit, but it also mentions previous settlement of the \$175,000 suit. The article may have been incorrectly dated because on April 23 the *New York World* reported that the latter case would either have to be retried or settled out of court, since the jury could not come to an agreement. I find no other mention of an end to the suit in which Murphy was the plaintiff. The available documentation is patently confusing.
 37. *New York World*, October 26, 1919, EPKC. Murphy's explanation appears

to be valid and sufficient. Hartog, of course, alleged that Murphy left the business because an impending increase in taxes to 80 percent would have cut his annual profits to \$50,000, which would have been too slow a return on his original investment (*New York Times*, April 18, 1923). Somehow, this argument is not convincing; furthermore, Murphy denied having any conversations on the tax rate, as Hartog stated. Also, Jimmy Hines' testimony corroborated Murphy's stated reasons for withdrawing (*ibid.*, April 19, 1923). Considering that the trial was held *after* the Hines-Murphy split (when Murphy tried to oust Hines as leader of the Eleventh District in Harlem, in 1920), there seems to be no reason why Hines would have been covering for the boss.

38. *New York Telegraph*, August 3, 1920, EPKC. According to the court brief, Murphy and/or Arthur Baldwin (his lawyer) had suggested that Hartog doctor (actually just omit) several bookkeeping entries so that Murphy would gain a greater profit and get the return on his investment in a shorter period of time without paying unduly heavy taxes. Baldwin further urged that Hartog do business as an individual, rather than a corporation, in order to avoid extra levies. *Corn Products Case*, pp. 4-5.

39. *New York World*, April 23, 1923, EPKC.

40. Quoted in *New York Mail*, April 30, 1924, EPKC.

41. Bennet, *Reminiscences*, II, 129.

42. These figures are computed on the basis of election returns tabulated in the *Annual Report of the Board of Elections of the City of New York for the Year Ending December 31st, 1913*, 18 and 20.

43. "Tammany's Waterloo," *Literary Digest*, XLVII (November 15, 1913), 927.

44. *New York Times*, November 2, 1913.

45. Foundation of the individual reforming groups is documented in the following articles: *New York World*, November 21, 1913; *ibid.*, December 13, 1913; *New York Evening Post*, February 26, 1914; unidentified newspaper clipping, February 27, 1914, all in EPKC.

46. *New York Tribune*, February 3, 1914, and *New York Press*, February 4, 1914, EPKC.

47. The identity of this article is unsure, but it is probably from the *New York World*, February 4, 1914, EPKC.

48. *Ibid.*, February 6, 1914, EPKC.

49. Unidentified newspaper clipping, EPKC.

50. *New York Sun*, July 14, 1912; *New York Tribune*, August 14, 1912, both in EPKC. Roosevelt dubbed his insurgent organization the Empire State Democracy.

51. *New York Tribune*, February 26, 1914, EPKC. In his autobiography McAdoo denies the motives documented by the newspapers. Commenting on his supposed hostility to Murphy over the gubernatorial nomination, he says, "I could have had the nomination. Tammany did not refuse to give it to me. I declined to take it." William Gibbs McAdoo, *Crowded Years* (Boston and New York, 1931), p. 169. Notably, McAdoo makes no further allusions to his anti-Murphy activities.

52. Arthur Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom* (Princeton, 1956), pp. 165 and 168.

53. New York *Tribune*, February 26, 1914, EPKC. For a description of the circumstances surrounding the appointment of the Collector of the Port, construed as an anti-Tammany move, see Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom*, pp. 165-168, and John Morton Blum, *Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era* (Boston, 1951), p. 78.
54. New York *American*, November 9, 1914, EPKC.
55. New York *Press*, February 10, 1914, EPKC.
56. See Link, *Wilson: The New Freedom*, pp. 169-172, and Blum, *Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era*, pp. 79-80.
57. New York *Sun*, July 24, 1917, EPKC.
58. New York *Times*, August 20, 1917, EPKC.
59. New York *Sun*, August 21, 1917, EPKC.
60. New York *Times*, August 27, 1917, EPKC.
61. New York *Post*, August 24, 1917, EPKC. The *Post* predicted a swift multiplication of Tammany defections, and downgraded the Hall's chances in the coming election. Both prognostications turned out to be mistaken.
62. Hylan won 313,956 votes, as compared to his nearest opponent, Mitchel, with just 155,497. These figures are computed on the basis of information in the "Official Canvass of the Votes Cast in the Counties of New York, Bronx, Kings, Queens and Richmond at the Election Held November 6, 1917," 25, 160, 225, 315, and 338.

Notes to Chapter V

1. See Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, and Arthur Mann, ed., *The Progressive Era: Liberal Renaissance or Liberal Failure?* (New York, 1963).
2. *Reminiscences*, pp. 59-60. In 1915 Binkerd, an upstater, served as a member of the New York Constitutional Convention, and from 1917 through 1919 he was assistant to the chairman of the Association of Railway Executives.
3. Riordon, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*, pp. 41, 43, 44.
4. Editorial, New York *World*, May 2, 1922, EPKC.
5. New York *Journal*, April 25, 1924, EPKC. On the Baltimore convention see Blum, *Joe Tumulty and the Wilson Era*, pp. 45-46; McAdoo, *Crowded Years*, Chapter X; Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (Princeton, 1947), Chapter XIII.
6. New York *Journal*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.
7. New York *World*, March 5, 1913, EPKC.
8. New York *Mail*, February 14, 1913, EPKC.
9. New York *World*, March 5, 1913, EPKC.
10. On the 1916 convention, see Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters: Facing War, 1915-1917* (Garden City, New York, 1937), pp. 245-261.
11. "Notables at the Big Conventions," *Collier's*, LVII (July 1, 1916), 19. But the New York *Times* of July 7, 1920, reflected (probably more accurately) that, while Tammany acquiesced in Wilson's renomination, it did so with little joy.

12. New York *American* and New York *Tribune*, September 23, 1916, EPKC. The agreement, as outlined by these newspapers, also involved demands for some Tammany recognition in the patronage market in Washington, and for a curb on possible opposition to Tammany's plan to name Robert F. Wagner for mayor and Al Smith for Manhattan borough president in the coming city contest. Needless to say, neither of the latter predictions was attempted. On the cooperation with the National Committee, see the New York *World*, September 23, 1916, EPKC.
13. Despite charges and countercharges that Tammany "knifed" the Wilson ticket in New York, there was at least one explanation for the President's poor showing in the city. Some district leaders "claimed that hyphenated New Yorkers—the German-Americans and the Irish-Americans—did not support the Democratic ticket because of the Wilson Administration's support of France and England in the war." See Herbert Mitgang, *The Man Who Rode the Tiger: The Life and Times of Judge Samuel Seabury* (Philadelphia and New York, 1963), p. 123.
14. New York *Journal*, April 25, 1924, EPKC. According to the New York *Times* of July 7, 1920, Murphy, George Brennan of Illinois, and E. H. Moore of Ohio were the "leaders of the Cox forces."
15. Farley interview.
16. Handlin, *Al Smith and His America*, p. 115.
17. "The Greatest Triumph of Tammany Hall," *World's Work*, XL (September, 1920), 426.
18. New York *Times*, July 7, 1920. As the *Times* remembered it, "not within forty years at least has the candidate really favored by Tammany been chosen as the Democratic nominee."
19. New York *Sun*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
20. Charles Willis Thompson, "The Three Musketeers of French Lick," *New York Times Magazine* (December 9, 1923), 3.
21. New York *Times*, November 13, 1923.
22. This remark, made in 1924, is reported in the New York *American*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.
23. Krock, *Reminiscences*, pp. 4–5. Krock describes Murphy's elaborate preparations for the encounter with Hull. In his insistence that everything be executed according to a step-by-step plan, the Tammany boss reminded Krock of a fourteenth-century Italian ruler.
24. New York *Herald Tribune*, April 26, 1924, EPKC. And, reported the *Herald Tribune*, he "stood a good chance of aligning Senator [Oscar] Underwood [of Alabama] with the others."
25. New York *Times*, April 27, 1924.
26. Pell, *Reminiscences*, II, 329.
27. Farley interview.
28. New York *Times*, April 27, 1924.
29. Pell, *Reminiscences*, II, 330.
30. *Ibid.*, pp. 330–331. Ed Flynn, *You're the Boss*, p. 44, and Jeremiah Mahoney agree. Mahoney insists that Smith's 1924 candidacy would have been a mistake

in any event, because the Republicans were then unbeatable. As he says, "... you could never drive the rascals out when the dinner pail was full. In 1924 God Almighty couldn't have won on the Democratic ticket." *Reminiscences*, p. 73. James Farley suggests that the Democrats' prospects might have been more favorable if the party had been in a position to exploit the recently unearthed Teapot Dome scandal. But somehow the vices of the Harding era faded beneath general prosperity and the image of Democratic disunity. Farley draws a useful parallel to the spectacle provided at the 1964 Republican National Convention, and its effect upon that party's fortunes in the November election. Farley interview.

31. As the *New York World* (editorial, May 2, 1922, EPKC) continues, the people also show "the least concern in the government that is closest to them. Otherwise there would be no Crokers and no Murphys, and the Hearsts would find nobody ready to do business with them."

32. Paterson, "Murphy," 353.

33. This phrase was coined by New York Senator Joseph O'Mahoney in his *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1958), p. 17.

34. This statement is reportedly part of a conversation between Murphy and Lieutenant-Governor George R. Lunn not long before Murphy's death. Lunn asked Murphy if Tammany had always been the kind of organization it was then. The source is Hoey, "Hon. Charles F. Murphy," 237.

35. *New York Post*, April 9, 1915, EPKC.

36. Flynn, *You're the Boss*, p. 130.

37. See Krock, *Reminiscences*, p. 3. "It was a great thing for Murphy," Krock says, "when he could afford to have an absolutely honorable ... son-in-law. That was an accomplishment like the accomplishment of some other humble person who had worked hard and was able to send his son to Yale."

38. Fowler, *Beau James: The Life and Times of Jimmy Walker*, p. 85. Had Murphy lived, Walker's friends and family felt that he would have been able to restrain the mayor's later indiscretions and unfortunate involvements (p. 110). Fowler reports that Walker respected only his own father more than he did Charles F. Murphy (p. 11).

39. Joseph M. Proskauer, *A Segment of My Times* (New York, 1950), pp. 42-43. Proskauer, later a distinguished jurist (and early active in the Citizens Union), served as Smith's campaign manager in 1920 and 1922.

40. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 42. This conversation, Proskauer recalls, took place somewhat after the election of 1918 at Murphy's Long Island estate.

41. See Handlin, *Al Smith and His America*, pp. 74-77. Observing that many of Smith's appointees were independents and even Republicans, William V. Shannon notes, "It is curious that Charles Murphy and his Tammany associates who had broken and impeached Governor Sulzer a few years earlier over this very issue of patronage should have been so tolerant of Smith's enlightened approach." *The American Irish*, p. 160.

42. Geoffrey Parsons, *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1949), p. 21. Parsons wrote for several New York newspapers.

34. J. Joseph Huthmacher, "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles Francis Murphy:

The Metamorphosis of Progressivism," *New York History*, XLVI (January, 1965), 28.

44. Mahoney interview.

45. *Ibid.*

46. Alfred E. Smith, *Up to Now—An Autobiography* (New York, 1929), p. 121.

47. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 122.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

49. Mahoney, personal letter, December 22, 1964, and *Reminiscences*, p. 63. "From that time [1919] on," he continued in his letter, "the Board practically met once a month and played a great part in the continued success of Tammany Hall. . . . It was only after the end of Murphy's leadership that the 'War Board' ceased to exist as an active body."

Judge Joseph M. Proskauer corroborates Mahoney's recollections of this advisory council. In 1918, he reports, Al Smith's gubernatorial campaign "was supervised by what was called a 'War Board.' Around its table sat not only independents like myself, but such members of the regular Tammany organization as Robert F. Wagner, James A. Foley, James J. Hoey, John Godfrey Saxe, and several others who lived to achieve distinction in the Senate, the courts and the councils of the nation." *A Segment of My Times*, p. 42.

50. Mahoney, *Reminiscences*, p. 63.

51. *Ibid.*

52. Benjamin Parke De Witt, *The Progressive Movement: A Non-partisan, Comprehensive Discussion of Current Trends in American Politics* (New York, 1915), p. 189.

53. Huthmacher, "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles Francis Murphy: The Metamorphosis of Progressivism," 26. See also Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes*, I, 211 and 213.

54. Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes*, I, 212.

55. Huthmacher, "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles Francis Murphy: The Metamorphosis of Progressivism," 26.

56. *Ibid.*, and Pusey, *Charles Evans Hughes*, I, 212 and 259-262.

57. The best—and most graphic—description of the fire and its implications can be found in Leon Stein's *The Triangle Fire* (New York and Philadelphia, 1962).

58. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

59. Handlin, *Al Smith and His America*, p. 56.

60. Stein, *The Triangle Fire*, pp. 134-135.

61. *Ibid.*, pp. 158 and 198-200.

62. Handlin, *Al Smith and His America*, p. 56.

63. Moscow, *Politics in the Empire State*, p. 10.

64. Stein, *The Triangle Fire*, p. 210.

65. In 1912 the Republicans regained control of the Assembly, and, according to Smith, the only really "outstanding constructive achievement was the passage of the resolution proposing an amendment to the state constitution to permit the enactment by the legislature of a workmen's compensation law and certain of the recommendations of the Factory Investigating Commission which had been in active operation for more than six months." Smith, *Up to Now—An Autobiography*, p. 122.

66. New York *Times*, January 7, 1913.
67. These figures are derived from information in *ibid.*, December 12 and 13, 1913.
68. Quoted in Emily Smith Warner, *The Happy Warrior: A Biography of My Father, Alfred E. Smith* (Garden City, New York, 1956), p. 70.
69. New York *Times*, March 15, 1913.
70. *Ibid.*, April 5, 1913.
71. *Ibid.*, May 11, 1913.
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.*, May 4, 1913.
74. *Ibid.*
75. Huthmacher, "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles Francis Murphy: The Metamorphosis of Progressivism," 31. On May 17 Sulzer signed the Widows' Pension Compensation Bill, allocating \$15,000 for a 15-man commission which would report to the 1914 legislature. New York *Times*, May 18, 1913. According to Huthmacher, the final provisions for such pensions were incorporated in the Child Welfare Act, which did not win approval until 1915.
76. New York *Times*, May 4, 1913.
77. Huthmacher, "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles Francis Murphy: The Metamorphosis of Progressivism," 31.
78. New York *Times*, February 21, 1913.
79. *Ibid.*, March 8, 1913. Another bill signed March 14 concerned capital of title, credit guaranty and security guaranty corporations. *Ibid.*, March 15, 1913.
80. *Ibid.*, December 13, 1913.
81. Sulzer signed these on May 19. *Ibid.*, May 20, 1913.
82. The New York *Times* reported the signing of this bill in articles on both May 27 and June 1, 1913.
83. Huthmacher, "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles Francis Murphy: The Metamorphosis of Progressivism," 31.
84. New York *Times*, May 2, 1913. This bill was among those vetoed in Sulzer's wrath over direct primaries. See above, p. 57.
85. Huthmacher, "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles Francis Murphy: The Metamorphosis of Progressivism," 31.
86. New York *Times*, March 14, 1913.
87. *Ibid.*, April 23, 1913.
88. *Ibid.*, May 4, 1913.
89. *Ibid.*
90. *Ibid.*
91. Warner, *The Happy Warrior: A Biography of My Father, Alfred E. Smith*, p. 73; Smith, *Up to Now—An Autobiography*, p. 126.
92. New York *Times*, December 9 and 13, 1913.
93. *Ibid.*, May 17 and December 12, 1913.
94. *Ibid.*, December 13, 1913.
95. *Ibid.*, May 4, 1913.
96. *Ibid.*, January 24 and 28, 1913. According to the latter, in order to become

part of the Constitution, the amendment faced passage by another legislative session and acceptance in a popular vote.

97. *Ibid.*, December 12, 1913. According to the *Times*, the bill was similar to the one that twice met defeat under Sulzer's governorship.

98. *Ibid.* There is a statistical discrepancy here. According to the listings in the *Times* of December 13, 1913, the vote was 38-6 on the Massachusetts ballot.

99. *Ibid.*, January 15 and 16, 1913. The Assembly approved the amendment by a vote of 128-4, and the Senate, 43-4. Massachusetts and Minnesota had already ratified it.

100. *Ibid.*, December 12, 1913.

101. *Ibid.*, December 13, 1913.

102. *Ibid.*

103. *Ibid.*, December 9, 1913. The *Times* noted talk among many Tammanyites of "introducing bills providing for the initiative and referendum, the recall of public officials, and even of judicial decisions, as suggested in the Bull Moose platform." None of these measures, however, got off the ground in that session.

104. *Ibid.*

105. Smith, *Up to Now—An Autobiography*, pp. 133 ff. Charles S. Whitman served as governor from 1915 through 1918.

106. Steffens, *Autobiography*, p. 377.

107. The progressive outlook was not merely confined to this four-year legislative spurt. In 1922 Jeremiah Mahoney was chairman of the Platform Resolutions Committee at the Syracuse convention. One of the planks he urged dealt with stock exchange regulation. Mahoney gained Murphy's approval, but the provision was scratched at the insistence of Joseph Proskauer. Mahoney delights in his thought-provoking quip to Franklin Roosevelt. "Franklin," he said one day, "Charlie Murphy and myself were fourteen years ahead of you with SEC." Among the other measures which the state platform chairman advocated were "unemployment insurance, old age pensions, [and] monopolization of the state insurance fund." Years before the Lehmans or the Roosevelts ever put their policies to work, these Tammany fellows, according to Mahoney, "were doing the advocating of all these things to produce social security. . . . And we created the foundation upon which others built This all started with Charles F. Murphy." *Reminiscences*, pp. 46 and 50.

108. One of the most provocative revisionists of Progressivism is J. Joseph Huthmacher, whose illuminating insights into the dual nature of the movement's leaders are best expressed in "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles Francis Murphy: The Metamorphosis of Progressivism," *passim*, and in "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XLIX (September, 1962), 231-241, reprinted under the title of "The Urban Masses on the Move" in Mann, ed., *The Progressive Era: Liberal Renaissance or Liberal Failure?*, pp. 40-47.

109. *Up to Now—An Autobiography*, p. 121.

110. *You're the Boss*, p. 39.

111. Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York, 1946), pp. 24-25.

112. *New York Times*, April 26, 1924.

113. As one perceptive writer explained it, Tammany's leaders "still speak of 'idealism' with that scorn with which practical men view the impracticable. But when an idealistic programme has won a sufficient body of support to count in politics, Tammany is quick to adopt it." William L. Chenery, "So This Is Tammany Hall!" *Atlantic*, CXXXIV (September, 1924), 318.
114. New York *Evening World*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
115. See Flynn, *You're the Boss*, p. 39.
116. Barry, "Mr. Murphy—the Politicians' Politician," 54.
117. The humble people from whom he sprang felt a kinship with Murphy and affirmed their appreciation of his work. Labor spokesman Peter J. Brady eulogized the Commissioner as "one of [labor's] best friends. . . . He never failed to help us when we needed his powerful aid to push labor legislation. Many of the provisions of the labor law and the workmen's compensation act were due to his wholehearted support of these measures, regardless of whom they hit." New York *Telegram and Evening Mail*, April 25, 1924, EPKC.
118. Farley interview.
119. Smith, *Up to Now—An Autobiography*, pp. 281–282.
120. Barry, "Mr. Murphy—the Politicians' Politician," 54.
121. New York *Journal*, October, 1911, EPKC.
122. Ferdinand Pecora, *Reminiscences* (Oral History Project, Columbia University, 1962), I, 273. John Heffernan recalls the appointment of Brooklyn doctor Joseph O'Connell as Health Officer of the Port. "Joe," Murphy said, "I want you to go down there and make good. If you're bothered by any patronage question or by any politician or anything like that, send him to me. I'll take care of him." *Reminiscences*, p. 67.
123. Pecora, *Reminiscences*, I, 271–273. On the subject of appointments, Pecora suggests that Murphy consistently refused to name a Catholic as district attorney or as police commissioner, because of the possible susceptibility of these men to intercessions on behalf of accused criminals from members of the clergy. At the time Pecora was an assistant in the district attorney's office. *Reminiscences*, III, 630–631, and Pecora interview.
124. Farley interview. For Jeremiah Mahoney, Murphy's devotion to the fortunes of the party distinguished him from his line of successors, who were "small men . . . anxious to be successful financially." Despite their probable honesty, these leaders, like John F. Curry, "didn't have the same interest in the success of the party . . . that Murphy had. He was *proud* of the fact that the party became great and powerful during the time that he was the voice of the party." Mahoney interview.
125. Perhaps the only time Murphy went on record on world affairs was when he came out with a plea for world disarmament. See the New York *Times*, December 27, 1920. And, in that same year, the Hall publicized plans for an Americanization campaign to fight "the spread of Bolshevism" and "the seeds of discord sown by extremists." See the New York *World*, February 3, 1920, and the New York *American*, February 23, 1920, both in EPKC. But these statements certainly did not represent a coherent policy.

Notes to Chapter VI

1. *Reminiscences*, p. 5.
2. Quoted in Fowler, *Beau James: The Life and Times of Jimmy Walker*, p. 11. Calvary Cemetery was located on Boundary Avenue in Queens.
3. Quoted in *New York Times*, April 23, 1922, EPKC. The term "human spectacles" appears in this article.
4. *Ibid.*
5. This testimonial comes from Mayor Gaynor in 1910. It is repeated in Smith, *William Jay Gaynor, Mayor of New York*, p. 79.
6. Editorial, *New York Morning Telegraph*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.
7. Quoted in Hoey, "Hon. Charles F. Murphy," 236.
8. *Ibid.*
9. Murphy was succeeded by George W. Olvany, local lawyer and judge. "... [The] men who had been held in check by Murphy ran over the easy-going Olvany and brought Tammany into disrepute. Never before had there been a more striking illustration of the fact that the boss makes the machine.
"The machine began to run amuck, and so grasping and indifferent to public welfare were the members of the organization that Olvany, while building a lucrative law practice, lost all control of the district leaders. Tammany became a squabbling, disunited group, with the motto 'every man for himself.' The restrained policies of Murphy were forgotten in the quick lust for money and power. It was in this period that the city debt first began to rise and that office-holders were created with complete disregard for the payroll.
"Again, Tammany began to commit all the breaches of public decency that had brought about its downfall in past decades."
Within five years, even the Hall recognized how bad Olvany was, and banished the unsuccessful leader from the organization. John F. Curry was then elected leader. Although "one of the outstanding district leaders of the city," Curry "had neither the strength nor the qualifications to meet the larger problems of city, State and national affairs.
"Mr. Curry brought to his office the attitude of a district leader who for years had devoted himself to getting jobs for his followers. He had more persons on the city payroll as district leader than any other leader in town, and his whole political philosophy was based upon the importance of building up the city payroll with his own supporters. When that policy was put into city affairs its effect upon the city finances was immediate." *New York Times*, November 8, 1933. By the time Curry fell, New York was enjoying the early years of the La Guardia administration. This *Times* article (comparatively favorable to Murphy, though the *Times* was hardly a Murphy partisan) is an historical review of the various Tammany bosses in light of the Democracy's defeat at the hands of Fusion in the 1933 mayoralty election.
10. Hofstadter, *The Age of Reform*, p. 301.
11. Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (2nd ed., rev., New York, 1956), p. 30.
12. For a graphic, fictionalized description of the demise of political bosses in

the face of the New Deal, see Edwin O'Connor, *The Last Hurrah* (New York, 1956), pp. 101 and 330.

13. Handlin, *The Uprooted*, p. 224.

14. Glazer and Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*, p. 229. As William V. Shannon explains it, "the Tweed group," for instance, "simply did not know what to do with the machinery of government once it was theirs except to steal openly whatever was not nailed down." *The American Irish*, p. 70.

15. New York *Evening World*, May 3, 1924, EPKC.

16. Mahoney, *Reminiscences*, p. 14.

17. May 3, 1924, AIHS. The *Gaelic American* continued to claim for Murphy "many of the endearing characteristics of his race, not the least of which were his sympathy for the underdog and his never failing generosity to the poor and the afflicted."

18. While early estimates of his estate hovered near \$450,000 (*New York Times*, May 10, 1924, EPKC), the Tammany leader actually left holdings totalling \$2,170,761.22, divided as follows: real estate, \$272,300.00; cash, \$6,693.89; personal effects, \$7,236.10; mortgages, notes, etc., \$36,566.79; stocks and bonds, \$1,601,288.67; other property, \$246,675.00. *New York World*, November 27, 1925, EPKC.

No one seems to know just where Murphy's money came from. One friend once said, as was already quite clear, "As you and I look at wealth, Murphy is a very wealthy man." And yet, there are some guidelines from which we may begin to speculate about his fortune. W. Axel Warms notes, quite properly, that "as Dock Commissioner he was in a position to award dock facilities to the Knickerbocker Ice Company when that concern was intent on freezing out its rivals. When the ice investigation followed, Murphy stood revealed with a substantial block of the company's stock in his name." "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5.

Early, although generally unidentified, investments were "exceedingly lucky" for Murphy. According to the *New York Weekly Union*, October 18, 1902, AIHS, "In real estate, in stocks and bonds he watched the market and turned over his purchases at the right time and a streak of good luck attended him."

Real estate holdings were a sure, although admittedly limited, source of revenue. Newspaper accounts of the disposition of his estate listed as many as sixteen different buildings in Manhattan. Most were multi-story dwellings in the Gas House-Stuyvesant Square area. There are no accurate statistics on the value of the property, although the most conservative estimate held it at more than \$300,000. For details see the *New York Times*, December 20 and 31, 1924.

19. Barry, "Mr. Murphy—the Politicians' Politician," 54.

20. See, for example, Flynn, *You're the Boss*, p. 38.

21. *Harlem Home News*, May 20, 1922, EPKC. This article is a comparative evaluation of Murphy and Croker by former Governor Martin H. Glynn. Glynn says that "Croker with his methods could not succeed in New York City today, while in all probability Murphy with his methods, if transplanted back to Croker's time, would be stronger than even Croker was with his rod of iron,

his policy of force." His particularly apt conclusion is that Croker "would have insisted upon the mountain coming to him and would have been broken; he never could have learned to go to the mountain—and win—as Murphy has."

22. Steffens, *Autobiography*, p. 390.

23. See, for example, editorials in the *New York World* and the *New York Times*, April 26, 1924, EPKC.

24. As Murphy once told a woman reporter in French Lick, "I am not really as bad as the papers and magazines paint me, although I don't mind what they say, as long as I and God know it is not so; and I've got a heart, too." *New York World*, November 18, 1917, EPKC.

25. Recounted in the *New York Evening Post*, April 25, 1924, EPKC. The earliest source for this often-repeated anecdote seems to be Warms, "Charles Francis Murphy, Human Being," 5.

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KILROE COLLECTION

The major source of primary materials for this study has been the Edwin P. Kilroe Collection of Tammaniana, housed in the Special Collections Room of Columbia University's Butler Library. The collection includes over forty large scrapbooks of newspaper clippings and miscellaneous items dating back to the origin of the first Tammany Society in the 1780's, but the newspaper coverage is directed mainly toward events of the first three decades of this century, and is most comprehensive during the years 1907-1928. Every important New York newspaper is represented; the scope of the scrapbooks includes not only Tammany activities, but a detailed chronology of all political life in New York City, plus useful commentaries on state and national affairs. There are also thirty-two volumes of magazine articles, numerous pictures relating to the Tammany Society, and assorted memorabilia, including campaign buttons and programs from annual district balls. Beyond this primary source material, the collection includes many books on American politics and on New York City, records of court proceedings (like the impeachment of Governor Sulzer or the Corn Products indictment), and manuscripts of Kilroe's articles and lectures on the Tammany Society. The individual scrapbooks are not indexed, but the collection is catalogued chronologically.

Edwin Patrick Kilroe (1880-1953) was a New York City lawyer active in Tammany affairs in the Nineteenth Assembly District (according to district numbering when Murphy led the Eighteenth). Centered at the Monongahela Democratic Club, the Nineteenth was perhaps best known for its insurgent leader, James J. Hines. From at least 1912-1914 Kilroe served as chairman of the District's Democratic General Committee. He was well known for his illustrated lectures on the history of Tammany societies in New York and other parts of the country. Kilroe gave his collection of Tammany artifacts to Columbia University in 1942.

The designation "EPKC" will be used in the bibliography for non-scrapbook material found in the Kilroe Collection.

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Huthmacher, J. Joseph. "Charles Evans Hughes and Charles F. Murphy: The Metamorphosis of Progressivism." Paper delivered at the American Historical Association Convention, Chicago, 1962.

Professor Huthmacher's paper is extremely useful in pointing up the relationship between Murphy, Smith, Wagner, and the reforms enacted

in the New York State Legislature at the height of the Progressive Era. Yet, his analysis of the immigrant urban masses as creative reformers must be inspected more closely. The reader must question more fully the reasons behind Murphy's support for the progressive measures he championed.

Impeachment of Gov. Sulzer. EPKC.

This pamphlet is mainly a collection of editorial comment on the impeachment, but it also includes proceedings of the Frawley Investigating Committee. The editors' sympathies are anti-Sulzer. The pamphlet was compiled under the auspices of the *New York World*.

Kilroe, Edwin P., Abraham Kaplan, and Joseph Johnson. "The Story of Tammany." *Tammany: A Patriotic History, 1786-1924*. New York: New York County Democratic Committee, June, 1924, EPKC.

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This is a collection of reprints from the press, largely favorable to Sulzer. It also includes the text of the Hennessy Report, issued after the investigation of state government departments initiated during the Sulzer administration.

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